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Since the beginning of the war on terror, the US has intensified security efforts in Africa, promoting 
regional initiatives and increasing bilateral cooperation with local governments to fight terrorism on 
the ground. Yet, despite Washington’s attempts, Islamist violence on the continent is on the rise. 
What is more, several of US African partners have been criticised for overstepping legal boundaries 
in the conduct of counter-terrorism operations, committing human rights violations against African 
people. This study fills a longstanding gap in the literature by exploring whether, and above all, how 
post-9/11 US security policies may have a negative impact on radicalisation in African states, 
increasing dynamics culminating with mobilisation into terrorism. Relying on a critical theory-
inspired research orientation, it sets up an innovative and interdisciplinary framework, shifting the 
emphasis to local politics as a determinant for the impact of US policies and pointing to dynamics of 
violent interaction between African states and their population as a crucial dimension of 
radicalisation. Incorporating analytical elements from the research on remote warfare, security 
assistance and the role of agency, and social movements, the proposed framework develops around a 
three-step causal mechanism hypothesised to connect US policies to the increase in radicalisation on 
the ground. The mechanism posits that post-9/11 US security policies have a negative impact in 
African states characterised by the threat of terrorism and the use of indiscriminate repression against 
suspect groups by: 1) leading to the establishment of a partnership relationship within the framework 
of remote warfare; 2) from the partnership relationship, African states gain resources and room for 
manoeuvre to implement indiscriminate repression; 3) indiscriminate repression causes an increase 
in radicalisation in African states. To test such a mechanism, the research is designed as a case study, 
focusing on post-9/11 US security policies in Kenya by using theory-testing process tracing to 
identify the case-specific manifestations of the three steps. The research provides extensive evidence 
in support of the hypothesised mechanism in the case of Kenya, showing how US remote intervention, 
based on the provision of indirect support, has inadvertently contributed to fuelling the repressive 
campaign conducted by local security authorities against Muslims and ethnic Somalis, pushing the 
latter into the hands of the terrorist group Al-Shabaab. Such findings have significant implications, 
pointing to the need of context-sensitive security policies acknowledging the political drivers of 
terrorism and the limits of remote warfare in Kenya. At the same time, they make a theoretical 
contribution, setting the foundation for a more thorough approach towards the study of US efforts in 
Africa which, by overcoming divisions in the discipline, could help shape more sustainable and 
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Figure 3. Kenya: the north-eastern area 










Two decades have passed since the beginning of the war on terror and the reshaping of the US Africa 
policy. Yet, while Islamist violence on the continent is on the rise, we still know little about the 
consequences of American counter-terrorism initiatives in regard to the dynamics that nurture the 
jihadist threat on the ground. This work sheds light on these issues, exploring the effects of post-9/11 
US security policies on the increase in radicalisation in Africa. The following pages introduce the 
research question of the thesis, discussing the conceptual, theoretical and methodological choices that 
are made to answer it, as well as the ethical considerations that such choices imply.   
This chapter is composed of six sections. 
The first section sets out the research question and explains the rationale behind its formulation. 
The section provides a brief overview on previous works focusing on post-9/11 US security policies 
in Africa, identifying a gap in the literature for what concerns the analysis of the negative impact that 
such policies may have on dynamics of radicalisation on the ground.  
The second section presents the conceptual and theoretical choices made to answer the research 
question. The section introduces Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) as the research orientation adopted, 
outlining the benefits that such an orientation provides to the study of post-9/11 US security policies 
and the rise of terrorism in African states. Then, after having framed this research as a deductive 
study, the section introduces the research hypothesis and discusses its underlying theoretical 
framework.  
The third section focuses on the design and methodology of the research. The section shows that 
the research is designed as a case study, presenting US security policies in Kenya as the case chosen 
to test the validity of the hypothesis. Then, the section discusses the methodological choices that are 
made to conduct case study research, introducing process-tracing as the method used to explore causal 
connections between US security policies and radicalisation in Kenya.  
The fourth section deals with the ethics associated with this research. It examines ethical concerns 
that arise when exploring sensitive issues such as radicalisation and counter-terrorism, outlining the 
strategies adopted to address them.  
 The fifth section presents the findings of the research and highlights its contribution. The 
sections shows how this work provides strong evidence supporting the research hypothesis in the case 
under study, pointing out the empirical implications as well as the theoretical consequences that such 
evidence has for the study of post-9/11 US security policies in Africa.  
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Finally, the last section presents the structure of the thesis, providing an overview of the next 
chapters and their arguments.   
 
Background and research question 
Since the beginning of the war on terror, the US has invested a considerable amount of effort and 
resources in the promotion of African security. The last two decades have seen Washington 
developing a major security architecture in the continent, establishing military outposts, launching 
regional counter-terrorism initiatives and creating the first unified combatant command coordinating 
US activities on the ground: the Africa Command (AFRICOM) (Emerson 2014; Pham 2014; Turse 
2015; N. D. Allen 2018). US soldiers have been increasingly involved in the provision of security aid 
to African forces under a dense web of bilateral and regional assistance programmes, which have 
progressively turned into the epitome of a ‘light footprint’ approach designed to tackle terrorism “by, 
with and through” local partners (DOD 2018: 10; see Kandel 2014; Burchard and Burgess 2018). 
Furthermore, Africa has experienced a substantial increase in the use of unmanned drones by US 
forces seeking to neutralise the terrorist threat in critical areas (e.g., Bachman 2014; Moore and 
Walker 2016; Rinehart 2016).  
Yet, despite US initiatives, terrorism on the continent is on the rise, driven by the expansion of 
local groups affiliated with Daesh and Al-Qaeda, along with the emergence of new cells in countries 
historically spared from violent extremism. Several studies register a dramatic surge in Islamist 
terrorist activity during the last decade, noting how Africa hosts the majority of the states with the 
largest increase in terrorism worldwide (Adams 2020; ACSS 2020; IEP 2020; UN 2020). In this 
regard, an investigation shows that Islamist terrorist attacks increased fourfold between 2009 and 
2017, causing an 850 per cent increase in the number of deaths (Allison 2017a). Of particular concern 
is the marked rise in states receiving significant amounts of US assistance such as Mali, Niger and 
Burkina Faso, where attacks increased fivefold between 2016 and 2020 (Burke 2020).    
Research points to the political nature of the African state as a key obstacle to the effectiveness 
of US security efforts, noting how many of Washington’s allies on the ground tend to prioritise 
objectives related to the consolidation of power over counter-terrorism goals (e.g., Menkhaus 2009a; 
Solomon 2013; Metelits 2016; N. D. Allen 2018). Despite more and more states on the continent 
having authorised elections, Africa is still beset by authoritarian and illiberal regimes repressing 
political dissent and committing widespread human rights violations against their own populations 
(see e.g., Cheeseman 2019; AI 2020). According to data from Freedom House, in 2020 only nine out 
of fifty-four countries on the continent could be classified as ‘Free’ in terms of democracy and 
pluralism (Freedom House 2020; Temin 2020). Along these lines, studies emphasise how “violence 
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from militant Islamist groups still represents a relatively small share of total violence on the 
continent” (Donnenfeld 2019), which is largely caused by state forces (CFR 2020a). Exploring such 
trends, some authors raise serious concerns regarding long-term humanitarian and political 
consequences associated with the (indiscriminate) allocation of military and defence aid towards 
African governments (e.g., Hagmann and Reyntjens 2016).  
Such concerns, however, have often clashed with those of stakeholders, noting how disengaging 
from African allied forces risks further deteriorating security in a continent recently defined by the 
US State Department’s coordinator for counter-terrorism as a “key front in the next stage in the fight 
against terrorism” (quoted in Gardner 2020). In this view, making improvements to local security, 
even if minimal and in adverse conditions, can bring great benefits in the long run. Potential political 
and humanitarian repercussions of security initiatives have to be weighed against the drawbacks 
associated with inaction and non-intervention in some of the most vulnerable regions of the world. 
The logic behind such reasoning is captured by the words of the spokesperson of the US-led coalition 
against Daesh when confronted with the unintentional killing of civilians during counter-terrorism 
operations: “any unintentional loss of life during the defeat of [IS] is tragic. However it must be 
balanced against the risk of enabling [IS] to continue terrorist activities, causing pain and suffering 
to anyone they choose” (quoted in BBC 2019a). 
Still, what if the unintentional consequences of US policies in African states could jeopardise the 
very security objectives that Washington aims to achieve on the ground? What if, by resorting to 
illiberal and repressive allies, US policy makers could inadvertently fuel local instabilities, 
exacerbating the threat of terrorism? Could there be a causal relationship between post-9/11 US 
security policies and the increase in radicalisation in African states? Surprisingly, these crucial 
questions have received little academic attention. Some authors suggest that, when cooperating with 
African governments that engage in “corrupt and abusive behavior”, the US “might create more 
enemies among local populations than it eliminates” (Bruton and Williams 2014: 75; see also Klare 
and Volman 2006; Keenan 2013; Solomon 2015a on this argument). However, this scholarship has 
rarely, if ever, provided a detailed account of how post-9/11 US policies may contribute to the 
deterioration of security in African states, shedding light on the mechanism by which dynamics of 
radicalisation may be affected. Despite the increasing role played by African forces within the US 
counter-terrorism framework, the impact of US policies on local security “appear[s] to have remained 
relatively untested” (McInnis and Lucas 2015: 15).  
Such a state of affairs is largely due to the persistence of a major gap between the study of US 
interventionism and contemporary warfare in Africa on the one hand, and the study of radicalisation 
on the other. The scholarship has provided detailed accounts of post-9/11 US security efforts in 
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Africa, analysing the technical and logistical architecture set up by Washington in the last two decades 
to fight enemies on the ground. Still, such accounts have rarely intertwined with a study of how social 
actors in local theatres react to US policies, shedding light on local perceptions and objectives while 
exploring dynamics of mobilisation to violence. On the other hand, the research on terrorism and 
radicalisation has tended to prioritise a focus on militants and their organisations, often treating 
radicalisation as an apolitical process abstracted from a specific time and context (for a critique, see 
e.g., Jackson 2009; Jarvis 2009; Solomon 2015b; Tellidis 2016). Such a tendency has contributed to 
providing legitimacy to a view of militarised approaches as the most effective response to emerging 
threats on the ground, overlooking the impact that state actions and local security efforts may have 
on the expansion of terrorism.  
This research aims at filling the above gap by focusing on the primary research question: have 
post-9/11 US security policies had a negative impact on radicalisation in African states, and if so 
how?  
Here, the term ‘security policies’ is meant to encompass the spectrum of US military, diplomatic 
and intelligence initiatives and measures dealing with security in African states. These include direct 
forms of intervention through the deployment of US forces on the ground (both for combat and for 
more development-oriented activities) as well as indirect forms of intervention through the provision 
of support to local security authorities. For the purposes of this research, however, US military 
initiatives based on air power are excluded from the definition of security policies. Although, as 
mentioned above, in the last two decades Africa has seen a surge in the use of unmanned drones by 
the US, the reliance on such instruments as a means to achieve security objectives in African states 
has – so far – been relatively limited and circumscribed to specific areas (mostly Somalia and Libya). 
Drones might turn into a critical weapon in the next stage of the war on terror on the continent, as 
trends seem to suggest (Whitlock 2013; Penney et al. 2018; Turse, Moltke and Speri 2018). Still, they 
are unlikely to replace other forms of intervention as the major instrument to counter terrorism and 
achieve security objectives on the ground.  
As regards the term ‘radicalisation’, this research focuses on “behavioural” forms of 
radicalisation (Vidino 2010: 5; Neumann 2013: 873), exploring dynamics culminating with 
involvement in terrorist activities, rather than with the mere acquisition of a radical mindset. For this 
reason, the term radicalisation is employed to denote the process of mobilisation into terrorism.  
 
Research orientation, approach and hypothesis 
Overcoming the division between the study of US policies in Africa and that of radicalisation requires 
some specific conceptual, theoretical and methodological choices. This section deals with the first 
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two of such choices, introducing Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) as the research orientation guiding 
this work and presenting the research hypothesis with its underlying theoretical framework.  
Rather than representing a full-blown theory, CTS is conceivable, in broad terms, as a critical 
theory-inspired research orientation that “self-consciously adopts a sceptical attitude towards state-
centric understandings of terrorism and which does not take existing terrorism knowledge for granted 
but is willing to challenge widely held assumptions and beliefs” (Jackson 2007a: 246; see also e.g., 
Gunning 2007a; Jackson, Breen-Smyth and Gunning 2009a; Jarvis 2016). The term ‘critical’, 
therefore, denotes the self-reflexive approach of CTS towards the subjects of study, which implies 
“stand[ing] apart from the prevailing order of the world and ask[ing] how that order came about” 
(Cox 1981: 129; see also Toros ang Gunning 2009: 87).  
CTS highlights the complex and heterogeneous nature of Islamist violence, criticising de-
historicised and de-politicised explanations of jihadism based on psychological disorder or religious 
ideology as the main cause (see e.g., Jarvis 2009; Toros and Gunning 2009). As some of its founding 
scholars clarify,  
 
CTS research entails a particular ontological position which accepts that ‘terrorism’ is 
fundamentally a social fact rather than a brute fact; that its nature is not inherent to the violent act 
itself, but is dependent upon context, circumstance, intention, and crucially, social, cultural, legal, 
and political processes of interpretation, categorisation, and labelling (Jackson, Breen-Smyth and 
Gunning 2009b: 222).  
 
This research aligns with such a position, approaching terrorism as a form of political violence whose 
logic and strategic significance has to be found in the convergence of specific social, political and 
cultural dynamics in a specific time and setting. As discussed in Chapter 2 when setting out the 
conceptual basis of the thesis, the term ‘Islamist’ terrorism is used in this work just to refer to the 
“appropriation of Islamic concepts” on the part of “individuals, groups and organisations that pursue 
political objectives” relying on violence as a method of contention (Chome 2020: 8).  
Adopting a CTS orientation provides two major benefits to the study of US security policies and 
the rise of terrorism in African states. Firstly, it helps frame local politics as the link between US 
security efforts and radicalisation on the ground. Providing a context-sensitive lens for the study of 
terrorism, CTS challenges the predominance of a “problem-solving” approach that, rather than 
questioning existing power relationships and institutions as a source of frictions underlying dynamics 
of radicalisation, “takes the world as it finds it”, conceiving such power relationship and institutions 
as “the given framework for action” and seeking to make them “work smoothly by dealing effectively 
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with particular sources of trouble” (Cox 1981: 128-129; see Jackson 2007a; Gunning 2007b). In so 
doing, CTS brings the state under the radar of the research as a potential agent of mobilisation, 
questioning heavy-handed security measures as a driver of violence among vulnerable groups 
(Gunning 2007b; Lindahl 2016). Such a move has considerable implications for the study of US 
initiatives in Africa. Indeed, it points to African partners as a critical variable affecting the rise of 
terrorism. African authorities play a key role within the post-9/11 US security framework, translating 
US directives, assistance and support into concrete measures. As such, they connect the input given 
by US policy makers with its outcome on the ground. At the same time, however, African authorities 
are one among other social actors involved in dynamics of interaction within the local context, 
engaging in activities that can have major repercussions for the emergence of political violence. 
Exploring how African states react to US policies and, most of all, how such reactions are perceived 
by other actors on the ground, affecting dynamics of radicalisation, enables us to assess the impact of 
Washington’s security policies on the process of mobilisation.       
The second benefit provided by CTS concerns the way in which its versatility and propensity 
towards disciplinary pluralism allow us to capture multi-scalar connections between the subjects of 
study and formulate hypotheses regarding their causal relationship. As a research orientation, CTS 
encourages the incorporation of analytical elements from different theoretical traditions. Jackson, 
Breen-Smyth and Gunning (2009b: 222) stress how CTS is “a very broad church that allows multiple 
perspectives…to be brought into the same forum”, some of which may even “originate within a 
problem-solving approach”. Applied to the study of US security policies and radicalisation in African 
states, such an element of eclecticism enables the setting up of an interdisciplinary framework 
approaching the phenomena in question from various angles to explore how US policies are translated 
into concrete measures by local authorities and how, in turn, such measures affect mobilisation into 
terrorism on the ground.  
Reaping the benefits provided by the CTS orientation, this research adopts a “deductive 
approach” to answer the research question, “develop[ing] a theory and hypothesis” by engaging in 
deductive theorising, and then “design[ing] a research strategy to test the hypothesis” (Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill 2009: 124). The research hypothesis is: post-9/11 US security policies have had 
a negative impact on radicalisation in African states by reflecting a strategy of remote warfare in 
contexts characterised by the threat of terrorism and the use of indiscriminate repression against 
suspect groups by local security authorities.   
The theoretical propositions underpinning the research hypothesis can be conceptualised into the 




1. Post-9/11 US security policies in African state (indicated with the letter ‘Y’) lead to the 
establishment of a partnership relationship within the framework of remote warfare.  
 
2. From the partnership relationship, state (Y) gains resources and room for manoeuvre to 
implement indiscriminate repression. 
 
3. Indiscriminate repression causes an increase in radicalisation in state (Y). 
 
 
                                            Step 1                  Step 2                   Step 3 
                    A              q               r               B 
                    X 
                   C1 
                   C2 
 
A: Post-9/11 US security policies in African state (Y). 
q: Establishment of a partnership within the framework of remote warfare.  
r: State (Y) gains resources and room for manoeuvre to implement indiscriminate repression. 
B: Increase in radicalisation in state (Y). 
X: This sign simply indicates that the occurrence of the causal mechanism is dependent on the presence of the 
conditions below.  
C1 and C2 are scope conditions, that is, the conditions that “identify the theory’s domain” (Powner 2014: 24), 
defining the “context in which a theorized mechanism is expected to operate” (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 177). 
C1: State (Y) suffers from the threat of terrorism. 
C2: Local security authorities in state (Y) use indiscriminate repression against suspect groups.  
Figure 4. Arrow diagram of the causal mechanism. Adapted from Van Evera (1997: 12) 
 
A causal mechanism can be conceived just as “a complex system, which produces an outcome by the 
interaction of a number of parts” (Glennan 1996: 52, quoted in Beach and Pedersen 2013: 1). As such, 
causal mechanisms are used to provide explanations of the dynamics that link a cause, or independent 
variable (post-9/11 US security policies in African states), with its presumed effect (an increase in 
radicalisation in African states).  
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As detailed in Chapter 2, the theoretical propositions underpinning the first step of the causal 
mechanism (A  q) build on research on remote warfare (e.g., Watts and Biegon 2017; Knowles and 
Watson 2018a, 2018b; Biegon and Watts 2020; Knowles 2020; McKay, Watson and Karlshoej-
Pedersen 2021). Remote warfare is a concept developed by the Oxford Research Group (ORG) to 
capture recent evolutions in the character of war, denoting a “strategy of countering threats at a 
distance, without the deployment of large military forces” (Watts and Biegon 2017: 1). Such a 
strategy emerges from the increasing willingness of states to contain military, economic and political 
costs associated with the deployment of ‘boots on the ground’ in contemporary forms of conflict. 
Rather than taking risks by sending militaries to do frontline fighting, states turning to remote warfare 
seek to achieve security goals while maintaining a strategic distance from the theatres of violence, 
relying on private military contractors, resorting to air power or establishing a partnership relationship 
with local forces and providing them with indirect support (Demmers and Gould 2021; Watson and 
McKay 2021).  
This research hypothesises that, being driven by a problem-solving perspective on the war on 
terror in Africa, the US establishes partnership relationships with local actors to achieve security 
objectives remotely. Such a hypothesis rests on the presence of the first scope condition (C1), 
meaning that, for A  q to occur, the African state in question (Y) must suffer from the threat of 
terrorism. This implies that there is (at least) a terrorist organisation operating in state (Y) and/or in 
the region in which state (Y) is located (otherwise almost any state in the world would suffer from a 
certain degree of threat). The rationale behind C1 is that, in line with what is argued by the scholarship 
on remote warfare (see e.g., Knowles and Watson 2018a, 2018b), to reflect a strategy of remote 
warfare, US indirect support in state (Y) must be aimed at fighting an enemy on the ground. Thus, 
the theory is not valid in cases where the US provides military support to an African state but there is 
not a local terrorist threat to fight (as, for example, US assistance might be just aimed at strengthening 
the security sector of the recipient state to prevent future threats). In such cases, as it will emerge 
from the next step of the causal mechanism, the US would hardly face major constraints if confronted 
with the repressive behaviour of local security authorities and could easily withdraw support.   
The second step of the causal mechanism (q  r) builds on research on security assistance and 
the role of agency (e.g., Cochran 2010; Schroeder 2010; Biddle 2017; Matisek and Reno 2019; 
Knowles and Matisek 2019; Mezzell 2019). Here it is hypothesised that adopting a remote warfare 
strategy to fight threats from a distance entails significant risks. This is due to two main factors 
characterising a strategy of remote warfare, which impose considerable limitations to US policy 
makers while allowing partners to use US indirect support with fewer restrictions. Firstly, the lack of 
US oversight over the security performance of African forces receiving indirect support, due to the 
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physical and strategic remoteness separating the US from surrogates (Biddle 2017; Ucko 2019). 
Secondly, the generation of a moral hazard in that, rather than being passive actors, African states are 
more than conscious of their frontline role in the US counter-terrorism framework and can exploit the 
tension between US security imperatives on the ground and its reluctance to intervene directly as a 
leverage to gain negotiating power while evading Washington’s pressures regarding the use of 
military support (see Abrahamsen and Sandor 2018).   
The above factors highlight how, the context in which US policies are implemented plays a 
crucial role in determining the outcome of Washington’s security efforts. In socio-political 
environments where the perceptions and interests of local security authorities converge towards the 
adoption of security measures diverging from those desired by Washington, US indirect support risks 
inadvertently contributing to furthering such measures, providing resources and room for manoeuvre 
for their implementation (see Knowles and Matisek 2019; Matisek and Reno 2019). This point is of 
key importance given the high levels of state repression in the African continent. Along these lines, 
this research hypothesises that, in contexts in which the second scope condition is present (C2: local 
security authorities in state (Y) use indiscriminate repression against suspect groups), the 
establishment of a partnership relationship within the framework of remote warfare by the US 
unintentionally results in the provision of resources and room for manoeuvre for the implementation 
of indiscriminate repression. As further clarified in Chapter 2, the term ‘indiscriminate’ denotes the 
extension of repressive measures by local authorities to people merely suspected of involvement in 
terrorism (as opposed to ‘selective’ repression, which only targets militants and their followers, see 
Hafez 2003). When implemented against ‘suspect groups’, indiscriminate repression targets entire 
communities (either real or imaginary, see Breen-Smith 2014) whose members are suspected of being 
involved in terrorist activities.  
The third, and last, step of the causal mechanism (r  B) deals with the effects of indiscriminate 
repression on radicalisation in African state (Y), building on research on social movements and 
political violence (e.g., McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Hafez 2003; Wiktorowicz 2004a; della 
Porta 2013; 2018; Bosi, Demetriou and Malthaner 2014a; Klandermans 2014). Adopting a Social 
Movement Theory (SMT) approach to the study of radicalisation, this research hypothesises that the 
use of indiscriminate repression by local security authorities in state (Y) causes an increase in 
radicalisation among targeted groups. Including activities such as the curtailment of “political and 
civil liberties”, “the use of physical violence against human beings”, as well as “intimidation or the 
threatened use of violence” (Osa and Shock 2007: 133), repression fuels a motivation to take revenge 
against the state (Hafez 2003; della Porta 2013), increasing the appeal of terrorism. At the same time, 
generating a disconnect between the state and targeted groups, repression allows terrorists to navigate 
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the vulnerable sections of the society, establishing connections with local people and enabling 
aspiring militants to concretise their propensity for mobilisation.  
In line with the CTS orientation, the causal mechanism places local politics at the heart of the 
analysis, framing the actions and reactions of African states as a crucial determinant for the impact 
of US policies on the ground. The turn to remote warfare as a major strategy guiding US counter-
terrorism efforts is hypothesised to facilitate the abuse of indirect support by local authorities, 
entailing critical consequences for radicalisation in contexts where such authorities rely on 
indiscriminate repression against suspect groups. One might question the actual impact that US 
policies might have on the process of mobilisation within the mechanism, given that the presence of 
C2 implies that Washington’s partners on the ground (already) rely on measures based indiscriminate 
repression (which are deemed to trigger radicalisation in the mechanism). In this regard, drawing a 
parallel with the provision of indirect support to parties involved in conventional forms of warfare 
can help grasp the hypothesised causality between US policies and the increase in radicalisation. 
Indeed, as an actor that provides aid to help an allied army on the battlefield contributes (at least in a 
minimal way) to the activities of the army that are aimed at defeating the enemy, the same can be said 
in case the army in question redirects its military efforts towards other targets. The provision of 
weapons, training, knowhow, logistical and economic resources inevitably plays a role in increasing 
the scale and scope of the activities carried out by the surrogate on the ground. What is at stake here 
is not the extent of such a role, which also depends on the resources and capacities on which the 
surrogate can already rely, but instead its existence. If US policies contribute to the mobilisation of 
even just a single new adversary each time they are implemented in a given context, they turn the 
conflict in question into a potentially never-ending war. This does not mean that the activities of local 
allies could not have similar outcomes (albeit on a different scale) without US involvement. However, 
it does raise serious concerns regarding the effectiveness of US initiatives, indicating that, despite the 
effort made by Washington to defeat enemies on the battlefield of the war on terror in Africa, US 
policies inadvertently end up increasing their ranks.     
Following the CTS orientation, the hypothesised mechanism also links strands of research that 
have so far remained largely unconnected, setting up an interdisciplinary theoretical framework that 
captures the links between the study of US security efforts, African agency and the consequences that 
the latter has in terms of radicalisation into terrorism. Covering such a wide spectrum of subjects, the 
framework inevitably glosses over some nuances in their structure and configuration, often sacrificing 
specificities in favour of the big picture. As the most critical example, US security policies and 
Kenyan counter-terrorism measures are often treated as the product of unitary actors, overlooking the 
competition between different bureaucracies and agendas within and among state institutions. For the 
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purposes of this work, such a line of action brings more benefits than disadvantages. Generalisations 
and approximations may raise ethical concerns, which will be discussed in the following pages of this 
chapter. Still, if they do not affect the integrity and functioning of the hypothesised mechanism, they 
have no relevant impact on the reliability of the research findings. On the contrary, by smoothing the 
research process, they can provide a clearer overview of the connections between the subjects of 
study, shedding light on the chain of causality. Indeed, sometimes it is necessary to “ignore a vast 
number of trees in order to see the forest” (Herbst 2000: 4).  
 
Research design and methodology 
This research is designed as a qualitative case study. As Gerring elucidates (2006: 20), a case study 
“may be understood as the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is…to shed 
light on a larger class of cases (a population)”. Such a study is of great utility, if compared to large-n 
studies, when seeking to explore whether and, most of all, how a given phenomenon can occur, as is 
the case with this research. Indeed, focusing on a single unit, case study enables the researcher to 
provide an in-depth investigation of the intermediary dynamics through which initial conditions lead 
to the final outcome (Van Evera 1997: 54). As such, it allows for a relatively large degree of flexibility 
and eclecticism in the structuring of the research, being particularly suitable for qualitative research 
integrating multiple perspectives to provide a thorough understanding of those dynamics at different 
levels of analysis (Snow and Trom 2002: 154). 
Cases characterising case study research have specific temporal and spatial boundaries (Gerring 
2006). In this research, since African states (characterised by the presence of scope conditions C1 and 
C2) identify the population of cases to which the hypothesised causal mechanism refers, the spatial 
boundaries of a single unit coincide with that of an African state. As regards the temporal boundaries, 
the research focuses on the ‘post-9/11’ period, which is meant to last up to the year 2020. Such a time 
limit, coinciding with the last year of the Trump presidency in the US, is due to the shortage of data 
for the year 2021, which overlaps with the final stage of the research process.  
To explore the impact of post-9/11 US security policies on radicalisation in African states, this 
research focuses on Kenya as a case study. The rationale behind such a choice is based on the 
“typicality” (Gerring 2006: 96) characterising the Kenyan case, that is, the high chance of 
representativeness of the case in relation to the population. A “typical” case is a case in which both 
the independent variable (A) and the outcome (B) are present, and the scope conditions (C) are 
favourable, “allow[ing] the theorized mechanism to operate” (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 150). Due 
to such characteristics, typical cases are ideal for “confirmatory” purposes, that is, for proving the 
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existence of a causal mechanism and validating its underlying theoretical framework (Seawright and 
Gerring 2008: 297).  
In the post-9/11 period, the Kenyan case has presented both A (US security policies) and B 
(increase in radicalisation) as well as favourable scope conditions. As other African states, the country 
has suffered from terrorism, being subjected to the activities of Al-Qaeda and its local affiliate in East 
Africa, Al-Shabaab. Since the late 2000s, the latter group has represented a major and unprecedented 
threat in East Africa, causing approximately half of the Islamist terrorist incidents on the continent 
(ACSS 2019). Hundreds of the group’s attacks have concentrated in Kenya (START 2019). Taking 
advantage of the nearly 700 kilometres of porous border separating militants’ strongholds in southern 
Somalia from Kenyan territory, Al-Shabaab has stretched its tentacles in the country, increasing 
incursions southwards (ICG 2014, 2018; Anderson and McKnight 2015a; Bryden and Bahra 2019). 
In so doing, the group has managed to establish links with local madrassas and religious organisations, 
gaining traction among the marginalised sections of the population, where an increasing number of 
Muslims of both Somali and non-Somali ethnicity have mobilised into terrorism (e.g., Botha 2013; 
K. Allen 2015; Miriri 2019; Mkutu and Opondo 2019). Indeed, while turning into one of the main 
targets of terrorism on the continent, Kenya has progressively become a key recruitment pool for 
militants in East Africa, providing most of Al-Shabaab’s foreign fighters and giving rise to a local 
affiliated cell, Al-Hijra (Kajee 2014; AP News 2017; Mogire, Mkutu and Alusa 2018; Cannon and 
Ruto Pkalya 2019).  
Faced with terrorism in the country, the US has intensified security efforts, fostering military and 
diplomatic cooperation to strengthen the national security architecture. In the last two decades, 
Kenyan forces have received increasing amounts of training under bilateral and regional programmes, 
becoming a major US security ally in the fight against Al-Shabaab in East Africa (Muhula 2007; 
Mogire and Mkutu 2011 Whitaker 2014).  
However, reflecting major trends on the continent, Kenya’s security performances have raised 
serious concerns among observers. Reports of human rights groups and NGOs highlight how Muslim 
and ethnic Somali communities in the country have increasingly been suspected of having links with 
Somali terrorists and subjected to harsh counter-terrorism measures by Kenyan forces, whose 
initiatives have often degenerated into the perpetration of violence and abuse (e.g., OSF 2013a, 
2013b; AI 2014; HRW 2016). Research studies warn against the adoption of such measures by local 
authorities, arguing that human rights violations risk deteriorating the living conditions of vulnerable 
Kenyan communities, creating dangerous tensions, and even increasing the resilience of Al-Shabaab 
(Mkutu, Marani and Ruteere 2014; Anderson and McKnight 2015a; Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom 
2017; Mwangi 2017a). In so doing, some works place the emphasis on the consequences of US 
13 
 
policies, maintaining that Washington’s support may further undermine humanitarian and political 
conditions in the country (see e.g., Ruteere and Ogada 2010; Mogire and Mkutu 2011). Still, 
reflecting the aforementioned gap between US policies and the emergence of terrorism in Africa, the 
scholarship has tended to overlook potential repercussions of Washington’s security initiatives in 
terms of radicalisation.   
Testing the presence of the hypothesised causal mechanism in the Kenyan case, this research 
addresses such a gap, investigating the impact of post-9/11 US security policies on mobilisation into 
terrorism in the country. To do so, the research relies on “theory testing process-tracing” as the 
method to conduct the analysis (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 14). Process-tracing is “a key technique 
for capturing causal mechanisms in action” (Bennet and Checkel 2012: 12). The ‘theory-testing’ 
version of such a technique is conceptualised by Beach and Pedersen (2013) for studies that (like this 
one) adopt a deductive approach, allowing for inferences regarding the presence of a hypothesised 
causal mechanism (and its underlying theoretical framework) in a single case study (Beach and 
Pedersen 2013: 15). This requires a specific procedure to render the causal mechanism ‘visible’ and 
capture its empirical manifestations. 
As Bennet and Checkel remark (2012: 13), hypothesised causal mechanisms are unobservable, 
as “we do not get to observe causality – we make inferences about it”. To test the presence of a causal 
mechanism in a case study it is necessary to “operationalise” it, that is, to “translat[e] theoretical 
expectations into case-specific predictions of what observable manifestations each of the parts of the 
mechanism should have if the mechanism is present in the case” (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 14). 
Process-tracing scholars emphasise how such a procedure resembles the work of “a detective in 
search of specific evidence that will help solve the mystery”, in that “the investigator specifies in 
advance the…[prediction]…that counts in favor of or against a hypothesis and then looks to see 
if…[supporting]…data are present” (Mahoney 2012: 587).  
The degree of certainty and uniqueness characterising the predictions formulated by the 
researcher in relation to the hypothesised steps of a causal mechanism determines the confirmatory 
power of the inferential test (Van Evera 1997). Here, ‘certainty’ refers to the unequivocal character 
of the forecast (i.e. the forecast has to occur for the related step to be valid), while ‘uniqueness’ 
denotes the exclusive relationship between the forecast and the hypothesis (i.e. the forecast cannot 
have causal explanations other than those implied by the occurrence of the hypothesised step) (Van 
Evera 1997: 31). The more a prediction is formulated in a way that, if supporting evidence is found, 
such a prediction is necessary and sufficient to validate the related step, the more the test acquires 
strength and approaches a doubly decisive test. The latter is the strongest inferential test for causal 
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mechanisms (being characterised by the highest values of certainty and uniqueness), although, as 
Beach and Pedersen highlight (2013: 104), its role is more that of an ideal type:  
 
in real-world social science research, it is also almost impossible to formulate predictions in such 
a manner [i.e. pure certainty and uniqueness] given the difficulty of finding and gaining access to 
the type of empirical evidence that would enable doubly decisive tests. Furthermore, inverse 
relationships often exist between the uniqueness and certainty of tests in that the more unique the 
empirical predictions, the less likely we are to find the evidence, and vice versa. 
 
The following table (Figure 5) shows the operationalisation of the hypothesised causal 
mechanism and the consequent predictions that this research formulates for the case under study.   
 
 Hypothesised causal mechanism Case-specific predictions (observable 
manifestations of the hypothesised causal 
mechanism) 
Step 1 
A  q 
Post-9/11 US security policies in African 
state (Y) lead to the establishment of a 
partnership relationship within the 
framework of remote warfare 
 
Scope condition (C1):  
state (Y) suffers from the threat of 
terrorism 
 
If C1 is present (meaning that Kenya suffers from 
the threat posed by Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab), 
the research expects to see the US providing 
security assistance to Kenya to fight Al-Qaeda 
and Al-Shabaab while keeping a low military 
presence on the ground 
Step 2 
q  r 
From the partnership relationship, state 
(Y) gains resources and room for 
manoeuvre to implement indiscriminate 
repression 
 
Scope condition (C2): 
local security authorities in state (Y) use 
indiscriminate repression against suspect 
groups  
 
If C2 is present (meaning that Muslim and ethnic 
Somali communities are subjected to 
indiscriminate repression by Kenyan security 
authorities), the research expects to see Kenya 
managing to use US security assistance to 
implement indiscriminate repression against 




r  B 
Indiscriminate repression causes an 
increase in radicalisation in state (Y) 
The research expects to see Kenyan Muslim and 
ethnic Somali communities becoming prone to 
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mobilising into Al-Shabaab, and managing to do 
so, in the face of indiscriminate repression  
 
Figure 5. Operationalisation of the causal mechanism. Adapted from Beach and Pedersen (2013: 112-113)  
 
As it emerges, rather than leaving room for alternative explanations, this research formulates very 
specific predictions, seeking to maximise the degree of certainty and uniqueness. In the first step of 
the causal mechanism (A  q), if C1 is present (meaning that Kenya suffers from the threat posed 
by Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab), the research expects to see the US providing security assistance to 
Kenya to fight Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab while keeping a low military presence on the ground. Such 
a prediction is measurable by looking for trends concerning the number of US military personnel in 
Kenya and the amount of security assistance provided by the US to Nairobi in the post-9/11 period, 
along with data from statements and documents attesting that the purpose of the assistance has been 
to fight terrorism. If supporting evidence is found, it strongly corroborates the hypothesis that post-
9/11 US policies in African state (Y) lead to the establishment of a partnership relationship within the 
framework of remote warfare. Indeed, by including key elements denoting such a relationship (the 
provision of indirect support to a local actor to fight an enemy while containing troops on the ground), 
the prediction has a high degree of certainty (in its absence there could be no A  q) and a relatively 
high degree of uniqueness (if confirmed by evidence, the prediction could hardly have causes other 
than the establishment of a relationship in which a benefactor country relies on a local actor to achieve 
security goals from a distance).   
In the second step of the causal mechanism (q  r), if C2 is present (meaning that suspected 
Muslim and ethnic Somali communities are subjected to indiscriminate repression by Kenyan security 
authorities), the research expects to see Kenya managing to use US security assistance to implement 
indiscriminate repression against Muslim and ethnic Somali communities. Such a prediction is 
measurable by looking for evidence attesting that Kenyan security authorities benefiting from US 
security assistance have been involved in practices of indiscriminate repression against such 
communities, along with evidence of Kenya avoiding sanctions from the US. If such evidence is 
found, it validates the hypothesis that the partnership relationship means that African state (Y) gains 
resources and room for manoeuvre to implement indiscriminate repression. Indeed, on the one hand, 
the observation of Kenyan authorities managing to use US assistance to carry out indiscriminate 
repression against Muslim and ethnic Somali communities could hardly have plausible explanations 
other than the establishment of the security partnership allowing the recipient state to gain resources 
and room for manoeuvre for repression (high degree of uniqueness). On the other, such an observation 
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is highly necessary to validate q  r (high degree of certainty), as there could hardly be such a step 
in its absence.   
Finally, in the third step of the causal mechanism (r  B), the research expects to see Kenyan 
Muslim and ethnic Somali communities becoming prone to mobilising into Al-Shabaab, and 
managing to do so, in the face of indiscriminate repression. Such a prediction is measurable by 
looking for data from statements and documents attesting that members of such communities have 
decided to mobilise into Al-Shabaab when facing indiscriminate repression by national authorities, 
along with evidence of suspect groups translating their aspiration into action. Even in this case, if 
supporting evidence is found, it strongly corroborates the hypothesis that indiscriminate repression 
causes an increase in radicalisation in African state (Y). Indeed, due to its specific character, the 
forecast has a high degree of certainty (there could be no r  B without groups targeted by 
indiscriminate repression becoming prone to mobilising into terrorism and managing to do so) and a 
high degree of uniqueness (as the emergence of a propensity for mobilisation into Al-Shabaab among 
groups subjected to indiscriminate repression, along with the concretisation of such a propensity, 
could hardly have explanations other than r  B).  
Importantly, being expected to lead to an ‘increase’ in radicalisation, nor post-9/11 US security 
policies neither local practices of indiscriminate repression are conceived as the sole factors causing 
mobilisation into terrorism in Kenya (which would require a different kind of analysis to rule out rival 
explanations) but instead as “factors that contribute to an outcome” and whose removal (or absence) 
does not necessarily “eliminate the outcome” (Mahoney 2015: 203). As regards such an outcome, 
this study restricts its focus on mobilisation into Al-Shabaab (including its affiliate Al-Hijra) as the 
sole indicator of behavioural radicalisation of Kenyan people. This means that, despite the focus on 
Al-Qaeda as a potential threat in Kenya and a consequent target of post-9/11 US security policies, 
dynamics of mobilisation into the group are not considered when exploring the increase in 
radicalisation. Although Al-Qaeda played a substantial role in East Africa between the 1990s and the 
early 2000s, also affiliating with Al-Shabaab in 2012, its relatively limited presence on the ground 
during the last two decades implies that (differently from Al-Shabaab) the group could not benefit 
directly from the consequences of Kenyan harsh security policies, capitalising on emerging tensions 
in the country to gain new fighters. In the same way, despite the increasing media attention on the 
Kenyan separatist group Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) during recent years, topped off by the 
allegations of Kenyan officials regarding the existence of links between the group and Somali Islamist 
terrorists (Chonghaile 2012a; ICG 2014), dynamics of mobilisation into the MRC are not considered 
part of the increase in radicalisation. Such a choice is due to the ambiguity surrounding the portrayal 
of the MRC in Kenya, which has been found to be affected by “systematic bias”, often highlighting 
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the violent nature of the group “despite the lack of supporting empirical evidence” (Goldsmith 2018: 
27), along with the release of several authoritative investigations remarking that “no direct operational 
or ideological link exists between Al-Shabaab and…the Mombasa Republican Council” (ICG 2018: 
8).  
The high degree of certainty and uniqueness characterising the case-specific predictions that this 
research formulates implies that, if evidence supporting each prediction is found, the mechanism 
(with its underlying theoretical framework) is confirmed. This, however, does not mean that the 
mechanism is generalisable. Process-tracing is used to prove that the theory that has been developed 
operates in the case under study. As Beach and Pedersen highlight (2013: 89), “neither inferences 
about necessity nor sufficiency of a mechanism in relation to the population of a phenomenon can be 
made. To prove necessity or sufficiency of conditions in relation to a population requires cross-case 
comparative methods”. Such a state of affairs reflects a limit of case study research, which is “weaker 
with respect to external validity than its crosscase cousin” (Gerring 2006: 43). Thus, even if the 
predictions are confirmed, the causal mechanism cannot automatically be assumed to operate in cases 
other than that of Kenya. Still, this does not mean that the research question (concerning the wider 
population of African states characterised by C1 and C2) would be left unanswered. On the contrary, 
“the validity of the [proposed] theory and its ability to explain at least one case…[would 
be]…strongly corroborated” (Van Evera 1997: 66). As one scholar remarks, “for any given process 
tracing test, the key requirement is simply that the generalization apply to the kind of case under 
analysis” (Mahoney 2012: 585). The research hypothesis is to be considered valid if within-case 
findings suggest so, as it proves to explain (at least) the case for which it has been tested. Such a 
validity can then pave the way for “cross-case speculation” and stimulate further investigations testing 
its ability to explain other cases composing the population of reference (Gerring 2006: 85). 
To find the evidence necessary to confirm the case-specific predictions, the research follows the 
guidelines laid down by Beach and Pedersen (2013: 120-143), collecting data by – deliberately – 
looking for observations enabling assessment of the forecasts. As the two scholars clarify,  
 
the selection of sources in process-tracing research is not driven by random sampling; instead, we 
select sources based on the type of evidence that is best suited to enable us to engage in a critical 
theory test. In other words, source selection is theory-driven (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 132).  
 
This poses serious challenges in light of the accessibility of the data required in this study. As regards 
the case-specific prediction of A  q, for example, several analysts highlight how “it is extremely 
challenging to compile a comprehensive picture of how much security assistance is being provided 
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to each African country, given the complex patchwork of legal authorities and programs under which 
the State Department and DOD are currently operating” (Ploch 2015: 3; see also e.g., McDonald 
2015). Even data on the use of repression by security authorities and on dynamics of mobilisation are 
often difficult to access, given the fact that repressive states rarely “advertise” their violent actions 
against the population or enable enquiries about the consequences of such actions to be conducted 
freely among targeted communities (Blakeley 2009: 13; see also Blakeley and Raphael 2017). These 
difficulties are exacerbated by the persistent dangers complicating the conduct of interviews in areas 
affected by high levels of terrorism (for studies discussing such dangers in northern Kenya, see, for 
example, Kfir 2017), along with more recent limitations to field research imposed by the outbreak of 
Covid-19.  
To cope with such challenges and mitigate access problems, contact was made with human rights 
practitioners with an expertise in counter-terrorism and post-9/11 security issues in Kenya to arrange 
online interviews. However, after many attempts, it became evident that, despite the assurance of 
anonymity and confidentiality, potential risks for personal safety (due to the sensitiveness of the 
research topics) meant that people were extremely reluctant to speak. On more than one occasion, 
NGO workers with a well-known expertise on Kenya and the war on terror took a step back when 
informed of the nature of the research. Consequently, an alternative route had to be taken to gather 
data.  
Following recent studies addressing methodological issues caused by the pandemic, this research 
adopts documentary research as a method of data collection, using documents as a “substitute for 
the…material gained from seeing, hearing, and analyzing with one’s own eyes” (Krause et al. 2021: 
4). Documentary research refers to “the analysis of documents that contain information about the 
phenomenon we wish to study”, whereas the term ‘document’ simply refers to “an artefact which has 
as its central feature an inscribed text”; in other words, “a written text” (Mogalakwe 2006: 221, 222). 
Despite being traditionally regarded as a specific feature of historical research, during the last two 
decades such a method has been promoted by several studies in the field of social science as a major 
instrument “to read between the lines of our material world” (McCulloch 2004: 1).  
This research relies on multiple types of documents, both primary (“eyewitness accounts of a 
given process”) and secondary (which are “produced based on primary sources”) (Beach and 
Pedersen 2013: 132). Data are gathered from media articles;1 UN reports; reports and briefings 
released by human rights groups, NGOs and think thanks; reports from Kenyan security institutions 
 
1 In two cases, media articles included a video document of which selected passages have been transcribed verbatim (see 
McLellan, MacQueen and Neidig 2003). Parts of text quoted from such documents have been indicated as ‘transcribed’ 
in the thesis.     
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and African regional organisations; documents released by Wikileaks; Kenyan and US governments’ 
official documents; documents released by the US Department of State (DOS) and Department of 
Defense (DOD); and academic research articles. To ensure maximum levels of robustness in the 
research and support claims with substantial evidence, a major effort has been made to triangulate 
consistently between different data sources. Such a modus operandi has enabled the thesis to 
overcome potential difficulties caused by the lack of interviews, avoiding biases in the selection of 
the observations and the evaluation of their accuracy (see Beach and Pedersen 2013). In the case of 
post-9/11 US security policies, triangulating data from DOS and DOD official documents with data 
from media articles and thinks thanks (for example, the Security Assistance Monitor project run by 
the Center for International Policy), the research has managed to acquire a detailed picture of the 
trends regarding US security assistance in Kenya, as well as crucial information concerning the US 
military presence in the country. Data from Wikileaks has complemented such a picture, also 
contributing to shedding light on important aspects concerning the US-Kenya security and diplomatic 
relationship. In this regard, the research aligns with previous studies stressing the suitability of 
Wikileaks data for research purposes and their capability to “offer unique insights into political 
phenomena” that would “otherwise be impossible to obtain, or in the best-case scenario, [would] 
require years or even decades of delay” (Michael 2015: 183). Of course, such insights are often the 
expression of opinions and perceptions that may not necessarily reflect those of all the social actors 
at play. In this study, for example, most of the leaked data provide the viewpoints of members of the 
US embassy in Kenya. Still, triangulating such data with data from other sources and reading leaked 
information through the lens of the ‘facts’ (that is, what the US has actually done in relation to the 
topics treated) enable to assess the influence that such viewpoints have had on US policies and to 
contextualise them within broader trends.   
As regards data on repression and radicalisation, triangulating between media articles and reports 
of human rights groups and NGOs has enabled the thesis to provide a thorough overview of dynamics 
of state violence and counter-terrorism in Kenya, capturing the perceptions of targeted communities 
and the implications that such perceptions have had for the emergence of radicalisation. Despite the 
criticism of some scholars towards the use of newspapers and media articles in academic research 
(e.g., Ortiz et al. 2005), this work aligns with studies maintaining that, if triangulated with other data 
sources, media articles can offer an extremely useful lens to explore dynamics of mobilisation (e.g., 
Koopmans and Rucht 2002; Earl et al. 2004). In the case under study, they have provided precious 
information regarding the occurrence of specific episodes of violence in the counter-terrorism 
framework, contributing to shedding light on the feelings of local Kenyan communities. Furthermore, 
rather than merely focusing on the interpretation of the events provided by the authors of the articles, 
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this research has consistently sought to extract the ‘raw material’ (i.e. the primary data; see 
McCulloch 2004) included in the documents (for example, gathering data from interviews of local 
actors providing eyewitness accounts of events) and to interpret such material by contextualising it 
within the local socio-political landscape.  
This latter procedure of contextualisation is of key importance for two reasons. Firstly, because 
it enables us to critically assess the content of the data, avoiding bias by evaluating observations based 
on “what is known about the actors, their intentions, their interactions, and the situation in which they 
found themselves” (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 126). Secondly, because it helps mitigate potential 
cultural bias stemming from the vast cultural gap existing between the author of this research (born 
and raised in Europe) and many of the topics that the research treats (for example, the perceptions of 
radicalised people in Kenya). Although, as critical scholars note, “the condition of objectivity is 
impossible in a historical human subject” (Booth 2008: 71) and “no individual can pretend to 
being…entirely unbiased”, “striv[ing] for fairness, balance and inclusivity when making inferences” 
by contextualising narratives within their landscape of meaning is nonetheless a key task to produce 
high-quality research (Froese 2013: 124).  
In line with what suggested by Bennet and Checkel (2012: 32), both data collection and analysis 
have been stopped “when repetition occurs” and new evidence cannot alter the emerging picture or 
contribute to better defining its structure. As the scholars clarify (2012: 32), 
 
for each test in determining whether an animal is a duck – walk, sounds, etc – a small sample is 
sufficient. A thousand steps or quacks provide no more convincing evidence than a few. 
 
Ethical considerations 
Although the scholarship on terrorism and counter-terrorism tends to discuss ethical considerations 
mostly in relation to the conduct of fieldwork and interviews (e.g., Bikson 2007; Dolnik 2013; Mills, 
Massoumi and Miller 2020), this research takes into account the ethics associated with documentary 
research, acknowledging that treating sensitive topics such as radicalisation and repression implies 
several concerns of which to take care. In the first instance, the research is responsive to ethical 
concerns that may arise from seeking to explore the ‘rationale’ underlying radicalisation in a state 
such as Kenya, where the wounds left by terrorism are still fresh among the population. Here, the 
contextualisation of documentary material plays a critical role in adding historical depth to the 
analysis and avoiding the production of misleading and deceptive explanations (based on data 
abstracted from their spatial and temporal dimensions) that may hurt the feelings of stakeholders in 
the country (see Subotić 2020). As will be further discussed in Chapter 2, seeking to identify the 
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“human faces of terror” (Booth 2008: 74) by locating dynamics of mobilisation within the socio-
political and cultural environment from which they originate is not a procedure aimed at normalising 
jihadism or providing some sort of justification for its occurrence. On the contrary, the main objective 
underlying such a procedure is to contribute to the eradication of terrorism by shedding light on the 
dynamics that add fuel to it and light the fire of instability in vulnerable contexts. Yet, too often works 
de-exceptionalising Islamist violence and highlighting the acts of terror committed by state forces 
under the banner of counter-terrorism come under heavy criticism. As Edward Said emphasised 
during an interview after the 9/11 attacks,      
 
if you start to speak about this [i.e. terrorism] as something that can be understood historically—
without any sympathy—you are going to be thought of as unpatriotic, and you are going to be 
forbidden. It’s very dangerous (Said 2001, quoted in M. Smith 2016).  
 
This research also takes into account ethical concerns that may emerge when exploring security 
policies and dynamics of state repression, acknowledging that documentary research can “cause 
significant reputational damage [to security actors] when unflattering documents, pieces of writing, 
or testimonies are uncovered” (Subotić 2020: 8). Such concerns can be of particular relevance in a 
work that, as already mentioned, often treats US policies and Kenyan measures as the product of 
unitary actors. Indeed, glossing over nuances in internal divisions among state institutions risks 
implicitly extending potential reputational damages to all people and entities that form part of the 
establishment. The research is aware of such a risk and recognises the heterogeneity and pluralism 
characterising both US and Kenyan institutions. Rather than implying the existence of a unanimous 
consent regarding the character of national security efforts among social actors composing the US 
and Kenyan establishment, the generalisations that are made in this work are functional to the 
achievement of its main goal, that is, to contribute to the effectiveness of such efforts by enabling 
investigation of potential repercussions on the ground.  
In this regard, during the last two decades the study of US security policies in Africa (and, more 
widely, the global South) has been subjected to a tendency towards a division between a strand of 
research omitting or overlooking lines of responsibility when exploring humanitarian and political 
implications and another strand manifesting a propensity towards a systemic criticism, often resulting 
in the production of approximate and ethically questionable material. Reality is much more fluid and 
complex than that captured by such strict dichotomies: even the road to catastrophes is often paved 
with good intentions. This thesis acknowledges that adopting a critical orientation towards the study 
of (counter-)terrorism implies rejecting preconceptions and being willing to “say the unsayable” if 
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that is necessary for research purposes (Booth 2008: 68). Along these lines, it makes a major effort 
to contextualise security strategies within their landscape of meaning, exploring the rationale guiding 
policies on the ground by consistently providing the analysis of the choices and actions taken by 
social actors with historical depth. To do so, the research does not refrain from resorting to data 
sources such as Wikileaks documents.  
The ethics of Wikileaks has been a matter of debate in recent years, driven by concerns related 
to the risks and moral dilemmas associated with the reliance on leaked data. This research aligns with 
studies identifying the benefits of using Wikileaks to reduce the distortion of information in global 
politics as outweighing the costs (e.g., Marlin 2011; Cornut  and de Zamaróczy 2020), framing “self-
censorship…[as]…a giant step backward” in academic research (O’Loughlin 2016: 343). On the one 
hand, the use of leaked data in academia can hardly cause risks in terms of the security and reputation 
of stakeholders, due to the fact that academics just retrieve data that is already available to the public 
(Michael 2015). To even further minimise such risks, this research has avoided including the names 
of stakeholders. On the other, the use of leaked data does not condone the leaking of information. On 
the contrary, in the same way that “computer security researchers frequently analyze stolen password 
databases to better understand how real people choose passwords, with the ultimate goal of improving 
computer security”, even social science researchers can decide to use leaked information “precisely 
because its nature makes it particularly unique and valuable” to improve security from threats such 
as terrorism (Michael 2015: 180). 
 
Findings and contribution 
This research finds strong evidence in favour of the case-specific predictions of the steps of the causal 
mechanism. As regards the first prediction, after having attested the presence of scope condition 1 
(C1) in the case under study, showing that Kenya has suffered from the threat posed by Al-Qaeda and 
Al-Shabaab in the post-9/11 period, the research provides evidence of the provision of US security 
assistance to Nairobi to fight such a threat. US assistance, which has increased significantly after the 
rise of Al-Shabaab as a regional player in East Africa in the early 2010s, has not been associated with 
the maintenance of a major military presence in the country. On the contrary, while training and 
equipping local forces to project its power on the ground, Washington has maintained just a few dozen 
soldiers on active duty in Kenya. Such observations provide a strong inferential test for the occurrence 
of A  q in the case study, supporting the hypothesis that, if C1 is present, post-9/11 US policies in 
African state (Y) lead to the establishment of a partnership relationship within the framework of 
remote warfare.    
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The research also provides evidence supporting the second prediction. After having shed light on 
the presence of C2 (use of indiscriminate repression by Kenyan security authorities against Muslim 
and ethnic Somali communities), the research shows how Kenyan authorities have managed to evade 
pressures and avoid major sanctions from the US while using security assistance to implement 
indiscriminate repression. On the one hand, increasing remoteness between Kenyan surrogates and 
US policy makers has reduced US oversight capabilities over the activities of local forces, limiting 
considerably the enforcement of legal provisions regulating the allocation of aid to repressive actors 
in the country. On the other, the awareness of the critical role played within the post-9/11 US security 
framework on the part of Kenyan authorities has generated a moral hazard in that the latter have 
managed to resist US pressure, being conscious that the reluctance to intervene directly through the 
deployment of troops has turned Kenya into an essential partner for Washington to achieve counter-
terrorism goals on the ground. Such findings corroborate the second step of the causal mechanism (q 
 r) in the case study, supporting the hypothesis that, if C2 is present, the partnership relationship 
means that state (Y) gains resources and room for manoeuvre to implement indiscriminate repression 
against suspect groups.  
Finally, the research provides evidence in support of the third prediction, showing how Kenyan 
Muslim and ethnic Somali communities have become prone to mobilising into Al-Shabaab, and have 
managed to do so, in the face of indiscriminate repression. The research highlights that the use of 
indiscriminate repression has been accompanied by an increase in the propensity of Muslims and 
ethnic Somalis to rebel against the state and join Al-Shabaab along with the generation of conducive 
socio-political conditions enabling them to concretise such a propensity through emerging 
connections with militants. These observations substantiate the last step of the causal mechanism (r 
 B) in the case study, supporting the hypothesis that indiscriminate repression causes an increase 
in radicalisation in state (Y).   
The validation of the three steps of the causal mechanism in the case study (A  q  r  B) 
makes both empirical and theoretical contributions. At the empirical level, it firstly highlights the 
need for more targeted security strategies by Kenyan authorities to tackle the terrorist threat in the 
country. Besides increasing significantly the cost of intelligence activities, in terms of time and 
resources spent by Kenyan forces to penetrate the social fabric of suspect groups, harsh security 
measures generate deep social fractures, setting in motion processes playing into the hands of violent 
entrepreneurs capitalising on growing discontent and disaffection among the population.  
Such insights regarding the impact of Kenyan measures have major implications for US security 
policies in the country, highlighting the need for a recalibration of US initiatives in light of the 
character of local responses to terrorism. Whether the establishment of a partnership relationship can 
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contribute to strengthening the Kenyan counter-terrorism architecture, improving the capacity of 
Nairobi to detect jihadist cells and foil their plots, it also increases resources and room for manoeuvre 
for the perpetration of human rights violations by local forces against vulnerable groups, 
unintentionally fuelling the vicious circle of violence by favouring the process of mobilisation into 
Al-Shabaab.  
At the theoretical level, despite not allowing to make generalisations, the validation of the causal 
mechanism in the Kenyan case corroborates the research hypothesis, validating its underlying theory 
as an innovative framework to explore the impact of post-9/11 US security policies in the continent 
and paving the way for further studies focusing on other African states composing the population of 
reference. Combining analytical tools from different (and previously unconnected) strands of 
research, the proposed framework fills the gap between the study of US policies and that of the 
emergence of terrorism in Africa, shifting the emphasis to local politics and shedding light on the 
way in which US policies intertwine with the preferences and perceptions of local actors. In so doing, 
it allows us to capture how Washington’s security efforts are translated into concrete measures by 
African authorities, enabling appreciation of their repercussions in terms of radicalisation and 
providing a more thorough lens to assess their effectiveness on the ground.     
Such a lens points to post-9/11 US security policies in Africa as a matter of concern. Being driven 
by a problem-solving perspective on the war on terror that frames (counter-)terrorism as a (largely) 
military issue and African security institutions as necessary allies to restore local stability, the US 
strategy of remote warfare increases the resources and capabilities on which African partners can rely 
when dealing with common threats on the ground. At the same time, however, it decreases the ability 
of Washington to exert control over the use of such resources and capabilities. In contexts 
characterised by the implementation of indiscriminate repression by local authorities against suspect 
groups, such dynamics contribute to fuelling the process of mobilisation on the ground, jeopardising 
the very objectives that US security policies are meant to achieve. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
This work is organised into six chapters. The first two provide the knowledge and analytical tools for 
approaching the research topics, making a review of the related literature and laying down the 
conceptual and theoretical foundations on which the research is based. Then, the subsequent three 
chapters provide an analysis of the case study, exploring the impact of post-9/11 US policies on 
radicalisation in Kenya. Each of these chapters is dedicated to a different step of the causal 
mechanism, providing evidence in support of the predictions formulated. Finally, the last chapter sets 
out the conclusions of the study, discussing its implications. 
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Chapter 1 reviews the literature on the subjects under study. Starting by examining the main 
themes and debates related to post-9/11 US security policies and terrorism in Africa, it discusses 
works on the effects of security assistance and on the use of repressive policies by US African allies, 
showing the presence of a gap for what concerns the impact of US initiatives on the emergence of 
terrorism on the continent. Then, the chapter shifts its focus to the case study, providing a review of 
the literature on post-9/11 US security policies and radicalisation in Kenya.  
Chapter 2 sets out the conceptual and theoretical basis of the thesis. It lays down the definitions 
of radicalisation and terrorism adopted, offering a greater insight into the role played by CTS as the 
research orientation of this work. Then, the chapter examines in depth the proposed causal 
mechanism, exploring its underlying theoretical framework, along with the case-specific predictions 
for the Kenyan case.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the first step of the hypothesised causal mechanism (A  q). The chapter 
firstly provides a brief overview of US security assistance Africa, showing the programmes and 
initiatives implemented by the US administrations in the last decades. Then, after having confirmed 
the presence of scope condition 1 (C1) in the case under study, shedding light on the evolution of the 
terrorist threat in Kenya and East Africa, the chapter provides evidence in support of the prediction 
related to A  q. The chapter shows that, while keeping a low military presence on the ground, the 
US has provided increasing amounts of assistance to Kenyan security authorities to project its power 
in East Africa and fight Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab remotely.  
Chapter 4 deals with the second step of the causal mechanism (q r). It starts by attesting the 
presence of scope condition 2 (C2) in the case study. The chapter provides a historical account of the 
emergence of socio-political fractures between the Kenyan state and Muslim and ethnic Somali 
communities, showing how the latter have increasingly been perceived as a potential threat to security 
and subjected to indiscriminate repression in the post-9/11 period. Then, the chapter provides 
evidence in support of the prediction related to q  r, showing that, due to the limits characterising 
the US strategy of remote warfare, Kenya has managed to evade Washington’s pressure and avoid 
major sanctions while using security assistance to implement indiscriminate repression against 
Muslims and ethnic Somalis.   
Chapter 5 focuses on the third, and last, step of the causal mechanism (r  B). The chapter 
provides evidence in support of the prediction formulated in relation to r  B. It shows that Kenyan 
Muslim and ethnic Somali communities have become increasingly prone to mobilising into Al-
Shabaab when facing indiscriminate repression, managing to turn their aspiration into action thanks 
to the emergence and consolidation of conducive socio-political conditions.  
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The last chapter sets out the conclusions of the research. It discusses how the validity of the 
causal mechanism in the case study corroborates the research hypothesis, exploring empirical and 
theoretical implications. In so doing, the chapter treats issues of generalisation, calling for other 
holistic and interdisciplinary works exploring the proposed causal mechanism, with its underlying 




























This chapter provides a review of the literature dealing with the arguments treated in the thesis. 
Starting by exploring works on post-9/11 US security policies and terrorism in Africa, it then focuses 
on the main subjects characterising the case study of this research: post-9/11 US security policies and 
dynamics of radicalisation in Kenya.  
The chapter consists of four sections.  
The first section reviews the literature on post-9/11 US security policies and terrorism in Africa. 
It starts by analysing how scholars have interpreted and assessed shifts in the US approach towards 
the continent in the era of global terrorism. Debates here focus on the role that African states have 
played in the international arena since the beginning of the war on terror, and the impact of US 
economic and security concerns on the allocation of Washington’s assistance. Then, after having 
introduced the main features of post-9/11 US security policies in Africa, the section explores research 
examining the effects of US security assistance and investigating potential repercussions of US 
initiatives in the continent in terms of human rights and democratic governance. The section 
concludes by highlighting the presence of a gap in the literature for what concerns the study of the 
impact of US policies on the emergence of terrorism in African states.  
The second and third sections of the chapter review studies focusing on post-9/11 US security 
policies and radicalisation in Kenya. The second section begins by examining how scholars have 
explained the increasing significance of East Africa in the war on terror and the geo-strategic role 
played by Kenya in the post-9/11 US security framework. Thereafter, it explores research on US 
security assistance to Nairobi during the last two decades, considering its effects in military, 
humanitarian and political terms. The section concludes by analysing studies on post-9/11 US-Kenya 
cooperation along with works investigating the implications of Washington’s security concerns and 
demands in Kenya.   
The third section explores the literature on terrorism and radicalisation in Kenya. The scholarship 
in this area is relatively recent, as most of the research has been published in the 2010s, during the 
escalation of Al-Shabaab’s attacks in the country. The first part of the section focuses on the factors 
pointed out by scholars as the principal causes of radicalisation of Kenyans into terrorism. The second 
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part examines how studies have explained and assessed Al-Shabaab’s operations and mobilisation 
strategies in the country.  
Finally, a conclusive section summarises the main themes and debates reviewed in the chapter 
and discusses some implications. 
 
Post-9/11 US security policies and terrorism in Africa  
In 2000, during the electoral campaign, George W. Bush declared that, as far as he could see, Africa 
was not part of the US strategic interests (Walker and Seegers 2012). Two years later, the 2002 US 
National Security Strategy stated that American national interests and core values required the US to 
tackle state fragility and insecurity on the continent (White House 2002: 10). Since then, Washington 
has assumed a leading role in the promotion of security in many African states (Copson 2007; van de 
Walle 2009; Aldrich 2014; Westcott 2019). As authors note (Howell 2006; Owusu 2007; Piombo 
2007; I. Taylor 2010), whereas the years after the end of the Cold War registered a marked decrease 
in the US engagement in African security, in the last two decades, assistance to several African 
governments has reached unprecedented levels. The US has enhanced regional and bilateral 
cooperation with key partners, intensifying the provision of counter-terrorism training and equipment 
to African forces while also implementing more development-oriented projects in vulnerable areas 
(Ellis 2004; Aning 2010; Pham 2014; Hagmann and Reyntjens 2016). Since 2007, such efforts have 
fallen under the authority of the newly established US Africa Command (AFRICOM).   
Scholars have investigated why US perceptions changed so drastically in a such a short period 
of time. Most of the literature agrees that the challenge of instability in Africa came to prominence 
as intrinsically connected with the threat of international terrorism, reshaping the US foreign policy 
agenda (e.g., Mills 2004; Kraxberger 2005; Davis and Othieno 2007; Bachmann 2010; Kandel 2014). 
As the British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw argued with reference to the 9/11 attacks, “it is no longer 
necessary to prove a direct link between a troubled faraway country and the order of our own 
societies…Six months ago, no American could have proved a link between the chaos of Afghanistan 
and the safety of the thousands working in the World Trade Centre” (Straw 2002, quoted in 
Abrahamsen 2005: 65). According to this perspective, the 9/11 attacks demonstrated how major 
threats for international security could originate in territories where social, economic and political 
conditions facilitate the emergence and spread of violent extremism. Growing fluidity and 
interconnectedness characterising the global system were capable of amplifying considerably the 
magnitude of potential risks arising from insecurity and instability in the global South (Duffield 2001; 
Rotberg 2002). Along these lines, in a continent where Muslims represent approximately forty per 
cent of the total population, African fragile states started being regarded by Washington as potential 
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safe havens for Islamist terrorists, who could take advantage of porous borders, poor governance and 
weak security systems “to move men, weapons and money around the globe” (Mentan 2004: 2; see 
also Mills 2004; Kraxberger 2005; Mills and Herbst 2007; Newman 2007; Emerson 2008; Solomon 
2013). At the same time, Africa’s “ungoverned territories” and “opaque areas of activity”, were 
believed to provide fertile ground for the emergence of new clandestine organisations, opening 
another front in the war on terror (Pham 2007: 47, emphasis in original).  
Other studies, however, emphasise how the revival of US security policies in Africa in the post-
9/11 period has gone hand in hand with the rise of American economic interests in the Western and 
the Sahel regions of the continent (Stevenson 2003; Barnes 2005; Obi 2006; Pham 2008). Volman 
(2003) and Carmody (2005, 2011), for instance, contend that the counter-terrorism measures 
implemented by the Bush administration in Africa were influenced considerably by the rise of US oil 
interests during the early 2000s and the consequent willingness to secure geo-strategic areas from the 
threat of instability. Keenan (2009, 2013) goes further, arguing that US counter-terrorism measures 
have followed a specific strategy aimed primarily at addressing the domestic energy crisis. The 
existence of a planned and premeditated US strategy for Africa has been questioned by scholars 
emphasising “the absence of an overarching strategic vision” (van de Walle 2009: 11) in the pursuing 
of Washington’s initiatives in the continent, due to “the tension between the various agendas driving 
U.S. policy” (Branch 2011: 220; see also Olsen 2017). However, some works maintain that African 
people’s perceptions of US counter-terrorism policies as the expression of a broader strategy to 
achieve US interests on the ground (along with their fear of an “Iraqisation” of the continent, see 
Esterhuyse 2008: 127), lie at the heart of AFRICOM’s little success among local governments (e.g., 
Nathan 2009; Tella 2016).   
The literature has provided different interpretations of the effects of post-9/11 US security 
policies in Africa. Studies note how a lack of funding and the prioritisation of short-term security 
measures by US policy makers have resulted in a “steady erosion of the civilian component of 
America’s engagement”, arguing that “AFRICOM has…reverted to its more traditional military roots 
away from using the softer edge of military power” (Emerson 2014: 49-53; see also Matisek 2018). 
Scholars warn against the ‘militarisation’ of the US Africa policy and the prominence of the 
Department of Defense (DOD) in the management of US activities (e.g., Menkhaus 2009a; Bachman 
2010; Howell and Lind 2010; Wiley 2012; Abrahamsen 2016a). Such a trend, attested by the 
increasing role played by Special Operation Forces (SOF) and unmanned drones in the framework of 
US initiatives, is deemed to be unproductive in terms of security, marginalising longer-term and more 
targeted forms of engagement that could better achieve counter-terrorism objectives on the ground 
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while also fostering the political and economic development of the continent (Howell and Lind 2010; 
Ryan 2011; Solomon 2015a; Hagmann and Reyntjens 2016).  
Other works, however, take a less critical approach, framing US initiatives and the rise of 
AFRICOM as the demonstration of “an ever-increasing commitment to helping Africans address the 
challenges of security on their continent” (Forest and Crispin 2009; see also e.g., Penn 2008). Scholars 
in this field tend to regard US security assistance and cooperation with African governments as a 
major opportunity for the achievement of local security, political and development goals. In this view, 
McFate (2008a: 10; see also 2008b) stresses how AFRICOM has the potential to become a major 
“post-Cold War experiment that radically rethinks security in the early 21st century based on peace-
building lessons learned since the fall of the Berlin Wall”. Specifically, authors maintain that US 
measures to build African states’ military and police systems can play a crucial role in improving 
conditions on the ground, professionalising local forces (Jamieson 2009; Harkness 2015; see also 
Reveron 2010) and contributing to the eradication of terrorism in unstable contexts (Mills and Herbst 
2007). Such developments are deemed to be of fundamental importance in light of the spread of 
militant groups in West and East Africa during the last decade, with the expansion of major 
organisations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and Daesh such as Boko Haram, Ansar Dine and Al-Shabaab. 
The strengthening of security partnerships between African states and the US, with the intensification 
of military-to-military training activities on the African soil, would help local actors tackle emerging 
threats, shaping “more robust and stable local military institutions and civil-military relations over 
the long-term” (Harkness 2015: 22).  
There is a relatively young but rapidly growing body of scholarship exploring the effectiveness 
of US security cooperation and assistance, in the form of military aid, training and equipment. Some 
studies argue that US military aid “increases a recipient’s political will to comply” and cooperate in 
counter-terrorism operations (Jadoon 2018: 780), noting how the provision of training to local forces 
is correlated with an increase in state stability on the ground (Childs 2019). Other works, however, 
contend that a rise in US security support is not necessarily associated with safer security conditions 
(e.g., Gries, Meierrieks and Redlin 2015; Savage and Caverley 2017), but instead can even lead to an 
increase in anti-American terrorism in recipient countries (Neumayer and Plümper 2011; Dimant, 
Krieger and Meierrieks 2017). Scholars in this field problematise the effectiveness of training and 
equipping programmes in fragile settings, arguing that, without addressing internal problems related 
to “legitimacy, authority, and control”, US military initiatives risk having little or no positive effect, 
generating partner armies that resemble a “Fabergé egg”: very expensive in terms of maintenance but 
“easy to break” in the face of organised enemies (Matisek 2018: 274, 277; see also Reno 2018). 
Furthermore, authors place the emphasis on the role of agency, questioning the extent to which the 
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security interests of the US and its partners in the war on terror can systematically overlap (e.g., 
Tankel 2018). Specifically, research adopting a principal-agent perspective highlights the frequency 
of a misalignment between the goals of the US and those of recipient states, also identifying major 
limitations as to Washington’s ability to induce partners to act in furtherance of security objectives 
on the ground (e.g., Byman 2006; Berman et al. 2019; Powell 2019). As scholars stress, the promise 
of further aid (which is deemed necessary to motivate local actors to act) can easily disincentivise 
partners to eradicate external enemies (Biddle, Macdonald and Baker 2018), making “the business of 
fighting terrorists quite profitable” (Bapat 2011: 315). In this regard, Boutton notes how recipient 
states often tend to refrain from disarming terrorist groups when they necessitate increasing resources 
to cope with inter-state rivalry (Boutton 2014) and intra-state competition (Boutton 2016).  
Exploring such challenges, Paul, Clarke et al. (2013) maintain that Washington’s security 
policies are more effective when partner states present specific economic and political features, 
including a strong economic system and high standards of governance. A propensity for democracy 
among local leaders is identified as a critical factor also to improve stability in fragile countries (e.g., 
McNerney et al. 2014) and increase security and accountability in repressive settings (Jones et al. 
2006). In cases in which democratic conditions are absent or poorly developed, works maintain that 
US policy makers should at least strive to identify common security objectives with partners, fostering 
mechanisms of risk assessment allowing Washington to detect potential challenges in advance and to 
better handle unexpected responses by recipient governments (Paul, Moroney et al. 2015; Watts 
2015).  
Building on a notion of local agency as a crucial determinant of the effects of US security 
policies, this research contends that the identification of common security objectives with African 
partners does not imply that the latter perceive the nature of such objectives in the same way that 
Washington does, nor that they cannot use different means to achieve them. Crucially, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter, by relying on African security institutions as the main instrument to 
achieve security goals in the continent ‘remotely’, US policy makers risk rendering much of their 
strategy vulnerable to the perceptions and preferences of local actors, losing control of the aid 
provided. This raises critical questions regarding the impact of Washington’s initiatives in contexts 
where such perceptions and preferences converge towards the adoption of harsh security measures to 
deal with emerging threats.  
In this regard, the literature expresses serious concerns about the indiscriminate allocation of 
security assistance in a continent plagued by authoritarian and illiberal regimes such as Africa (e.g., 
Keenan 2008; Bruton and Williams 2014; Allen 2018). As development studies show, despite the 
process of democratisation involving many states since the 1990s, aid towards African governments 
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has frequently fallen prey of dynamics of corruption (e.g., Moyo 2009; Asongu and Jellal 2013), even 
contributing to extending the regulatory and enforcement power of local authorities over civil society, 
with a consequent deterioration of fundamental rights and freedoms of African citizens (Howell and 
Lind 2009, 2010; Hagmann and Reyntjens 2016).  
Several works criticise the Bush administration for having ensured increasing resources and 
military support to Africa’s repressive governments while at the same time failing to take sanctions 
against partners in cases of human rights violations (Barnes 2005; Jourde 2007; Zeleza 2007; Keenan 
2013). As scholars note (Pham 2014; van de Walle 2015), the Obama administration sought to give 
a new face to US security policies in the continent, placing the emphasis on the promotion of Africa’s 
development. The war on terror was reframed as part of Overseas Contingency Operations, with a 
closer focus on preventive measures aimed at tackling violent extremism at its roots by improving 
local socio-political and economic conditions (Wiley 2012). Still, critics emphasise that, despite the 
use of a different rhetoric, “the ‘kinetic’ fight–the use of deadly force by the U.S. military and 
intelligence agencies–…continued unabated” (Stern 2015: 63), while US security assistance to some 
African illiberal democracies even increased significantly (Ryan 2011; van de Walle 2015; Burchard 
and Burgess 2018; Usiskin 2019). In this regard, Kandel (2014: 16-17) stresses how the ‘light 
footprint approach’ promoted by the Obama administration “favour[ed] (on paper) an integrated 
approach”, but “in practice, U.S. foreign policy in Africa [was] based on a strategy of cooperation 
with African partner nations (almost all of the African states)” whose “primary objective [was] 
helping local armies build their capacities”. Despite the limited amount of research exploring the 
Trump administration’s approach to security in Africa, works highlight patterns of continuity with 
the previous administrations (e.g., Abrams 2017; Starr-Deelen 2017), raising concerns that the 
America-first policy promoted by the US president, along with his emphasis on great power 
competition, may set the ground for an even greater militarisation of the continent in the 2020s 
(Owusu, Reboredo and Carmody 2019).   
According to some authors, the indiscriminate allocation of US assistance to African allies is 
caused by a poor knowledge of the African continent (e.g., Uvin 2010; Metelits 2016). As Menkhaus 
notes (2009a: 56), “some of America’s closest African allies in the War on Terror are the principal 
source of insecurity to parts of their population, a fact which Africans understand much more keenly 
than the United States does”. Matisek remarks the point (2020: 110), maintaining that the US 
approach to the continent has often neglected “the unique histories, contexts, and cultures that inform 
the way authority, legitimacy, and power are organized and exercised in each state”. Solomon goes 
even further (2013: 438), arguing that the US has ignored “that the African state exists as a predatory 
vehicle of an elite political group generally belonging to a particular ethnic group”.  
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Other studies, instead, place a greater emphasis on the tension between the promotion of human 
rights and democratic values, on the one hand, and US pressing need for security, on the other (e.g., 
Adebajo 2003; Carothers 2003; Menkhaus 2009a). Specifically, critics raise concerns that post-9/11 
US security policies may be driven primarily by the “desire to safeguard the ‘here’ against the 
‘elsewhere’” (Abrahamsen 2016a: 34), that is, tackling threats undermining national interests 
regardless of humanitarian and political conditions in the African continent (Volman 2007; Besteman 
2008; Callaway and Mattews 2008; Keenan 2008). Aning, Jaye and Atuobi endorse this view (2008: 
614), arguing that “there is nothing altruistic about US involvement in Africa”, and highlighting US 
military and economic goals, along with the US-China competition for resources and influence, as 
among the major concerns underlying US security policies. After having analysed Washington’s use 
of sanctions against African partners in cases of human rights violations on the ground, Burchard and 
Burgess reach similar conclusions (2018: 362), noting that “in high security interest cases, security 
almost always wins over human rights”.  
However, some scholars argue that, despite humanitarian and political implications associated 
with post-9/11 US counter-terrorism support to and cooperation with illiberal partners, there are 
several arguments in favour of a continuation of such security relationships. As Byman maintains 
(2006: 114),  
 
although U.S. allies range from disappointing to abysmal, the jihadists they fight are typically far 
worse. The jihadists’ ideals and practices are bloody and back-ward, and the United States can be 
said to be on the ‘least worst’ side. Second, the area regimes do not want to kill Americans, and 
the jihadists do. Sheer self-interest dictates recognition of this difference, however distasteful to 
the allies. Third, the United States can push reform on its allies…this is difficult and likely to 
suffer many problems, but it is not impossible.  
 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, this research problematises such a perspective, contending 
that, in contexts characterised by the use of repressive means by local authorities, the provision of US 
support to African states can have serious effects, unintentionally contributing to exacerbating socio-
political frictions and fuelling violent dynamics of interaction among local actors causing an increase 
in radicalisation. Without a deep knowledge of the socio-political environment of recipient countries, 
as well as their history, arming and training the “‘least worst’ side’” (Byman 2006: 114) to fight 
terrorism from a distance may generate blowback.  
In this regard, some studies consider potential repercussions of US security efforts in Africa for 
what concerns the exacerbation of regional instabilities and the intensification of terrorism (Hills 
2006; Tynes 2006; Keenan 2013; Bruton and Williams 2014; Solomon 2015a). For example, Klare 
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and Volman (2006: 625) argue that “by developing close military relationships with unstable and 
unpopular regimes, and becoming ever more deeply involved in African conflicts, the USA is fuelling 
an upsurge in anti-American sentiment in the region and promoting the growth of Salafists and other 
Islamic jihadist groups”. Similarly, Keenan (2008: 19) stresses that, by militarising relations with 
African states, the US “will create more militants and hence unrest and insecurity, as we are seeing 
in most countries of North Africa and the Sahel”. Along these lines, Solomon (2015a) concludes that 
Washington’s approach to counter-terrorism in Africa risks turning sub-state terrorism in 
international terrorism, as in response to Washington’s counter-terrorism measures, local groups such 
as Ansar Dine and Boko Haram seek assistance from transnational organisations such as Al-Qaeda 
and Daesh.  
Still, although links between post-9/11 US security policies and terrorism in Africa have been 
mentioned by scholars, they have rarely, if ever, been investigated with reference to dynamics of 
radicalisation, exploring how US policies may have a detrimental impact on the rise of terrorism on 
the continent. As seen above, the literature on the US and terrorism in Africa has provided detailed 
explanations of the objectives underlying Washington’s post-9/11 initiatives, shedding light on the 
architecture designed by US policy makers to address emerging threats on the ground, discussing its 
opportunities as well as the potential political and humanitarian consequences. Yet, paradoxically, 
these accounts have not intertwined with examinations of the dynamics through which local people 
actually mobilise into Islamist groups, analysing whether, and through which mechanism, American 
efforts may affect them negatively. On the other hand, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the 
research on terrorism and radicalisation has often concentrated on militants and their organisations, 
prioritising explanations based on religious ideology or cultural strain at the expense of context-
related and political dynamics that, in the African continent, may turn US security assistance to local 
authorities into a counter-productive instrument. As recently argued by Brooks (2019: 393), more 
study has to be done on the way in which factors such as local civil-military relations affect the 
success of security efforts in recipient countries. Studies on contemporary warfare and counter-
terrorism in distant theatres echo such a call for future research, stressing that it is “important to find 
and amplify the voices of the communities in states where…operations are conducted” to understand 
their effects on the ground (McKay 2021: 240). There is a high need for further studies providing a 
more comprehensive picture of how US security policies impact on the socio-political environment 
of African societies by exploring dynamics of radicalisation into terrorism. Focusing on post-9/11 US 




Post-9/11 US security policies in Kenya 
Within the post-9/11 security framework, East Africa has increasingly been perceived by Western 
powers as playing a crucial role (Abrahamsen 2004; Lyman and Morrison 2004; Woodward 2006). 
Scholars highlight several factors that have rendered the territory “a battleground for jihadists and 
their foes” (Kagwanja 2006: 75). Firstly, the geographical location of the Horn region, overlooking 
the Middle East, with which local communities have historically maintained solid bonds (Glickman 
2003; De Waal 2004; Rotberg 2005). Such a proximity has often been regarded as facilitating the 
diffusion of radical ideologies and the transfer of weapons and militants (e.g., Kagwanja 2006). 
Furthermore, the 1991 collapse of the Barre’s regime, which plunged Somalia into chaos, opening 
the door to the spread of violent extremism, with the emergence of armed militias and radical religious 
movements (Dagne 2002; Menkhaus 2004, 2005; Woodward 2013). The porosity of the borders 
between East African countries, exacerbated by the high levels of corruption among local police 
forces, has allowed militants to move easily within the region (Shinn 2004; Duncker 2007; Losey 
2011). Finally, the presence of several Muslim communities associated with high levels of poverty 
and social exclusion is often mentioned as a factor facilitating the penetration of potential agitators 
and increasing the risk of terrorist recruitment (Kagwanja 2006; Otiso 2009).  
Research studies generally date back the first appearance of Al-Qaeda in East Africa to the early 
1990s, when the organisation established links with some local networks and began to conduct 
operations in the region (Haynes 2006; Watts, Shapiro and Brown 2007; S. J. Hansen 2013). In 1998, 
the group’s operatives carried out the first major attack, bombing the US embassies in Nairobi and 
Dar es Salaam. Nairobi had already suffered from terrorism in the previous decades, being the theatre 
of a dramatic attack by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in 1980 (Ndzovu 
2014). However, according to some authors (Mogire and Mkutu 2011), the vulnerability of the 
Kenyan security system to non-state actors remained underestimated by Western powers until the 
1998 US embassy bombings due to the widespread perception that previous incidents were too 
isolated to denote an actual threat.  
The 1998 attacks led to an increase in security cooperation between the US and Kenya (Aronson 
2013). Yet, several works in the literature highlight how a major intensification of US security 
assistance policies in the country occurred only after the beginning of the war on terror (Muhula 2007; 
Ruteere and Ogada 2010; Prestholdt 2011; Bachman 2012). Such an intensification has been 
explained in relation to several factors determining Kenya’s geo-strategic significance in the post-
9/11 US security framework. Authors highlight how, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Kenya was 
one of the few East African countries not afflicted by domestic political conflicts (Aronson 2011) and 
was perceived by Washington as the most stable ally against terrorism “in a volatile and violent 
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subregion” (Barkan and Cooke 2001: 1). However, Kenya was also regarded as a weak state and a 
potential sanctuary for terrorists (Bachmann and Hönke 2009), lacking capacities and resources to 
secure its territory (Otiso 2009; Mabera 2016). Such considerations assumed further relevance in light 
of the proximity with Somalia, with which Kenya shares nearly 700 kilometres of poorly policed 
border, and of the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al-Shabaab during the mid- and 
late 2000s (S. Mair 2003; Rabasa 2009). According to scholars, the country has progressively 
represented a “bulwark” against the spread of terrorism in East Africa (Collier 2015: 38), as well as 
the “gateway to the Horn of Africa…for the…pursuit of terrorist masterminds” (Muhula 2007: 47). 
Finally, studies argue that Kenya has been perceived by the US as a crucial security partner in the 
post-9/11 period also because of the country’s economy and transport network, which are of 
fundamental value for the economic development of neighbouring countries and the Horn region 
(Carson 2005: 174-175).  
Since the early 2000s, the US has provided Kenya with security support, adding Nairobi to 
regional counter-terrorism initiatives (Whitaker 2010; Prestholdt 2011; Bachman 2012). A growing 
body of scholarship has investigated the effects US policies in the country. Some studies argue that 
high levels of American engagement have helped Kenyan security authorities develop a more solid 
counter-terrorism architecture, advancing security in the region (e.g., Losey 2011). As authors 
maintain (Watts, Jackson et al. 2018; Watts, Johnston et al. 2018), Kenyan troops benefiting from US 
counter-terrorism aid and military-to-military exchanges have shown increasing professionalism and 
have achieved considerable successes in the fight against Al-Shabaab, performing well even during 
complex operations.   
Other works, however, are more sceptical regarding the effects of post-9/11 US security policies 
in the country. According to some analysts, despite contributing to strengthening local defence 
capabilities, increasing US investments in the Kenyan security sector have had major implications in 
terms of national security, attracting the reprisal of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab (Muhula 2007; Otiso 
2009; see also Bruton and Williams 2014). Critics also place the emphasis on the socio-economic and 
political dimensions characterising the war on terror in Kenya, highlighting the risk that Washington’s 
counter-terrorism concerns in East Africa may overshadow major security problems of Kenyan 
people stemming from factors such as poverty and less than exceptional civil-military relations, 
consequently causing a “depreciation of human rights” on the ground (Ruteree and Ogada 2010: 227; 
see also Bachman and Hönke 2009; Lind and Howell 2010; Brown and Raddatz 2014). As scholars 
stress, while providing local forces with more sophisticated instruments to combat East African 
militants, US assistance has played a limited role in enhancing democracy and socio-economic 
conditions in Kenya (Hills 2006; Laugesen 2015). On the contrary, according to some studies, “U.S. 
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diplomatic pressure and promises of aid have encouraged Kenyan authorities to fight a sometimes 
spurious war, which paints dramatic pictures of authorities’ efforts, but does less to address tangible 
security threats [to the Kenyan population]” (Prestholdt 2011: 5). In this view, rather than improving 
local governance, post-9/11 US security demands and counter-terrorism support have pushed the 
Kenyan government to tighten up security measures and attack “what it saw, or what was presented 
to it, as the root cause of radicalisation”, increasing police control over mosques and madrassas and 
exacerbating tensions in the country (Mogire and Mkutu 2011: 481). Several works raise concerns 
with regard to the heavy-handed approach adopted by Nairobi to deal with security threats in the last 
two decades, noting how Kenyan counter-terrorism operations have frequently degenerated into 
widespread human rights violations against the Muslim population, especially ethnic Somali 
communities (e.g., Williams 2014; Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom 2015, 2017; Mogire, Mkutu and Alusa 
2018).  
However, in line with what was argued in the previous section, while considering humanitarian 
and political repercussions of US security initiatives in Kenya, the literature has tended to overlook 
potential implications in terms of radicalisation. Contextualising post-9/11 US policies in the country 
within a strategy of ‘remote warfare’, this study explores whether and how such policies may affect 
the process of mobilisation to violence, focusing on Kenya’s socio-political environment as a major 
determinant for the effectiveness of Washington’s military efforts as well as US ‘softer’ counter-
terrorism measures. 
As regards these latter measures, the scholarship on US security policies in Kenya highlights the 
increased use of US military-led development initiatives in the post-9/11 period as an instrument to 
tackle socio-economic problems in vulnerable areas, winning hearts and minds of local people and 
finding an “entry point into communities that are potentially hostile to the US and its interests” 
(Bradbury and Kleinman 2010: 4). Such initiatives have included infrastructural, educational and 
health-care projects implemented by personnel from the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa 
(CJTF-HOA) in the north-eastern and coastal regions of Kenya, characterised by a high concentration 
of Muslims and ethnic Somalis (Bachmann 2017, 2018). Studies register mixed results of CJTF-HOA 
efforts, with some positive acceptance of US development projects by Muslims living in the Lamu 
area (Howell and Lind 2009). However, most of the literature is sceptical about the effectiveness of 
US ‘soft’ measures in the country, stressing that the increasing support to national authorities has 
contributed to providing a picture of US operatives as closely associated with Kenya’s heavy-handed 
counter-terrorism policies, generating mistrusts among local communities (e.g., Seesemann 2007; 
Bachmann and Hönke 2009; Bradbury and Kleinman 2010; Ndzovu 2014).  
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Besides focusing on the implementation of security initiatives, the literature on US policies in 
Kenya has also examined Washington’s diplomatic efforts and post-9/11 cooperation with Kenyan 
policy makers. In this respect, works note how the Suppression of Terrorism (SOT) Bill, adopted by 
the Kenyan government in 2003, has been widely perceived by Kenyans as Nairobi’s response to US 
pressure concerning the drafting of anti-terror regulations (e.g., Kamau 2006; Whitaker 2007; 
Bachmann 2012; Mazrui, Njogu and Goldsmith 2018). The SOT Bill, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 4 of the thesis, provided a vague definition of terrorism and foresaw a major extension of 
police powers. However, growing opposition from Kenyan politicians and civil society forced the 
government to withdraw the document (Howell and Lind 2009). Authors show that, before the 
increase in Al-Shabaab’s activities in the country during the early 2010s, most of Kenyans did not 
consider terrorism as a major concern (Krause and Otenyo 2005), while a considerable part of the 
population was disturbed by Washington’s increasing interference in Kenyan politics (Whitaker 
2008, 2010). As a consequence, some studies maintain that Nairobi found itself in the crossfire, 
trapped between US expectations regarding the enhancement of legal and political instruments to 
fight terrorism and the fear of losing internal political support by accommodating US demands 
(especially in light of the increasing political clout of Muslim communities in the Kenyan electoral 
system; see e.g., Watts, Shapiro and Brown 2007; Whitaker 2008).    
Scholars regard such a tension between national and international pressures as contributing to 
generating major frictions in the US-Kenya security relationship, resulting in the maintenance of US 
travel advisories discouraging journeys to the country (e.g., Kamau 2006; Otiso 2009). In this respect, 
however, Whitaker (2008: 256) identifies Kenya as a “reluctant partner” in the US-led war on terror, 
arguing that, while domestic political pressures hampered Kenyan government’s public compliance 
with US guidelines during the 2000s, security cooperation continued “behind the scenes”. In this 
perspective, episodes such as Nairobi’s refusal to sign a Bilateral Immunity Agreement (BIA) in the 
mid-2000s, exempting US military personnel from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), are not framed as deteriorating the partnership with Washington, but instead as attempts of 
Kenyan authorities to “gain popular support by resisting U.S. preferences”, which, however, did not 
compromise joint counter-terrorism efforts out of the public eye (Whitaker 2008: 267). Such an 
unwillingness of Kenyan authorities to overtly align with the US would cease in the face of the 
escalation of Al-Shabaab’s attacks in the country, when increasing security concerns led Nairobi to 
adopt a more responsive approach towards Washington’s demands (Whitaker 2014).  
The ‘reluctant partner’ thesis has fostered debate in the academic world, attracting consensus 
(e.g., Aronson 2011) as well as criticism. For instance, Fisher (2013) argues that, contrary to 
Whitaker’s argument, Kenya’s democratic pressures and domestic political constraints actually 
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hampered national authorities from projecting the image of a reliable and committed security partner 
to the eyes of US policy makers. Such a poor “image management” would have considerable effects 
on the allocation of US military and defence assistance, causing the suspension of some assistance 
programmes in the country and the provision of greater amounts of aid to other East African allies 
perceived as ‘more reliable’ (Fisher 2013: 2).    
However, findings reported by several works challenge such a view, showing how, despite 
diplomatic setbacks, in the last two decades Kenya has remained Washington’s major security partner 
in East Africa (e.g., Muhula 2007; Bachman 2012). As some authors emphasise, Nairobi has 
maintained a close relationship with the US, even allowing American forces to use the Kenyan 
territory to carry out counter-terrorism operations in Somalia (Mogire and Mkutu 2011; Mazrui, 
Njogu and Goldsmith 2018). Indeed, while Kenyan security units have continued to benefit from US 
counter-terrorism initiatives, increasing investments have turned Camp Simba (in Manda Bay, close 
to the Somali border) into a US military outpost on the Kenyan soil (Bachman and Hönke 2009; 
Prestholdt 2011; Turse 2015).  
Along these lines, a more detailed picture of the post-9/11 US-Kenya relationship is provided by 
studies maintaining that, when confronted with national and international expectations, Nairobi has 
carried out a strategic management of US pressure and domestic criticism (Bachmann 2012), seeking 
to take advantage of Kenya’s geo-strategic significance in the post-9/11 scenario “to maximize the 
material benefits derived from its partnership with the United States” while at the same time 
minimising the “accompanying costs” associated with public compliance (Watts, Shapiro and Brown 
2007: 59; see also Hills 2006). In this way, as Bachman clarifies (2012: 126) “the Kenyan government 
[has] balance[d] what seem at first glance contradictory security agendas, ranging from following a 
responsibility to protect, to exercising economic self-interest, to executing international 
counterterrorism interests”. As will be shown in Chapter 3 and 4, several pieces of evidence point to 
the actual existence of tensions between US policy makers and Kenyan authorities during the 2000s, 
due to Kenya’s little counter-terrorism efforts. Still, in the last two decades, Kenyan authorities have 
managed to handle US discontent and frustration, being aware that Washington’s counter-terrorism 
concerns in East Africa require the US not to disengage or take measures against non-compliance that 
may weaken a crucial security partner in the fight against Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab.  
 
Radicalisation in Kenya 
As seen in the previous section, while exploring diplomatic cooperation, development initiatives and 
the provision of counter-terrorism support to local forces, the scholarship on US security efforts in 
Kenya during the last decades has not addressed potential repercussions of Washington’s policies on 
40 
 
the process of mobilisation into terrorism. Some authors have made reference to humanitarian and 
political implications of US activities in the country. Still, the literatures on US policies and 
radicalisation in Kenya have so far not intertwined to provide a full account of the mechanism through 
which such policies may impact on dynamics of interaction among social actors on the ground and, 
through them, on national security. This section complements the above one by reviewing works on 
terrorism and radicalisation in Kenya. As will be shown in the following pages, most of the studies 
have tended to overlook the way in which state-society relationships within the counter-terrorism 
framework may contribute to fuelling frictions in the country and generating a socio-political 
environment favouring the rise of terrorism. Such a state of affairs, which, as discussed in the next 
chapter, reflects broader trends in the research on terrorism, has contributed to hampering the study 
of US policies and radicalisation in Kenya, neglecting crucial drivers of mobilisation into terrorism 
that may be affected by Washington’s intervention.  
A considerable problem that emerges when exploring the scholarship on radicalisation in Kenya 
is that the term itself is rarely defined. Consequently, understanding whether authors refer to 
behavioural or cognitive processes is frequently a hard task. As illustrated in the next chapter, such a 
complication, stemming primarily from the absence of a universal definition of radicalisation, is not 
restricted to the research on terrorism in Kenya. A second difficulty concerns the estimation of the 
scope of radicalisation in relation to the Kenyan Muslim population (including ethnic Somalis), given 
that figures on the number of Muslims in Kenya are still debated. Scholars have provided different 
percentages, ranging from 5-10 per cent (e.g., Haynes 2006; Rabasa 2009) to 15-20 per cent (e.g., 
Oded 2002; Seesemann 2007; Whitaker 2008). The majority of recent studies identify Muslims as 
corresponding to around 10-11 per cent of the total population (e.g., Mwinyihaj and Wanyama 2017; 
Cannon and Ruto Pkalya 2019).    
One of the most cited causal factors in the literature on radicalisation in Kenya is religious 
ideology. Works observe that, in the last decades, Wahhabism has increasingly spread across Kenyan 
Muslim communities, as a consequence of Saudi Arabia’s efforts in financing the establishment of 
Islamic NGOs, charitable organisations, madrassas and mosques in the country (Møller 2006; Lind, 
Mutahi and Oosterom 2017; Mutahi and Kabala 2018). Scholars regard such doctrine as playing a 
crucial role in encouraging Kenyan Muslims to take up arms for the cause of Islam, pushing some of 
them into the arms of Somali terrorists (e.g., Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens 2014). As Lind, Mutahi 
and Oosterom highlight (2017), in 2006, several Kenyan Muslims and Islamic preachers that received 
funds for studying in Arab countries crossed the border and went to Somalia to support the Islamic 
Courts Union (ICU). Along these lines, in her study on Kenyan women joining Al-Shabaab, 
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Badurdeen (2018a) identifies religious ideology, along with economic and sentimental reasons, as a 
fundamental aspect of voluntary recruitment.  
Other authors, however, frame Kenya’s liberal religious tradition, along with the preponderance 
of Sufism in the country, as a shield against the spread of radicalism among local Muslim 
communities (Haynes 2006; Vittori, Bremer and Vittori 2009). Writing in 2005, Rosenau holds that 
Kenya could not be considered a fertile ground for terrorism, since, despite presenting potential 
“agitators” and a certain degree of state weakness in the field of security, the country resisted the 
penetration of a “mobilizing belief” in the form of religious radicalism (Rosenau 2005: 5).   
Mwakimako and Willis (2014: 9-10) take a different position, claiming that it would be too 
simplistic to associate Sufism with moderation and Salafism with political violence, as “race, 
ethnicity, and attitudes to devotion all cross-cut in unpredictable ways with ideas about the place of 
Islam in politics”. Rather, the authors emphasise Kenyan government’s exclusionary policies as a 
driver of instability, fuelling tensions between the state and the Muslim minority (Mwakimako and 
Willis 2014). Such a view has been shared by studies focusing on socio-economic marginalisation 
and inequality as major causes of radicalisation in the country (Nzes 2012; Hellsten 2016; Mazrui, 
Njogu and Goldsmith 2018).  
In this respect, scholars argue that poverty, unemployment and lack of economic opportunities 
increase the effectiveness of terrorist recruitment strategies among Kenyan vulnerable groups (Nzes 
2014; Mkutu and Opondo 2019). As stressed in the literature, Muslim and ethnic Somali communities 
living in the north-eastern and coastal areas have historically suffered from underdevelopment, being 
marginalised by national economic programmes (S. D. Mueller 2014; Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom 
2015). The increase in social fragmentation and the consolidation of ‘ungoverned spaces’ (Mwangi 
2017b) are regarded as having substantial implications for Kenya’s security (Patterson 2015; Ruteere 
and Mutahi 2018). Studies maintain that the promise of financial gain has represented a crucial 
incentive for several youths recruited by Al-Shabaab in Mombasa and Garissa counties (Mkutu, 
Marani and Ruteere 2014) and in Lamu county (Mutahi and Kabala 2018). Speckhard and Shajkovci 
(2019) put forward a similar argument, identifying economic needs as one of the major causes of 
recruitment pointed out by former Al-Shabaab’s Kenyan militants.  
Authors underline that the worsening of Kenyan Muslims’ living conditions has been directly 
proportional to the spread of ideologies portraying the Islamic world as under attack by Western 
forces, as well as to the strengthening of a sense of belonging to the global Ummah (Seesemann 2007; 
see also Badurdeen 2012; Nalugala 2017). This also because, as some works contend (e.g., Carson 
2005), in the absence of careful political institutions, Kenyan religious leaders and Islamic 
organisations have progressively replaced the state in addressing Muslims’ grievances. Along these 
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lines, exploring the personal background of Kenyan people recruited into Al-Shabaab, Botha (2014a, 
2015) adopts a political socialisation perspective to explain the formation of religious identities 
underlying the radicalisation process in the country. Religious identification, rather than religious 
ideology per se, is also highlighted by Rink and Sharma (2016) as a determinant of radicalisation in 
Nairobi’s Eastleigh District.  
Some authors frame the increasing media coverage of Kenyan Muslims in the war on terror as a 
major opportunity for such communities to abandon their historically peripheral status in the country, 
contributing to their socio-political integration at national level (Mwinyihaj and Wanyama 2017). 
This argument, however, is in sharp contrast with the findings of research studies investigating the 
impact of Kenyan government’s security policy among the Muslim and ethnic Somali population 
(Burbidge 2015; Whittaker 2015; Mazrui, Njogu and Goldsmith 2018). In this regard, according to 
Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom (2017: 119), Nairobi’s response to terrorism can be compared to “killing 
a mosquito with a hammer”, in the sense that, instead of acknowledging socio-economic problems 
and inequality as a critical component of Kenya’s vulnerability, national security authorities have 
contributed to worsening the living conditions of marginalised communities, cracking down on 
Muslims and ethnic Somalis. Some studies argue that growing violence in the counter-terrorism 
framework may have serious implications, as human rights violations risk generating dangerous 
tensions among social groups, undermining national security (Mkutu, Marani and Ruteere 2014; 
Mwakimako and Willis 2014; Anderson and McKnight 2015a; Mwangi 2017a). However, scholars 
have rarely provided detailed accounts of the way in which such processes may affect radicalisation, 
exploring whether, and above all how, violent dynamics of interaction within the counter-terrorism 
framework could fuel mobilisation into terrorism among the Kenyan communities involved, 
favouring the activities of Al-Shabaab in the country.   
As regards the latter, the literature provides several explanations for the intensification of Al-
Shabaab’s operations in Kenya during recent years. One of the main arguments is that the launch of 
the 2011 Operation Linda Nchi by the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) played a crucial role. The 
operation, which involved approximately two thousand military personnel crossing the border with 
Somalia (Olsen 2018), was a major attempt by Kenya to dismantle the terrorist group by attacking its 
strongholds in the southern areas of the country. Despite KDF being formally integrated within the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2012, many scholars identify Linda Nchi as a major 
factor triggering Al-Shabaab’s retaliation (e.g., Anderson and McKnight 2015a; Halakhe 2020). 
Others, however, criticise such an explanation, stressing Al-Shabaab’s long-standing ambition to 
expand its activities in Kenya due to factors such as “international status and visibility, the presence 
of the region’s mostly-free media, a highly developed and lucrative tourist sector” (Cannon and Ruto 
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Pkalya 2019: 837). Another hypothesis, which has already been mentioned in the previous section, 
focuses on Kenya’s close relation with Western countries such as the US (or even the UK and Israel), 
that is regarded as attracting Somali terrorism (Muhula 2007; Otiso 2009; Mogire, Mkutu and Alusa 
2018). Studies also point to widespread corruption and lack of accountability among Kenyan forces 
in the border area with Somalia as crucial incentives for militants to target the country (e.g., Wise 
2011; Hope 2018; Mogire, Mkutu and Alusa 2018).   
A final reason for the increase in Al-Shabaab’s activities in Kenya, which will be further explored 
in Chapter 3, places the emphasis on militants’ survival strategies. While recognising that the fight 
against the KDF and AMISOM troops has considerably damaged Al-Shabaab (Kfir 2017), and that 
the organisation has entered the “beginning of its political end-game” in Somalia (Williams 2014: 
922), some studies underline the “resilience” (Anzalone 2016a) and “reinvention” (D. Anderson 
2014a; Bryden 2014; Williams 2014) of Al-Shabaab. According to this perspective, the group has 
succeeded in adapting to the changing regional scenario and can hardly be defeated by relying just 
on military interventions (N. Anderson 2016; J. C. Mueller 2018). As works note (Bryden 2014; 
Anderson and McKnight 2015a; Bryden 2015), such an adaptation, which began in the early 2010s, 
led militants to shift from a tactic based primarily on territorial control to a more volatile approach. 
In Somalia, the new Al-Shabaab has actually withdrawn from several strongholds, turning to rural 
guerrilla warfare (Meservey 2013; Bryden 2015). In the meantime, however, the group has relied 
heavily on networks and connections with foreign cells in East Africa to extend its radius of action 
while, at the same time, gaining new resources and support (Gatsiounis 2013; Bryden 2014; Williams 
2014).  
Kenya has been among the main targets (S. J. Hansen 2013; Williams 2014; Glazzard et al. 2018). 
As noted in the literature, besides intensifying attacks in the country, in the last decade Al-Shabaab 
has also stepped up recruitment activities. The rise of an affiliated clandestine organisation in Kenya, 
Al-Hijra, has contributed to the group’s operations, disseminating the terrorist message (Anzalone 
2012; Nzes 2014; Anderson and McKnight 2015a). In this respect, works show that, whether Al-
Shabaab’s propaganda initially focused primarily on ethnic Somali people, since the late 2000s the 
group has leaned towards a more internationalist agenda, broadening its potential support base beyond 
the boundaries of Somali ethnicity (Gartenstein-Ross 2009; Vidino, Pantucci and Kohlmann 2010; 
Meleagrou-Hitchens, Maher and Shaheen 2012; S. J. Hansen 2013; Kfir 2017). An increasing number 
of Kenyan Muslims other than ethnic Somalis have responded to the call, embarking on a journey to 
Somalia or committing themselves to fight jihad in their home country (Chonka 2016; Torbjörnsson 
and Jonsson 2016).  
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Exploring such a rise in Kenyan recruits, some studies empty Al-Shabaab’s mobilisation 
strategies of all political substance, maintaining that the group’s “messaging formulated for Kenyan 
Muslims is based primarily on appealing to the global Salafi-jihadist narrative rather than on local 
issues” (Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens 2014: 528 emphasis in original). Others, however, highlight 
a more strategic use of messages and declarations to achieve recruitment of Kenyan Muslims (e.g., 
S. J. Hansen 2013; Menkhaus 2014a, 2014b; D. Mair 2017). According to this view, militants have 
sought to exploit local grievances, using a religious rhetoric to delegitimise national authorities and 
isolate potential supporters from the state (Anzalone 2012; Anderson and McKnight 2015a, 2015b; 
Anzalone 2016; Glazzard et al. 2018). As discussed in Chapter 5, this research aligns with such a 
perspective, arguing that, by capitalising on local dynamics of violent interaction between Kenyan 
counter-terrorism forces and suspect groups, Al-Shabaab has gained increasing appeal among 
potential supporters, fostering connections with the Muslim minority.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the main themes and debates in the literature on post-9/11 US security 
policies and terrorism in Africa, post-9/11 US security policies in Kenya and radicalisation in Kenya. 
As shown, the research highlights how, since the beginning of the war on terror, the US has enhanced 
security cooperation with key partners in Africa, setting up a major security architecture to catalyse 
increasing efforts in the continent. However, studies provide different explanations with regard to the 
drivers of US policies, with some scholars prioritising Washington’s economic interests on the ground 
as the major cause for involvement in African security affairs. In the case of US policies in Kenya, 
most of the works stress Nairobi’s geo-strategic significance in the fight against terrorism in East 
Africa as a crucial factor causing the increase in US security assistance in the post-9/11 period. While 
representing a natural barrier against the spread of instability from Somalia, Kenya is also framed as 
a vulnerable target for terrorists, having suffered a dramatic escalation of attacks in the last decade.   
The research also presents contrasting views with regard to the effects of post-9/11 US security 
policies. According to some scholars, US military and defence assistance to African countries has 
contributed to increasing security on the ground and shaping better social conditions, 
professionalising local forces and improving civil-military relations. Other authors, however, are 
more sceptical with regard to the impact of US security efforts, raising concerns that the 
‘militarisation’ of US aid may overshadow development goals and worsen living conditions in 
recipient countries. Similar debates can be found in the literature on post-9/11 US security policies in 
Kenya. In this respect, while some works emphasise how US security aid has improved Kenya’s 
counter-terrorism capabilities in the fight against Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, others contend that 
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Washington’s increasing support has a potentially dangerous impact, increasing social tensions in the 
country or even triggering the reprisal of East African terrorist cells.     
As argued in the first section of the chapter, existing research lacks an account of the way in 
which post-9/11 US security policies in Africa intertwine and interact with the socio-political 
environment in which they are implemented, affecting radicalisation. Particularly, the scholarship 
lacks a thorough analysis of the mechanism through which, by relying on indirect support to fight 
threats in distant theatres, post-9/11 US policies may unintentionally contribute to setting in motion 
dynamics fuelling violence on the ground and increasing mobilisation into terrorism. This is 
especially true in the case of Kenya, where the literatures on US security efforts and radicalisation 
have so far remained largely unconnected. As shown, although some authors highlight potentially 
negative repercussions of Kenya’s heavy-handed counter-terrorism measures, studies on 
radicalisation have generally concentrated on religious identity, ideology and socio-economic 
grievances as the major causes of mobilisation into terrorism. In so doing, political drivers of 
radicalisation, which may be sensitive to US indirect interventions through security cooperation and 
assistance, have been overlooked. Such a state of affairs is partly a consequence of the ambiguity of 
the very term ‘radicalisation’. As noted above, most of the research on terrorism in Kenya does not 
provide a definition of radicalisation, complicating the study of external forces which may impinge 
on the process through which it unfolds. More than that, however, works have tended to abstract 
terrorism from the socio-political context in which it emerges, treating radicalisation in isolation from 
counter-terrorism efforts and, more broadly, the relational dynamics among social actors on the 
ground.  
To address such complexity surrounding the study of radicalisation and terrorism, the next 
chapter provides clarity regarding the definitions adopted in this research, setting out its conceptual 















This chapter outlines the conceptual and theoretical framework of the research, providing an insight 
into the causal mechanism hypothesised to connect post-9/11 US security policies and radicalisation 
in Africa.  
The chapter is composed of five sections. 
The first section conceptualises radicalisation and terrorism, exploring the main debates on their 
meaning and providing the definitions adopted by this research. In so doing, the section discusses 
some of the elements characterising a critical theory-inspired orientation towards the study of 
(counter-)terrorism, examining two conceptual issues: the search for the ‘terrorist profile’ and the 
existence of a ‘new’ kind of terrorism in the form of transnational Islamist terrorism.   
The second section goes into more depth as regards the role played by Critical Terrorism Studies 
(CTS) as the research orientation of this study. It explains how deepening and broadening the analysis 
of (counter-)terrorism helps uncover crucial dynamics affecting the impact of US security policies on 
radicalisation on the African continent, ultimately contributing to the construction of the proposed 
causal mechanism.    
The third and fourth sections of the chapter examine in detail the theoretical foundation on which 
the causal mechanism is built, also discussing the three case-specific predictions that have been 
formulated in relation to the case study of the thesis: post-9/11 US security policies in Kenya. The 
third section explores the research on remote warfare and security assistance upon which the first two 
steps of the mechanism (A  q  r) draw. The fourth section of the chapter details the Social 
Movement Theory (SMT) approach to radicalisation that underlies Step 3 of the causal mechanism 
(r  B).  
Finally, the last section of the chapter summarises the main features of the proposed framework 
and discusses some of its implications.   
 
Conceptualising radicalisation and terrorism 
In recent years, the term ‘radicalisation’ has gained increasing currency in the academic literature, as 
well as in public and media debates. The meaning of the term has changed considerably throughout 
history, from early conceptualisations of ‘radicals’ in the nineteenth century (Schmid 2013; 
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Lindekilde 2016) to its connotation in research on social movements and the emergence of political 
violence during the 1970s and the 1980s (della Porta and LaFree 2012). Today, radicalisation is 
commonly associated with terrorism. Such a link was accentuated after the 9/11 attacks and the 
beginning of the war on terror, as part of a new effort by the research community to explore the 
pathways towards Islamist militancy (Silke and Brown 2016). The post-9/11 period has witnessed a 
marked rise in the number of studies on terrorism, with the creation of specialised journals (Githens-
Mazer and Lambert 2010; Sedgwick 2010; Silke and Schmidt-Petersen 2015).  
However, despite the proliferation of works addressing radicalisation, there is still a lack of 
clarity regarding the meaning of the concept. Such a state of affairs is primarily due to the absence of 
a universal definition; a fact that complicates substantially the study of the factors triggering the 
process, as well as the interchange between academia and the political world. To address such a 
problem, during the last two decades, scholars and government agencies have proposed a considerable 
number of definitions. Several of these focus on psychological processes that may increase individual 
propensity to violence. For example, Doosje et al. (2016: 79) regard radicalisation as “a process 
through which people become increasingly motivated to use violent means against members of an 
out-group or symbolic targets to achieve behavioral change and political goals”. Similarly, the US 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines radicalisation as “the process of adopting an 
extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method 
to effect social change” (Homeland Security Institute 2006: 2, 12 quoted in Schmid 2013: 12).  
Other definitions, however, place a greater emphasis on the violent component of radicalisation. 
In this regard, Olesen (2009: 8) concentrates on “the process through which individuals and 
organizations adopt violent strategies – or threaten to do so – in order to achieve political goals”, 
while della Porta and LaFree (2012: 5) regard radicalisation as “a process leading towards the 
increased use of political violence”. 
 On the whole, it is possible to identify two different connotations of radicalisation. The first one, 
generally called “cognitive” (Neumann 2013: 873; Hafez and Mullins 2015: 961; Sageman 2016: 90) 
or “non-violent” (Bartlett and Miller 2012: 2) radicalisation, denotes a change “towards more 
‘radical’ political beliefs or demands” (Malthaner 2017: 371), culminating with the acquisition of a 
radical mindset that although may facilitate involvement in violence in certain contexts, does not 
necessarily lead to it.  
The second type of radicalisation, termed “behavioural” (Vidino 2010: 5; Neumann 2013: 873) 
or “violent” (Bartlett and Miller 2012: 2), focuses on dynamics culminating with involvement in 
violence. This study concentrates on such a type of radicalisation, investigating the process through 
which people mobilise into terrorism, joining a terrorist group. In a way, this understanding of 
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radicalisation makes the concept resemble that of terrorist recruitment. However, while the latter 
places more emphasis on the role of the terrorist group in gaining new adherents (who ‘are recruited’), 
‘mobilisation’ shifts the focus to (mobilising) people, better capturing the dynamics that lead them to 
engage in terrorism.   
Conceiving radicalisation as mobilisation into terrorism requires a definition of the latter term. 
However, as Tilly reminds us (2005: 18), “no one owns the definitions of terror, terrorism, or 
terrorists”. Indeed, as well as for radicalisation, there is not a universal definition and, according to 
some authors, “it is unlikely that any definition will ever be generally agreed upon” (Shafritz, Gibbons 
and Scott 1991, quoted in Silke 1998: 54). Scholars and governments have proposed several 
interpretations of the concept, examining its core elements from different angles and theoretical 
perspectives. In the Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, Easson and Schmid (2011: 99-158) 
list more than 250 definitions. Still, political, theoretical and ethical constraints have hampered 
agreements on what constitutes terrorism.   
Such an elusive nature of terrorism has been explained by studies with reference to the different 
connotations that the term has had in previous centuries. According to this view, the meaning of the 
act of terrorism, as well as the political profile of its perpetrators, has changed considerably since the 
establishment of the Reign of Terror during the French revolution (Hoffman 2006), leading some 
authors to distinguish various ‘waves’ of terrorism (Rapoport 2001) and to differentiate between old 
and ‘new’ terrorism (Laqueur 1999; Neumann 2009; Bolanos 2012). Nonetheless, it is possible to 
identify some crucial points around which the debate on the definition of terrorism has revolved. 
Among these, there is the target of the terrorist act.   
Several works regard the targeting of civilians or non-combatants as a necessary element in the 
definition of terrorism (Reilly 1994; Coady 2004; Kapitan 2004; Richardson 2006). Ganor (2002: 
294), for example, identifies terrorism as “the intentional use of, or threat to use, violence against 
civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims”. Such a view, however, has not 
been immune from criticism, due to frequent difficulties in distinguishing military targets from non-
military ones (Jackson 2011; Shanahan 2016) and to governments’ wide margin of discretion in 
deciding what a civilian target is (Bryan 2012).   
The symbolic and communicative component of terrorism has been another important point of 
discussion. According to some scholars, the generation of fear and ‘terror’ with the aim of achieving 
a political objective represents one of the distinctive characteristics of the act of terrorism (Pape 2003; 
English 2009; A. Richards 2014). Therefore, rather than being circumscribed to its immediate effects, 
the meaning of terrorism would be based on the “political message” that terrorists seek to spread 
(Neumann and Smith 2005: 575). Other studies, however, reject the classification of terrorism as a 
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separate mode of contention, stressing that any action of political violence is characterised by a 
communicative element through which the perpetrator transmits a message to the targets and/or an 
audience (Bryan, Kelly and Templer 2011). Seeking to find a middle ground, Jackson (2011: 120) 
maintains that it is “the instrumentalization of the victims as a means of communicating with an 
audience” that distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violence.  
A final debate has concerned the perpetrator of the terrorist act. While most of the definitions of 
terrorism have focused on violence committed by non-state entities (Crenshaw 1981; Simpson 2004; 
Wight 2009), in recent years, a growing number of scholars adopting a critical theory-inspired 
approach have called for a broadening of the concept of terrorism so as to include state violence 
(Blakeley 2007, 2009; Breen-Smyth 2007; Jackson, Breen-Smyth and Gunning 2009a). Stohl 
(2006a), for instance, emphasises how, despite the little attention paid by the academia and the media, 
state terrorism has historically outstripped non-state terrorism in the number of victims.  
However, such a view on the inclusion of states among the potential perpetrators of terrorism has 
been challenged. In his seminal book on terrorism, Hoffman (2006: 28) contends that, whereas state 
crimes during wars are sanctionable on the basis of specific laws, terrorist groups refuse the 
enforcement of legislation on conflict. Accordingly, while exempting the state from terrorism is a 
“reflection of terrorism’s broadest and most customary usage”, equating state crimes with non-state 
terrorist activity “plays into the hands of terrorists and their apologists” (Hoffman 2006: 26, 40).  
Yet, focusing primarily on war crimes, Hoffman seems to overlook that what could fall under 
the rubric of state terrorism is characterised, to a considerable extent, by acts of state repression during 
peacetime, including torture, extrajudicial execution and enforced disappearance. Even though such 
acts may be regarded as already covered by regulations, there is no reasons why they could not be 
“both acts of ‘terrorism’ and ‘human rights abuses’ at the same time” (Jackson 2011: 126). Such a 
label would put a far greater emphasis on the extent (and the implications) of the offence. Most of the 
crimes perpetrated by authoritarian and illiberal regimes worldwide remain unpunished. There is no 
war on terror to deal with them.    
Along these lines, this thesis supports the inclusion of state terrorism into the definition of 
terrorism. Still, despite acknowledging that many instances of state repression could and should fall 
under the label of terrorism, the thesis focuses on mobilisation into non-state terrorism. Therefore, 
for the purposes of this research, the term terrorism will only indicate acts committed by non-state 
groups against an established political regime and its population.   
In line with Sageman (2017: 12), this study defines terrorism as a “categorization of out-group 
political violence during domestic peacetime” (Sageman 2017: 12), whereas the term ‘political 
violence’ denotes “the deliberate attempt to use force against people or objects for political reasons” 
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(Sageman 2017: 14). Such a definition stresses the centrality of political objectives underlying the act 
of violence. Relying on violence as a mode of contention to achieve a political goal is a decision that 
responds to specific strategical choices. In this sense, terrorism is a strategy that develops during 
dynamics of contention (Tilly 2004). Accordingly, “a terrorist is…somebody who uses such acts [of 
violence] as a strategy – a means – to further political ends” (Booth 2008: 65). These ends may not 
necessarily be perceived (or even shared) by all individuals mobilising into a terrorist group, some of 
which may engage for different and unrelated reasons (such as economic incentives). Nonetheless, 
they define the essence of terrorism, determining its trajectories and horizons.  
Sageman’s definition of terrorism also includes the implications associated with the use of the 
concept, emphasising categorisation as a crucial element characterising terrorism. Acknowledging 
such a component does not mean simply recognising that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom fighter’, but rather that, in the end, terrorism is “a man-made construct and as such tends to 
reflect the interests of those doing the defining” (Schmid 2011: 40). This perspective thus places the 
emphasis on the role of representation and social construction in the identification of terrorist violence 
(see Jackson et al. 2011; Jarvis 2016, 2019). Going further, one might argue that the absence of a 
universal definition of ‘terrorism’ as a separate mode of contention is not the consequence of the 
failure to find an agreement regarding its core elements, but rather, the cause. Indeed, “the word 
terrorists refers only to our enemies, not our friends” (Sageman 2017: 13, emphasis in original). Yet, 
arguing this does not mean “playing into the hands of terrorists and their apologists”, to borrow 
Hoffman’s phrase (2006: 26). None of the acts labelled as ‘terrorism’ is justifiable: the illegitimate 
recourse to violence must be punished according to the law. Instead, a critical reflection on the 
meaning of terrorism can help de-exceptionalise terrorist violence, highlighting the “human faces of 
terror” (Booth 2008: 74) hiding behind the veil of exceptionalism. Many governments have exploited 
the vagueness of the concept of terrorism, stretching its boundaries so as to include opponent groups 
and critical voices (e.g., Sedgwick 2010; Richards 2014). Furthermore, in several circumstances the 
label ‘terrorist’ has proved to be extremely volatile, with former ‘terrorists’ such as Nelson Mandela 
later being awarded with the Nobel Peace prize (Jackson 2007a). Time and context have frequently 
made the difference in determining what is terrorism and who is a terrorist.   
Questioning how terrorism and radicalisation are conceptualised and represented does not 
translate into rejecting their “systemic nature” (Zulaika 2016: 42) or reducing their analysis to an 
ontological debate (Toros and Gunning 2009). As Sageman notes (2017: 13), “the self-reflexive 
definition of terrorism does not mean that the notions of political violence and its perpetrators are 
arbitrary and relative, or that the study of terrorism is just a semantic game”. Still, framing terrorism 
as a strategy involving the perpetration of violence with the aim of achieving a political objective – 
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and radicalisation as the process of mobilisation into terrorism – helps to overcome two 
oversimplifications frequently characterising the research on (counter-)terrorism and contributing to 
shifting its focus away from the dynamics of contention underlying the act of violence.  
The first one concerns the search for the ‘terrorist profile’. The study of (counter-)terrorism has 
long been characterised by the endeavour to identify specific predispositions towards violence or 
distinctive characteristics in the personality of terrorists. Early works pointed to forms of mental 
disorder as underlying causes of involvement in terrorism (Hacker 1976; M. Taylor 1988; Pearlstein 
1991), identifying militants as affected by “a paranoid and narcissistic pathology” (Johnson and 
Feldmann 1992, quoted in Silke 1998: 55, emphasis in original). However, even post-9/11 research 
has emphasised mental illness or psychological damage as having crucial effects on the emergence 
of violence (DeMause 2002; Lachkar 2002, 2006). For example, DeMause (2002: 340, 346-347) 
maintains that “the roots of [Islamist] terrorism lie…in the extremely abusive families of the 
terrorists”, concluding that “like serial killers – who are also sexually and physically abused as 
children – terrorists grow up filled with a rage that must be inflicted upon others”.  
Such a view on terrorism as a “condition” (Borum 2011: 15) or even a “syndrome” (Kruglanski 
and Fishman 2006: 194) has not been corroborated by empirical evidence (Silke 1998; Victoroff 
2005; Horgan 2008; King and Taylor 2011). Most of the recent studies underline how terrorists do 
not present signs of mental disease and do not generally differ from the rest of the population in terms 
of personality traits (e.g., Pape 2003; Hassan 2006; Post 2006; Silke 2008). In line with such a view, 
the approach proposed by this research emphasises that “radicalization is not something that happens 
only to others – the mentally ill person or the evil character” (McCauley and Moskalenko 2011: 4). 
Rather, mobilisation into terrorism is conceived as a rational strategic choice taken during conflicts 
that are also characterised by the use of non-violent means of political struggle (Hafez 2003; 
Wiktorowicz 2004b; Tilly 2005; della Porta 2013). This perspective implies a removal of conceptual 
and analytical barriers separating “normal” violence from “pathological” terrorism, up to the point of 
regarding the latter as an expression of socio-political frictions that is often aimed at gaining popular 
support rather than just instilling fear (della Porta 2004: 209).  
The second oversimplification regards the conception of terrorism as a “creed” (Tilly 2004: 11) 
or an “ideology or form of politics in itself” (Jackson 2007a: 248).  
The relationship between religious ideology and propensity to violence has been a prominent 
theme in research on terrorism during recent years, due to the increasing threat posed by Islamist 
terrorism. The focus on religious terrorism, however, pre-dates the 9/11 attacks and the beginning of 
the war on terror (Rapoport 1984; Ranstorp 1996; Laqueur 1999). Several scholars draw a line 
between secular and religious terrorism, emphasising how the latter is indiscriminate, more violent 
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and characterised by a lack of morality (Ranstorp 1996; Hoffman 1995; Lesser et al. 1999; 
Juergensmeyer 2006, 2017). In this regard, Hoffman (2006: 85) argues that “where violence is 
regarded by its practitioners as a divine duty or sacramental act, embraces markedly different means 
of legitimation and justification than that committed by secular terrorists, and these distinguishing 
features lead, in turn, to yet greater bloodshed and destruction”. Other studies focus on the divisions 
and the growing tensions between the Western and the Muslim worlds (see Huntington 1996), 
framing the rise of Islamist terrorism as the consequence of causes such as the failure of modernisation 
within the Muslim world (B. Lewis 2002) or as “fractured globalisation” (Munroe and Moghaddam 
2012: 122), generating perceptions of Islamic values and beliefs as under threat and turning religion 
into a catalyst for violent reaction.  
The picture emerging from these works is that of an unprecedented global threat embodied by 
groups predicating the enforcement of religious (Islamic) law (Cook 2003; Laqueur 2004) through 
widespread violence and devastation (Hoffman 1995; Stern 2003; Sageman 2004). Specifically, 
distinguishing the ‘new’ kind of terrorism is a notion of violence as an apolitical action. Such a notion 
makes reconciliation and mediation hardly conceivable. In so doing, it contributes to providing 
legitimacy to heavy-handed security policies by state authorities as an inevitable response in complex 
environments. Several studies released in the last two decades frames repressive measures as an 
effective instrument to counter the spread of terrorism (for a review see Hafez and Hatfield 2006; 
Davenport and Inman 2012; Piazza 2017).   
Conceiving terrorism as violence aimed at achieving a political goal, this research problematises 
the distinction between secular and religious terrorism, maintaining that, although religious narratives 
and beliefs may compose the dialectical and symbolic repertoire of Islamist propaganda, religion 
alone cannot explain mobilisation into terrorism. As discussed in the following section, a more 
thorough approach is provided by works adopting a critical theory-inspired research orientation. Such 
a scholarship rejects the conceptualisation of a ‘new’ form of terrorist violence “driven by hatred, 
fanaticism and extremism” (Jackson 2007b: 408; see also e.g., Stohl 2008), showing that the study of 
jihadism has tended to be conducted through the lens of a European political tradition treating the 
role of religion in the political realm as that of an irrational and illogical component (Toros and 
Gunning 2009; Gunning and Jackson 2011). Furthermore, it stresses how studies on radicalisation 
have often been influenced by the political direction and the “ideological assumptions” (Kundnani 
2012: 8) of the institutional environments supporting the research (Burnett and Whyte 2005; Raphael 
2009). Such an attitude has led to the shaping of an approach to radicalisation that has frequently 
scratched the surface of mobilisation processes, overlooking their historical roots and contextual 
specificities in favour of a de-politicised picture of militancy (e.g., Gunning 2007b; Jackson, Breen-
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Smyth and Gunning 2009a; Gunning and Jackson 2011; Poynting and Whyte 2012). The latter, in 
turn, has reinforced the mainstream narrative about an irreconcilable conflict between the democratic 
world and religious fanaticism and intolerance (Jackson 2009; Tellidis 2016; Jarvis 2019). The 
consequence, as one author puts it, “is a systematic failure to address the reality of the political 
conflicts that radicalisation scholars claim they want to understand” (Kundnani 2012: 8).   
Radicalisation in the Muslim world does not present specific features distinguishing it from 
radicalisation in non-Muslim societies. More specifically, “the dynamics, process, and organization 
of Islamic activism can be understood as important elements of contention that transcend the 
specificity of ‘Islam’ as a system of meaning, identity, and basis of collective action” (Wiktorowicz 
2004b: 3, emphasis in original). Along these lines, this research conceives Islamist terrorism just as 
the “appropriation of Islamic concepts” on the part of “individuals, groups and organisations that 
pursue political objectives” relying on violence as a method of contention (Chome 2020: 8). Such a 
perspective has major consequences, implying that, to understand the emergence of jihadist violence 
it is necessary to overcome the centrality of religious ideology as a driver of mobilisation, shifting 
the focus from militants and their organisations to the wider historical and socio-political background 
in which radicalisation unfolds.  
 
A critical perspective on terrorism and counter-terrorism  
The way in which a phenomenon is interpreted and conceptualised determines the way in which social 
actors approach it and defines the range of strategies they rely on when seeking to counter it. This 
holds true for social, economic or political phenomena, including the rise of Islamist terrorism. 
Dominant conceptions of terrorism and its root causes shape the counter-terrorism approaches 
implemented by governments (see Crelinsten 2009). The provision of logistical support to local allies, 
the deployment of military divisions on the ground or the implementation of development-oriented 
initiatives are the direct expression of specific considerations on the nature of terrorism. Such 
considerations may lead to the adoption of different measures coexisting under the same approach. 
Still, the underlying principles and assumptions on which they are built respond to basic questions 
concerning the origins of terrorist violence and its primary objectives.  
In the early 2000s, narratives on the new terrorism and the ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington 
1996) gained increasing influence in mainstream debates on radicalisation. A Manichean outlook of 
the world resonated throughout the Bush presidency, envisaging a “fight…against ‘the Monster of 
Terrorism’…involv[ing] engaging with a ‘demonic enemy’…‘defined by hate’, driven by ‘mad 
intent’, and drew on ‘monstrous evil’” (quoted in Booth and Dunne 2011: 62). The dominant 
paradigm, in the words of a former Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was that 
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“today’s terrorists don’t want a seat at the table, they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting 
at it” (National Commission on Terrorism 2000: 2, quoted in Tellidis 2016: 138). Two major elements 
characterising such a viewpoint need to be highlighted. 
The first one, as stressed above, is the propensity to de-contextualise and de-historicise the 
process of mobilisation. Tactical and strategic repertoires of action adopted by militants come to be 
interpreted as the main raison d’être of terrorist groups (Stampnitzky 2016), with the consequence 
that “the Palestinian intifada, the Chechen resistance, and various armed groups in Afghanistan and 
Iraq...[are]…understood as part of the same threat to order” (Poynting and Whyte 2012: 5-6). In other 
words, rather than the product of socio-political dynamics, violence becomes an end in itself, whose 
logic has to be tracked down in light of the terrorists’ ideological commitment.  
The second element regards the prioritisation of the state as the main provider of security against 
the terrorist threat, associated with a tendency not to question the role played by states as potential 
drivers of instabilities and insecurities facilitating the emergence of political violence (Gunning 
2007b; Jackson 2007a).  
Despite a progressive refocusing and a moderation of the general discourse on terrorism, many 
of the implications stemming from a de-historicised, de-contextualised and state-centric perspective 
on (counter-)terrorism have continued to influence the academic debate and inform the Western 
security response (for a critique, see e.g., Poynting and Whyte 2012; Jarvis and Lister 2015; Lindahl 
2016). Specifically, the critical literature on terrorism points to the prominence of a problem-solving 
approach concerned primarily with technical and logistical evaluations aimed at restoring national 
stability rather than with a thorough investigation of the sources of destabilisation lying at the heart 
of the ‘status quo’ (Jackson, Breen-Smyth and Gunning 2009a; Lindahl 2016). “Taki[ing] the world 
as it finds it” (Cox 1981: 128-129), such an approach has frequently prioritised military and police 
initiatives as the main instrument against the spread of terrorism in distant theatres. States with scarce 
financial, tactical and operational resources to tackle emerging threats have increasingly been 
perceived as unable to secure their borders and provided with massive amounts of support in the 
attempt to strengthen the local security architecture. In the African continent, this has translated into 
the allocation of security assistance, including counter-terrorism training and equipment, to 
governments in vulnerable regions (e.g., Solomon 2015b).   
Security aid can contribute to improving the military and defence capabilities of African recipient 
countries, enabling local actors to access more resources and sophisticated instruments to increase 
state security. As such, it can represent an important tool against terrorism. Still, policy makers relying 
on such a tool as a one-size-fits-all response risk underestimating the extent to which, in some 
circumstances, state security may not coincide, or may even conflict, with the individual security of 
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the citizens, as well as the implications stemming from such a misalignment (Krause and Williams 
1997a). Particularly, there is the risk that, understating the political nature of terrorist violence, policy 
makers overlook crucial dynamics of interaction between recipient states and their population that 
can exacerbate social frictions and fuel processes of mobilisation to violence. This might generate a 
dilemma, as “in the process of providing various forms of security, insecurities are also reproduced, 
often in ways that either actually undermine the initial production of security or that merely perpetuate 
the problems to which they are supposedly providing solutions” (Dalby 1997: 12-13).    
Yet, as discussed in the previous chapter, the literature on US security policies in Africa has often 
been reluctant to acknowledge such relational processes and their repercussions. Rather than 
exploring the impact of US policies in terms of radicalisation, authors have prioritised the study of 
the security architecture set out by Washington in the post-9/11 period, as well as the objectives 
underlying the US involvement in the continent. At the same time, the previous section has 
highlighted how the research on radicalisation has often tended to empty terrorist violence of all 
political substance, regarding it as an “aberration” of the system (Toros 2016: 72) produced by 
ideological fanaticism or by cultural and psychological strain. In so doing, the focus of analysis has 
increasingly been restricted to terrorists and their groups, while the political drivers of mobilisation, 
which in the African continent may be affected by the provision of US support to local authorities, 
have fallen off the radar of the research. Schmid (2013: 37) makes the point using a simple analogy: 
“if a reporter described a tennis match only in terms of what happens on one side of the net, we would 
rightfully complain that we got only half the story. When it comes to terrorism, such a one-sided 
discourse is, however, still widely accepted”. To get the whole story, some “key moves” (Toros and 
Gunning 2009: 89) are necessary.  
To make such moves, this research draws on guidelines provided by Critical Terrorism Studies 
(CTS). Building on the work of Ken Booth in the framework of Critical Security Studies (CSS) 
(Booth 1997, 2007), CTS highlights ‘deepening’ and ‘broadening’ as crucial operations for 
approaching (counter-)terrorism as a research topic (e.g., Jackson, Breen-Smyth and Gunning 2009b; 
Toros 2016). ‘Deepening’ refers to the identification and highlighting of the political interests and 
assumptions underlying the concept of terrorism and guiding both the academic investigation and the 
measures implemented by policy-makers (Toros and Gunning 2009). As seen in the previous section, 
this means acknowledging that terrorism is “a historically variable” notion (Booth 1997: 36), whose 
related “discourses and practices…deriv[e] from particular sets of political assumptions…[that]…are 
not objective reactions to the world ‘out there’, the so called real world, but rather are from 
somewhere, for someone, and for some purpose” (Booth 2007: 150, emphasis in original). 
Uncovering such assumptions requires providing historical depth to the analysis and replacing 
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abstracted and universal classifications of terrorist violence with a closer focus on its formative 
conditions. This leads us to the second move: broadening.  
‘Broadening’ denotes the de-exceptionalisation of terrorism in favour of a historicised and 
contextualised examination of violence that emphasises the political, social and cultural dimensions 
in which counter-terrorism and radicalisation take place (Jackson, Breen-Smyth and Gunning 2009b; 
Toros and Gunning 2009). As Booth and Dunne highlight (2011: 75), “terrorists are made in society, 
not born in evil”. Broadening the subject of analysis, therefore, involves investigating mobilisation 
into terrorism as a rational and interactive process, analysing the “landscape of meaning” (Bryan 
2012: 24) in which it takes place. Rather than approaching Islamist terrorism as a form of violence 
adopted overnight, or as the mere consequence of ideological indoctrination, such a move puts “the 
temporal back into violence”, exploring the longer (context-related) processes of contention 
preceding and shaping radicalisation (Gunning 2009: 163). Within this framework, the nature and 
character of the actions implemented by state authorities are questioned as potential sources of 
tensions and frictions underlying mobilisation. Along these lines, “violent 
counterterrorism…[is]…no longer necessarily…viewed as a legitimate response to the violence of 
an inevitably illegitimate opposition” (Toros and Gunning 2009: 94, emphasis in original), but rather 
as capable of fuelling the vicious circle of violence, creating and recreating the evil it aims to eradicate 
(see Stohl 2006b; Zulakia 2009; Lindahl 2016).  
Deepening and broadening the analysis of radicalisation and counter-terrorism brings major 
benefits for the study of post-9/11 US security efforts in Africa, pointing to local politics as the link 
between US initiatives and dynamics of radicalisation on the continent. African states play a crucial 
role within the post-9/11 US security framework, translating US policies into actual measures. Indeed, 
being the main reference on the ground for US policy makers, African states determine the concrete 
character and configuration that Washington’s military resources and support assume when integrated 
into local counter-terrorism activities. At the same time, however, African states are social actors 
whose performance can have major implications for the rise of terrorism. As CTS scholars stress, 
choices related to mobilisation are not taken in a vacuum (e.g., Jackson, Breen-Smyth and Gunning 
2009a). Nor are they the mere result of structural factors or global ideological forces. Rather, as 
further discussed in the fourth section of this chapter, mobilisation often emerges from a “dynamic 
of interaction, adaptation, intended and united consequences” (Hafez 2003: 21) among social actors 
in which the state plays a major role. The measures implemented by US African allies can profoundly 
affect the perceptions of local people regarding ‘what is to be done’, setting in motion processes 
fuelling dissent and resulting in an increase in political violence.   
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Hence, capturing the effects of US policies on radicalisation on the continent requires a focus on 
the impact of agency, in terms of the reactions of US African allies and the effects that such reactions 
have among local populations. CTS offers a wide margin of manoeuvre to set up a framework of 
analysis enabling appreciation of such dynamics. Indeed, being committed to “disciplinary and 
intellectual pluralism” (Jackson, Breen-Smyth and Gunning 2009b: 222), CTS allows researchers to 
eclectically engage in deductive theorising by incorporating analytical elements from multiple 
theoretical traditions to capture connections between the subjects of study. Such traditions do not 
have to belong exclusively to the ‘critical’ field. On the contrary, scholars highlight how CTS is 
willing to integrate knowledge from the so-called ‘orthodox’ or ‘mainstream’ research on terrorism 
to catch the full spectrum of dynamics of mobilisation and formulate hypothesis regarding their cause 
(Jackson, Breen-Smyth and Gunning 2009a). Despite manifesting a preference for “perspectives that 
have been considered outside of the mainstream of the discipline” (Krause and Williams 1997b: x-
xi, quoted in Gunning 2007: 389), CTS simply provides a direction of research rather than setting out 
the theoretical instruments to follow it.     
Along these lines, this study places local politics at the heart of the analysis, setting up an 
interdisciplinary framework for investigating the effects of post-9/11 US security policies on 
radicalisation in African states. Combining analytical elements from the research on remote warfare, 
security assistance and social movements, such a framework is built around a causal mechanism 
composed of three steps (Figure 6).  
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Figure 6. Block diagram of the causal mechanism  
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Incorporating insights from multiple theoretical traditions that have so far remained largely 
unconnected, the proposed causal mechanism enables analysis of causal links between US security 
policies and the rise of terrorism in Africa, allowing for a holistic study of how such policies impact 
on the social fabric of African societies. In harmony with the CTS agenda, the mechanism contributes 
to “bringing politics back into counterterrorism” (Lindahl 2016: 219), postulating that US initiatives 
that underestimate the political drivers of radicalisation, framing the war on terror in the continent 
primarily through a problem-solving perspective that prioritises military cooperation with local 
actors, risk having unintentional repercussions undermining the achievement of their very objectives 
on the ground. In so doing, the mechanism de-exceptionalises the process of mobilisation, 
contextualising dynamics of radicalisation within the socio-political environment from which they 
originate by identifying practices of indiscriminate repression on the part of US African allies as 
favouring the spread of political violence on the ground.  
The next sections explore in detail each of the steps of the causal mechanism, providing an in-
depth overview on their theoretical foundation. In so doing, the sections discuss the observable 
manifestations that such steps are predicted to have if the mechanism is present in the case under 
study: post-9/11 US security policies in Kenya. To provide more clarity to the analytical procedure 
and place a greater emphasis on the causal forces at play, Step 1 and 2 of the mechanism are examined 
together.   
 
Step 1 and 2 of the causal mechanism: African states are not passive partners in 
the war on terror 
The theoretical propositions underpinning Step 1 and 2 of the hypothesised causal mechanism (A  
q  r) build on research on remote warfare (Watts and Biegon 2017; Knowles and Watson 2018a, 
2018b, 2018c; J. Richards 2018; Walpole and Karlshoej-Pedersen 2019; Biegon and Watts 2020a; 
Knowles 2020; McKay, Watson and Karlshoej-Pedersen 2021), and on research on security 
assistance and the role of agency (Cochran 2010; Schroeder 2010; Albrecht and Stepputat 2015; 
Biddle 2017; Abrahamsen and Sandor 2018; Matisek and Reno 2019; Knowles and Matisek 2019). 
The steps hypothesise that post-9/11 US security policies in African states suffering from the threat 
of terrorism lead to the establishment of a partnership relationship within the framework of remote 
warfare, characterised by the provision of indirect support to a surrogate with the aim of fighting an 
enemy in a distant theatre. However, rather than being passive partners in the war on terror, African 
states can take advantage of such a relationship to gain support to deal with local threats while 
reducing foreign interference in domestic affairs. In contexts characterised by harsh security measures 
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based on indiscriminate repression against suspect groups, these dynamics are hypothesised to result 
in the acquisition of resources and room for manoeuvre by local authorities to implement such 
measures.      
The idea of remote warfare as a concept capturing recent evolutions in military interventionism 
has been developed by the Oxford Research Group (ORG) (e.g., Watts and Biegon 2017, 2019; 
Knowles and Watson 2018a, 2018b), although other studies have highlighted similar trends in 
contemporary forms of conflict (for a discussion, see Knowles 2020; Watson and Mckay 2021), 
making reference to concepts such as proxy warfare (Mumford 2013), partnered warfare (Droege and 
Tuck 2017), liquid warfare (Demmers and Gould 2018), surrogate warfare (Krieg and Rickli 2019) 
or vicarious warfare (Waldman 2021). Remote warfare is a “strategy of countering threats at a 
distance, without the deployment of large military forces” (Watts and Biegon 2017: 1; see also Biegon 
and Watts 2020a). Such a strategy can involve a wide variety of activities normally forming part of 
different programmes and approaches, ranging from direct intervention through the use of unmanned 
drones to the provision of indirect support to local actors. Distinguishing remote warfare is the 
objective underlying such activities, that is, fighting an enemy (Knowles and Watson 2018a). Security 
support to local forces can fluctuate in and out of the spectrum of remote warfare, as, for example, 
pre-existing programmes aimed at developing a country’s security sector are aligned to or embedded 
in efforts to counter an emerging threat (Knowles and Watson 2018b). Such a fluctuation implies the 
existence of a “grey zone” blurring the boundaries between remote warfare and other forms of 
engagement aimed at achieving longer-term goals on the ground (Knowles and Watson 2018b: 4).  
This research hypothesises that, in cases where an African state (Y) suffers from the threat of 
terrorism (scope condition 1 [C1]), A  q occurs, meaning that the US establishes a partnership 
relationship with state (Y), engaging in cooperation and providing indirect support to fight such a 
threat remotely. Here, the presence of a terrorist threat in the local theatre implies that there is (at 
least) a terrorist organisation operating in state (Y) and/or in the region in which state (Y) is located. 
The rationale behind C1 is that, in line with what discussed above, security policies reflecting a 
strategy of remote warfare must be aimed at defeating a local adversary on the ground. In cases in 
which C1 is absent, the provision of US indirect support is not classifiable as part of remote warfare 
and the hypothesised mechanism is not set in motion. Indeed, as will be outlined later in this section, 
without a terrorist threat, local authorities could hardly manage to gain continuous support while 
implementing harsh security measures.   
If C1 is present in the case of post-9/11 US security policies in Kenya, meaning that Kenya 
suffers from the threat posed by Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, the research expects to identify 
manifestations of A  q. Specifically, it expects to find evidence of the US providing security 
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assistance, that is, military and defence aid and resources, including specialised training and 
equipment to Kenyan forces, to fight local terrorism while keeping a low military presence on the 
ground. As discussed in the methodological section of the introductory chapter, such evidence would 
provide a strong inferential test corroborating A  q, being characterised by a high degree of certainty 
(in its absence there could be no partnership relationship within the remote warfare framework) and 
uniqueness (it could hardly have causes other than the establishment of the partnership).      
The establishment of partnership relationships by the US to counter emerging threats in the 
African continent can be framed as the expression of a problem-solving perspective on the war on 
terror. Indeed, rather than being questioned as potential sources of friction underlying dynamics of 
mobilisation, existing security institutions in Africa are systematically treated as “the given 
framework for action” (Cox 1981: 128-129), turning into surrogates through which Washington can 
project its power on the ground. The term ‘surrogate’ here simply denotes an actor that “acts 
on…behalf or in support of” a policy of another actor [the benefactor], “in pursuance of shared though 
not necessarily identical goals and in circumstances that otherwise might require…[the 
benefactor]…to assume higher costs and/or risks” (Rubenstein 1988: 168, quoted in Cochran 2010: 
113). Such costs and risks concern the military, political and economic aspects of contemporary 
warfare. Recent experiences of conflict have shown how, despite a massive deployment of combat 
troops on the ground, organised violence in unconventional theatres can result in a large number of 
casualties and a protraction of hostilities, causing a substantial economic burden on the societies of 
the intervening countries. The increasing media coverage of international politics exacerbates the 
impact of direct military interventions, producing socio-political tensions due to public antagonism 
towards war and its violence (Waldman 2018, 2019a; Krieg and Rickli 2019). Relying on surrogates, 
benefactor states aim to counter threats without paying a high price in terms of human and financial 
resources, exploiting the “local knowledge” of indigenous forces during conflicts (Waldman 2019b: 
170) while keeping “military interventions (and their lived realities)…hidden 
from…[their]…publics”, or at least “mak[ing] it hard to trace lines of responsibility and underlying 
power constellations” (Demmers and Gould 2018: 365). Emerging partnership relationships, 
generally sustained by ad hoc institutional and military architectures, condense the efforts of the 
benefactor in encouraging local actors to achieve security goals on the ground. Although within the 
post-9/11 US security framework the turn to such efforts is frequently discussed in relation to the 
negative impact of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s (e.g., Kümmel and Giegerich 
2013; Biegon and Watts 2020a), the next chapter will show how, in the African continent, they can 
be conceived as an evolution of earlier trends.  
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Surrogates, however, are not merely ‘used’ by the benefactor. On the contrary, the link between 
such actors is based on a “perceived mutual benefit” (Mumford 2013: 17). That is, surrogates have 
considerable incentives to welcome the benefactor’s indirect engagement and be at the forefront in 
fighting terrorism. Such incentives relate to the fact that “becoming an intervener state can unlock 
multiple opportunities to acquire material and symbolic resources, as well as the chance to meet 
several practical interests tied to governing a state” (Abrahamsen and Sandor 2018: 392). In Africa, 
the US strategy to counter enemies at a distance is not only consistent with Washington’s objectives, 
but also with those of African leaders regarding the achievement of ‘African solutions to African 
problems’, reducing foreign interference in African domestic affairs while gaining increasing 
resources and room for manoeuvre to tackle perceived threats (Duffield 2007; Olsen 2014; Fisher and 
Anderson 2015; Hagmann and Reyntjens 2016). This is because of two factors characterising remote 
warfare that impose considerable limitations to US policy makers while allowing African partners to 
use indirect support with fewer restrictions.    
Firstly, the lack of information on the security performances of surrogates on the part of the 
benefactor (Biddle 2017; Krieg and Rickli 2019; Ucko 2019). The political and physical ‘remoteness’ 
between the US and African partner forces makes the access of US policy makers to reliable 
information rather difficult, complicating oversight. Information can sometimes even be deliberately 
distorted by local actors in the attempt to provide a picture of security efforts on the ground that 
encourages further engagement and support (see Byman 2006).  
Secondly, and more importantly, the generation of a moral hazard in that, by exploiting their geo-
strategic role within the post-9/11 US security framework and the reluctance of Washington to get 
directly involved in local conflicts, African surrogates can take advantage of the remote warfare 
strategy to gain leverage and negotiating power while evading US pressure regarding the use of 
indirect support (see Abrahamsen and Sandor 2018). The tension between the achievement of 
counter-terrorism imperatives in the continent and the avoidance of risks associated with the 
deployment of troops on the ground generates major constraints and dilemmas for US policy makers 
as, even when indirect support risks being partially derailed from its original purpose, “withdrawal 
of support could tempt terrorist actors to exploit the state’s loss of backing” (Mezzell 2019: 142).   
The above factors have considerable implications, highlighting how the effects of remote warfare 
are highly dependent on the socio-political environment in which US policies are implemented. This 
raises serious concerns. Indeed, although US policy makers and surrogates “might share basic 
counter-terrorist operational objectives, the underlying conception of national security may be 
different, and sometimes dangerously so” (J. Richards 2018: 3). Surrogates may also have different 
perceptions regarding the extent and the nature of the terrorist threat and, consequently, the measures 
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that are necessary to counter it. Engaging indirectly in local conflicts, the US places much of its 
security strategy into the hands of its partners, assuming that “resources, in terms of advisors provided 
and hostnation [sic] troops trained and equipped, will generate the desired product” (Matisek and 
Reno 2019: 68). Still, depending on the context, such a strategy may fall victim to perceptions and 
interests that diverge considerably from those of the supplier (see Schroeder 2010; Richmond 2011; 
Johnson 2014; Knowles and Matisek 2019; Walpole and Karlshoej-Pedersen 2019). Specifically, in 
fragmented, illiberal and corrupted systems, US indirect support risks being abused by security 
authorities using repressive means to tackle perceived sources of insecurity (Larsdotter 2015; 
Abrahamsen 2016a; Matisek and Reno 2019; Knowles 2020) or even exploiting the war on terror as 
“a licence to criminalise the opposition and clamp down on civil society” (Howell et al. 2008: 86). 
This risk is of critical importance in the African continent, where many of the US partners in counter-
terrorism have an appalling record on human rights and democracy (see Williams 2007; Solomon 
2015a; Hagmann and Reyntjens 2016). In such a socio-political environment, without targeted 
measures addressing underlying sources of inequality, a strategy relying primarily on local forces as 
surrogates may end up supporting security units involved in human rights violations or political elites 
carrying out discriminatory policies. Along these lines, US indirect support would turn into an 
“unintentional ‘kingmaker’” (Knowles and Matisek 2019: 15), contributing to strengthening the 
power of illiberal regimes and jeopardising individual security of their citizens.   
This research hypothesises that, when an African state (Y) relies on harsh security measures 
based on indiscriminate repression against suspect groups (scope condition 2 [C2]), the establishment 
of the partnership relationship with the US means that local authorities gain resources and room for 
manoeuvre to implement such measures.  
As discussed in the methodological section of the introductory chapter, if C2 is present in the 
case study, the research expects to identify observable manifestations of the above step of the 
mechanism (q  r). Specifically, it expects to see Kenyan authorities managing to use US security 
assistance to carry out indiscriminate repression against Muslim and ethnic Somali communities. As 
for the first step of the mechanism, due to the high level of uniqueness and certainty, the predicted 
evidence would provide a powerful test for causal inference, substantiating q  r.  
What the first two steps of the causal mechanism (A  q  r) imply is that, without “a 
comprehensive study of each country and…region” in which security policies are implemented, 
including a considerable “effort to understand the dynamics and the aspirations of the [local] people” 
(Johnson 2014: 649), countering emerging threats in Africa by delegating the fighting (and the 
consequent risks) to local security institutions could have serious repercussions on the ground. Indeed, 
it could set in motion, or fuel, a mechanism by which “what is being secured is the power of the 
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[surrogate] state to intervene in a variety of social arenas, but the personal health and security of the 
individuals…is not improved”; on the contrary, it deteriorates (Dalby 1997: 15). The effects such a 
mechanism would seriously undermine the achievement of development goals and exacerbate 
political conditions on the continent. In so doing, they would conflict with the emancipatory 
objectives highlighted by critical studies on security and terrorism, which remark how security is a 
“means” whose primary goal is “the securing of people from those oppressions that stop them 
carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others” (Booth 
2007: 112, 115, emphasis in original).     
However, besides humanitarian and political repercussions, there could be further implications, 
paradoxically undermining state security and stability on the ground. Such “unintended 
consequences” (Daase and Friesendorf 2010: 5), or blowbacks, relate to long-term counter-productive 
effects. Specifically, security policies providing indirect support to fragmented and illiberal systems 
risk underestimating the political nature of terrorism and the effects that an increase in repressive 
measures on the ground may have on radicalisation among targeted communities. These effects are 
discussed in the next section, which focuses on the third step of the causal mechanism (r  B).  
 
Step 3 of the causal mechanism: a Social Movement Theory approach to 
radicalisation 
Step 3 of the causal mechanism (r  B) builds on research on social movements and political 
violence; particularly on social movement studies exploring the impact of state policies on 
mobilisation to violence (e.g., McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Hafez 2003; Wiktorowicz 2004a; 
Davenport, Johnston and Mueller 2005; della Porta 2008; 2013; 2018; Alimi and Meyer 2011; Bosi, 
Demetriou and Malthaner 2014a; Klandermans 2014). Here, it is hypothesised that indiscriminate 
repression implemented by African state (Y) has counter-productive effects on national security, 
fuelling radicalisation among targeted groups.  
 Social Movement Theory (SMT) is a corpus of different theoretical frameworks providing 
analytical tools for the study of social movements, that is, “networks of individuals and organizations, 
with common identities and conflictual aims, that use unconventional means” (della Porta 2018: 463), 
and the environment in which they act. Historically, research on social movements has prioritised the 
study of non-violent movements in Western democracies, such as human rights movements using 
civil disobedience as a method of protest, over mobilisation processes in authoritarian and illiberal 
settings. Still, in recent years, an increasing number of social movement scholars have turned their 
attention to dynamics of contention in non-democratic states, exploring processes leading to the 
64 
 
emergence of political violence (e.g., McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Hafez 2003; Kurzman 2004; 
Wiktorowicz 2004a; Alimi, Bosi and Demetriou 2015).  
SMT provides a significant contribution to the study of terrorism (see Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008; 
Beck 2015; Bosi and Malthaner 2015). Firstly, it places the emphasis on dynamics of interaction as a 
crucial dimension affecting people’s interpretative processes and the selection of the repertoires of 
action. As social relations shape the way in which the external reality and the self are conceived and 
constructed by social actors (see Melucci 1995), interactions can cause significant changes in people’s 
preferences and perceptions, including “interpretations, expectations, and perceptions of the 
‘enemy’” (Malthaner 2017: 374). Social movement scholars maintain that the existence of grievances 
is not sufficient to explain radical behaviour (e.g., McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Tilly 2005). 
Rather, “pre-existing motivations, values and norms as well as dispositions are…shaped by, and even 
transformed during contention” (Alimi, Bosi and Demetriou 2015: 9). According to this view, 
encounters with the state can play a major role in triggering mobilisation to violence, contributing to 
defining the ‘political opportunities’ perceived by people in a given context (McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly 2001; della Porta 2018). Research shows how the closing down of such opportunities through 
adoption of exclusive policies by national institutions has tended to fuel distrust and disillusionment 
towards the political system among social actors, increasing the likelihood of violent forms of 
opposition (e.g., Kriesi et al. 1995; della Porta 2008). As Alimi and Meyer point out (2011: 476), 
“when authorities foreclose institutional means of redress, extra-institutional action appears to be the 
most promising route to influence”. 
Secondly, SMT stresses the role of resources as a pre-requisite for mobilisation and engagement 
in violent contention. As social movement scholars posit, without appropriate resources sustaining 
opponents’ efforts, social discontent can hardy translate into collective action (McCarthy and Zald 
1977; Tarrow 1998). The resources in question can be of different types, including “material” 
resources (e.g., money, supplies), “moral” resources (e.g., perceived legitimacy), “cultural” resources 
(e.g., operational knowledge), and “human” resources (e.g., leadership, manpower) (Edwards and 
McCarthy 2004: 125-128).  
Finally, rather than conceiving militants just as passive agents involved in the reproduction of 
coherent and pre-existing ideologies, SMT conceptualises them as active actors shaping and adapting 
interpretative orientations about specific events and circumstances with the aim of getting support 
from targeted audiences (Snow and Byrd 2007; see also Benford and Snow 2000; Snow 2004). By 
engaging in ‘framing’ activities, militants contribute to the construction of meaning, capitalising on 
socio-political dynamics to gain resonance among potential supporters and achieve their mobilisation.   
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Focusing on the three dimensions above, SMT approaches to radicalisation and terrorism have 
often been regarded as particularly suitable for a CTS research orientation. In the first place, SMT 
contributes to ‘broadening’ the area of study by contextualising terrorism within the social and 
political dynamics characterising its generative environment (Gunning 2009). Rather than 
concentrating on individual predispositions, cultural strain or global ideological forces as the major 
causes of radicalisation, a SMT approach shifts the emphasis to the arena of interaction and meaning 
construction where individuals, organisations and institutional actors operate. Such a perspective, 
therefore, departs from accounts of Islamist terrorism as the outcome of fanaticism and religious 
intolerance, in favour of a politicised and historicised investigation that includes a focus on the state 
and the effects of its policies. Specifically, a SMT approach implies a view of terrorist groups as 
“movements with political claims” (Beck 2008: 1566), whose violence represents “one of several 
forms of confrontation within a wider repertoire of actions and strategies” (Bosi, Demetriou and 
Malthaner 2014b: 2, emphasis in original) rather than “a static, individual disposition prior to 
movement participation” (Gunning 2009: 161). 
SMT, therefore, re-frames the process of radicalisation into Islamist terrorism within categories 
that can be examined by relying on analytical tools used for the study of political violence and even 
non-violent forms of Western activism (see della Porta 1988, 2013). Such an operation contributes to 
‘deepening’ the field, overcoming ‘orientalist’ assumptions by identifying jihadists as rational actors 
involved in strategic calculations over the costs and benefits of their actions and in constant interplay 
with other actors in the system (Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler 2006; Gunning 2009).  
Drawing from the analytical toolkit provided by SMT, the approach that this research proposes 
to the study of radicalisation in African states concentrates on indiscriminate repression as a 
determinant of mobilisation into terrorism. Such an approach does not aim at providing an all-
encompassing theory of radicalisation. Several studies highlight how dynamics of mobilisation into 
terrorism can involve a multiplicity of forces that can hardly be captured by any single theoretical 
explanation (e.g., McCauley and Moskalenko 2011; Schmid 2013; Hafez and Mullins 2015; 
Lindekilde 2016). As McCauley and Moskalenko stress (2008: 429), “it seems unlikely that any 
single theory can integrate all the influences that bring individuals to radical political action”. Rather, 
by shifting the focus to politics, the aim of this research is to investigate whether and how violent 
forms of interaction in the counter-terrorism framework may have detrimental effects in African 
states, undermining national security by increasing radicalisation. In light of what discussed in the 
previous section, such a trend would have substantial implications for post-9/11 US security policies 
in the continent. Indeed, it would suggest that, depending on the socio-political context, US policies 
risk adding fuel to, or even lighting, the fire of instability and violence.  
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State repression can be used as a “barometer” for (della Porta 2013: 35) or a “measure” of (Earl 
2011: 263) the available opportunities for social actors in a given context, denoting any action by the 
state authorities that “raises the contender’s cost of collective action” (Tilly 1978: 100). Following 
Osa and Schock (2007: 133), such actions can be divided into four main categories, encompassing 
the different nuances that repressive policies may assume: “negative sanctions, violence, coercion, 
and violence by proxy”. As they clarify,   
 
negative sanctions include actions such as curtailing political and civil liberties, imposing 
martial law, censoring public or private media, impeding the flow of information or the 
movement of people, banning political organizations and meetings, engaging in 
discriminatory legal practices, infiltrating movements, using agents provocateurs, spying, 
psychological warfare, harassment, imposing fines, and confiscating resources. Force 
entails the use of physical violence against human beings, such as imprisonment, beatings, 
rape, torture, disappearances, assassinations, executions, bombings, armed attacks, air 
strikes, and physical retaliation against colleagues or relatives. Coercion involves 
intimidation or the threatened use of violence. A fourth form of repression occurs when 
authorities overlook or encourage third parties who implement violence or coercion against 
the regime’s political challengers. In this situation, vigilante groups, lynch mobs, death 
squads, paramilitary forces, and the like carry out the government’s ‘dirty work’ by proxy 
(Osa and Schock 2007: 133). 
 
Unlike selective repression, targeting militants and individuals directly involved in clandestine 
activities, indiscriminate repression extends also to suspect citizens and potential sympathisers (Hafez 
2003). The logic behind such an extension is based on the assumption that, fearing repercussions 
associated with state violence, people would desist from cooperating with clandestine organisations, 
also pressuring militants and their supporters to change their course of action (Kalyvas 2006). As 
such, indiscriminate repression mainly characterises conflicts in which challengers can hardly be 
identified by state authorities and tend to hide among the population. In the counter-terrorism 
framework, indiscriminate repression has generally been implemented against ‘suspect groups’, 
targeting entire communities whose members are suspected of being involved in terrorist activities.   
However, by causing dynamics of violent interaction between the state and a segment of its 
population, security policies based on indiscriminate repression risk having negative repercussions 
on national security. Indeed, by removing a distinction in the treatment between so-called ‘terrorists’ 
and ordinary citizens, indiscriminate repression “erases the relationship between crime and 
punishment, thus abolishing the concept of transgression” in the eyes of bystanders (Kalyvas 2004: 
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104). The unpredictability of punitive measures adopted by national authorities means that even 
members of suspect groups distancing themselves from terrorism cannot be confident that “only 
‘troublemakers’ will be punished” (Hafez and Hatfield 2006: 363). This “widens the cleavage 
between groups” (Klandermans 2014: 18), politicising the collective identity of targeted communities 
by demarcating rigid boundaries distinguishing and isolating them from the rest of the population. 
The progressive strengthening of a sense of ‘we-ness’ produces solidarity among victims, facilitating 
the spread of interpretative orientations identifying their condition as unfair (Fireman et al. 1979; 
Simon and Klandermans 2001). A growing climate of collective fear, alienation and insecurity 
increases costs associated with inaction, fuelling a desire for revenge against the state (Hafez 2003; 
della Porta 2013).  
In contexts characterised by the presence of terrorist groups operating on the ground, as are the 
African states in which the causal mechanism is hypothesised to work (due to scope condition 1 [C1]), 
the emergence of such a climate has major implications. Indeed, on the one hand, it favours terrorist 
propaganda, increasing the effectiveness of militants’ framing activities seeking to forge an 
“oppositional consciousness” (Morris and Braine 2001: 27) encouraging collective action against the 
state. As della Porta emphasises (2013: 68), harsh repression has “cognitive effects” favouring the 
resonance of radical interpretative orientations among targeted people. On the other hand, by causing 
a disconnect between the state and suspect groups, it weakens state monitoring capacities at the 
margins of society, providing militants with room for manoeuvre to penetrate the “social space” 
(Campana and Ducol 2011: 403) of such groups and establish connections with locals. The 
progressive consolidation of such connections, especially if of transnational nature, increases 
considerably the capability of local would-be militants to mobilise, “lowering the power discrepancies 
between challengers and the state” (Osa and Schock 2007: 130). Indeed, it allows aspiring recruits to 
circumvent “repression and blockage at home” (Sikkink 2005: 154; see also Adamson 2005) by 
gaining access to a relatively safe space outside the radar of national authorities where to take refuge 
and acquire “resources for violence” (della Porta 2009: 19, emphasis in original) in the form of 
leadership, supplies, organisational and tactical skills to engage in collective action against the state.  
Along these lines, indiscriminate repression has two main consequences for dynamics of 
radicalisation in African states. Firstly, it increases a motivation to mobilise among targeted groups, 
culminating in the generation of a reservoir of potential recruits for terrorist movements promoting 
collective action against the state. At the same time, it contributes to removing barriers for would-be 




This research expects to find evidence of Step 3 (r  B) in the case under study. Specifically, it 
expects to see Kenyan Muslim and ethnic Somali communities becoming prone to mobilising into 
Al-Shabaab, and managing to do so, in the face of indiscriminate repression. As discussed in the 
methodological section of the introductory chapter, such a prediction has a high degree of uniqueness 
and certainty. Indeed, due to its very specific character, it could hardly have causes other than r  B 
and is necessary for r  B to occur. As such, if found, predicted evidence would provide a powerful 
inferential test corroborating r  B.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical and conceptual basis of the research. After having provided 
the definitions of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘terrorism’, it has examined the role of CTS as the research 
orientation, shedding light on how such an orientation contributes to the construction of the three-
step causal mechanism hypothesised to link post-9/11 US security policies and radicalisation in 
Africa. Then, the chapter has offered greater insights into the theoretical framework underlying the 
mechanism. Historicising and contextualising (counter-)terrorism, such a framework places local 
politics at the heart of the analysis, conceiving the socio-political environment in which US policies 
are implemented as a crucial variable affecting their outcome. In so doing, the framework emphasises 
the political nature of terrorism, pointing to dynamics of violent interaction between African states 
and their population as a major dimension of radicalisation.  
Drawing upon research on remote warfare, Step 1 of the causal mechanism (A  q) hypothesises 
that, in African states suffering from the threat of terrorism (scope condition 1 [C1]), post-9/11 US 
security policies lead to the establishment of a partnership relationship within the framework of 
remote warfare, characterised by the provision of indirect support to a surrogate state with the aim of 
fighting terrorism on the ground remotely.  
Step 2 (q  r) builds on research on security assistance and the role of agency, hypothesising 
that, in African states carrying out harsh security measures based on indiscriminate repression against 
suspect groups (scope condition 2 [C2]), the establishment of the partnership relationship means that 
local security authorities gain resources and room for manoeuvre to implement such measures.  
Relying on a Social Movement Theory (SMT) approach to radicalisation, Step 3 (r  B) 
hypothesises that indiscriminate repression implemented by US African partners increases 
radicalisation among targeted groups. 
The theoretical framework of the research suggests that, being driven by a problem-solving 
perspective on the war on terror in Africa, US policies overlook crucial dynamics affecting the 
emergence of radicalisation. The engagement in remote warfare, with the consequent provision of 
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indirect support to surrogates on the continent, can improve the capability of African forces to localise 
and dismantle terrorist networks. Still, if such forces rely on repressive practices against their own 
population, US policies risk jeopardising security objectives on the ground, contributing to fuelling 
mobilisation into terrorism.   
Following the procedure of operationalisation described in the methodological section of the 
introductory chapter, each step of the causal mechanism has been translated into a case-specific 
prediction of the observable manifestations that such a step is expected to have if present in the case 
of post-9/11 US policies in Kenya. Given the high degree of uniqueness and certainty characterising 
the predictions formulated, the hypothesised mechanism (with its underlying theoretical framework) 
is validated in the case study if evidence of the following dynamics is found: 
 
1. The US providing security assistance to Kenya to fight Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab while 
keeping a low military presence on the ground (to substantiate Step 1 of the mechanism, 
scope condition 1 [C1] must apply to the case study, meaning that Kenya suffers from the 
threat posed by Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab).  
 
2. Kenya managing to use US security assistance to implement indiscriminate repression 
against Muslim and ethnic Somali communities (to substantiate Step 2 of the mechanism, 
scope condition 2 [C2] must apply to the case study, meaning that Kenyan security authorities 
use indiscriminate repression against Muslim and ethnic Somali communities). 
 
3. Kenyan Muslim and ethnic Somali communities becoming prone to mobilising into Al-
Shabaab, and managing to do so, in the face of indiscriminate repression. 
 
The next three chapters focus on each of these predictions, providing evidence in support of the 












Causal Mechanism: Step 1 
Post-9/11 US security policies in Kenya 
 
This chapter deals with Step 1 of the causal mechanism (A  q), according to which, in African states 
characterised by the threat of terrorism (scope condition 1 [C1]), post-9/11 US security policies lead 
to the establishment of a partnership relationship within the framework of remote warfare. The 
chapter tests the validity of A  q in the case of post-9/11 US security policies in Kenya by looking 
for case-specific manifestations of the step. After having assessed the presence of C1 in Kenya, the 
chapter seeks to find evidence of the US providing security assistance to Kenyan authorities to fight 
local terrorism while keeping a low military presence on the ground.  
The chapter is composed of four sections. 
The first section provides a brief overview on US security assistance in Africa. It shows how 
events in the 1990s played a role in reorienting US security initiatives in the continent, exploring the 
evolution of US policies under the Bush, Obama and Trump administrations. A crucial aim of the 
section is to introduce the paraphernalia used by US policy makers when promoting security on the 
ground, shedding light on the structure of post-9/11 US security assistance programmes and counter-
terrorism initiatives to then facilitate their examination in the Kenyan context.  
The second section of the chapter attests the presence of C1 in the case study. The section traces 
the history of terrorism in East Africa, from the penetration of Al-Qaeda during the 1990s up to the 
emergence of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and its progressive expansion into the neighbouring countries. 
In so doing, the section shows how, in the last two decades, Kenya has become a major theatre in the 
war on terror, turning into one of the main areas of operation for East Africa’s militants.  
The third section focuses on post-9/11 US security policies in Kenya, exploring how Washington 
has responded to the terrorist threat. The section provides strong evidence in support of the case-
specific prediction formulated when operationalising A  q, showing that, since the beginning of the 
war on terror, the US has provided Kenyan authorities with significant amounts of security assistance, 
training and equipping Kenyan forces while seeking to improve the country’s logistical and military 
resources with the aim of countering local terrorism. Despite experiencing different levels of 
cooperation with Kenyan authorities, the Bush, Obama and Trump administrations sought to foster 
security efforts in the country, supporting local actors to fight Al-Qaeda in East Africa (AQEA), Al-
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Shabaab and its local affiliates while limiting the US military presence on the ground to a few dozen 
soldiers.  
Finally, the last section explains why the evidence reported in the chapter provides a powerful 
inferential test corroborating A  q, pointing to the prominence of a strategy of remote warfare aimed 
at achieving counter-terrorism objectives by relying on Kenya as a surrogate to project US military 
force. In so doing, the section summarises the main features of A  q and introduces some of the 
implications that will be explored in the next chapter.  
 
A brief overview on US security assistance in Africa 
During September 1993, US Black Hawk helicopters were flying over the skies of Mogadishu, 
scouring potential hotspots where General Aideed and the members of his militia might hide. The 
Task Force Ranger conducting the raids had been deployed by Washington in support of the UN 
operation on the ground, UNOSOM II, seeking to enforce a peace process in Somalia by disarming 
armed factions and neutralising the warlords that guided them. Such warlords had taken control of 
the Somali territory after the overthrown of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991, giving rise to an internal 
conflict that, added to a severe drought in the region, had generated a humanitarian emergency. After 
having suspended assistance to Barre’s regime in 1989, the US was seeking to further cooperative 
security efforts in the country, putting into practice the principles of ‘new world order’ and ‘assertive 
multilateralism’ set out respectively by Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton (Patman 
2015). However, peace enforcement in Somalia proved to be harder than expected. 
 On October 3, US Rangers were caught in an ambush by Aideed’s militia. The latter shot three 
helicopters down and engaged American forces in a fight that lasted until late into the night. At the 
end, the ‘Battle of Mogadishu’ cost the lives of 18 US soldiers, while 78 others were wounded. Such 
an episode had a substantial impact both in military and political terms for the US. Indeed, on the one 
hand it signalled (again) the limits of American technological and logistical supremacy in 
unconventional theatres, where local forces could exploit their familiarity with the “urban jungle” 
and disappear into the crowd of non-combatants (Bacevich 2002: 147). On the other hand, it fuelled 
aversion, both within the public and the government, towards US direct involvement in remote 
conflicts regarded as having minor potential repercussions for national security (Clarke and Herbst 
1997; Aning 2001). The wide media coverage of the violence in Somalia and the footage of the 
corpses of US soldiers generated considerable criticism among the American public. The US 
administration realised how ground combat could easily result in a relatively high number of 
casualties as well as a dramatic loss of support, generating a political backlash. On October 6, three 
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days after the so-called ‘Black Hawk Down incident’, President Clinton announced the withdrawal 
of US forces from Somalia within six months. The country would remain ungoverned for a long time.  
The experience in Somalia in the 1990s marked an important moment in the history of US 
security policies in the post-Cold War era. If not a turning point, Mogadishu represented a critical 
juncture in the process of the evolution of Washington’s policy in the African continent and, more 
broadly, the global South. October 1993 increased US policy makers’ alienation from forms of 
warfare involving open confrontation among forces on the ground. Specifically, it consolidated a 
tendency towards the avoidance of risks, particularly for what concerns possible US casualties, 
stemming from direct interventions in conflicts (Patman 2015). As shown in the following pages, 
such a tendency affected the political line of the Clinton administration in the aftermath of the battle 
of Mogadishu and continued to reverberate throughout the policies of the Bush, Obama and Trump 
administrations during the war on terror. The launch of the military campaigns in Afghanistan and 
Iraq in the 2000s, characterised by a massive deployment of US troops, represented a notable 
exception to such a trend. Still, both the campaigns contributed to increasing consensus among US 
policy makers toward the prioritisation of an already emerging approach based on limiting US boots 
on the ground.  
In contrast with the attitude showed in the first months of his presidency, after the events in 
Somalia President Clinton set out strict rules regulating US involvement in UN missions. As the 1994 
Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) clarified, the US would support UN peace operations 
when “UN involvement represents the best means to advance U.S. interests” (White House 1994: 2), 
providing troops only if (among other conditions) “both the unique and general risks to American 
personnel have been weighed and are considered acceptable”; “an end point for U.S. participation 
can be identified”; and “there is domestic political and Congressional support for U.S. participation, 
or such support can be marshalled” (White House 1994: Annex II).  
Furthermore, besides imposing restrictions to participation in peace operations, the US started 
refining a new policy for the use of military force, placing increasing emphasis on the role of air 
strikes and local armies (Bacevich 2002).  
During the course of its mandate, the Clinton administration relied extensively on missiles to 
project US force in distant theatres (e.g., Bacevich 2002; Badey 2006). Cruise missiles, for example, 
were the main tool used by the US to respond to the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, 
striking Al-Qaeda’s bases in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum accused of 
producing chemical weapons for the terrorist group.  
In parallel, the Clinton administration intensified the provision of security assistance to local 
actors in Africa to increase their capacity (and political willingness) to participate in peace operations. 
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In this regard, fearing that increasing ethnic tensions in Burundi could open a crisis in the country, 
the US promoted the creation of an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) in 1996. Despite the 
failure of the initiative, the US managed to set in motion the African Crisis Response Initiative 
(ACRI) a year later, shifting the focus from the creation of a standing force to the provision of training 
to African states’ militaries to conduct peacekeeping missions (Berman 2003). Similarly, in 2000, the 
US implemented Operation Focus Relief, training forces from Ghana, Senegal and Nigeria to fight 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone (Bacevich 2002: 158-159). While investing in 
the African military potential and incentivising African-led peace initiatives, such projects were 
instrumental to the alleviation of the burden weighing on the shoulders of the world’s superpower, 
allowing it to tackle humanitarian problems on the continent while avoiding risks associated with 
direct military intervention. Despite being driven by a different motivation, and supported by much 
greater resources, post-9/11 US security policies have responded to a comparable logic. Establishing 
ties with African governments, cemented by intense diplomatic efforts and increasing military and 
logistical aid, Washington has sought to tackle threats on the ground without paying a high economic, 
military and political price. The politico-military architecture fabricated around those ties, as well as 
the “political, legal, and ethical landscapes” in which they have been elaborated (Knowles and 
Watson 2018b: 2), has represented a departure from the “reactive, largely ad hoc approach to Soviet-
inspired crises” characterising US initiatives during the Cold War period, “to a more strategic and 
proactive approach focusing on resolving regional conflicts and reinforcing regional stability” (Nigro 
and Lovelace 2013: 268; see also Shapiro 2012; N. D. Allen 2018). Such an approach has been centred 
on African security institutions as the primary referent and the main beneficiary of US efforts, seeking 
to build military and political support among local actors to achieve “aligned US strategic objectives” 
on the ground (DOD 2017: V, quoted in Watts and Biegon 2017: 3).  
The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent beginning of the war on terror led to a substantial shift in 
the relationship between the US and Africa. Identifying major threats to national security as stemming 
from the world’s poorest and politically fragile regions, US policy makers started intensifying 
security cooperation with countries regarded as crucial allies in the fight against terrorism. The 
George W. Bush administration highlighted the significant role played by US partners in combating 
terrorism in local theatres, announcing the provision of increasing amounts of security assistance. 
Indeed, as the new war required the US to engage “on many fronts against a particularly elusive 





an essential element of our strategy remains working with others to reorient existing partnerships 
and create new mechanisms for cooperation among the willing and able states around the world. 
 
We will review funding for international counterterrorism training and assistance programs and 
ensure adequate resources are available to strengthen the capabilities of key states (White House 
2003: 20). 
 
Despite the relatively limited focus devoted by US policy makers to Africa during the 2000s, 
especially if compared to regions such as the Middle East and Central Asia, the political line 
implemented by the Bush administration translated into the creation of a major security structure 
catalysing the intensification of cooperation with key states on the continent. In 2002, the US created 
the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), turning Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti 
into a permanent military base from which to enhance partners’ security capacities and tackle 
terrorism in East Africa through an “‘indirect’ approach” (Ploch 2010: 26). In the same year, the Pan-
Sahel Initiative (PSI) was launched, providing counter-terrorism training and assistance to Mali, 
Niger, Chad, and Mauritania. Both the CJTF-HOA and the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism 
Partnership (TSCTP), which succeeded PSI in 2004, were integrated into the US Africa Command 
(AFRICOM) in 2008, along with other US initiatives in the continent such as the East Africa 
Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI, discussed in the third section of this chapter) and the Africa 
Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA, which succeeded ACRI in 2002).  
AFRICOM, whose headquarters has remained stationed in Stuttgart (Germany), was designed in 
2007 as the expression of the new strategic significance of Africa in the post-9/11 US security 
framework, coordinating US military operations as well as non-military programmes aimed at 
tackling instability and assisting African states in the promotion of African security. As AFRICOM 
Commander General William E. Ward argued in 2009, “by strengthening our partners’ security 
capacity, we will deny terrorists freedom of action and access to resources, while diminishing the 
conditions that foster violent extremism” (AFRICOM 2009). Such objectives were deemed to be of 
critical importance for US national interests, allowing Washington to unlock the potential of local 
actors to preserve regional stability “while at the same time alleviating some of the demands on U.S. 
forces” (Shapiro 2012: 24). Hence, in the words of the former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense, Ryan Henry, AFRICOM would have been successful if it had “[kept] American troops out 
of Africa for the next 50 years” (quoted in Ploch 2011: 6, emphasis in original).  
To sustain major security initiatives in Africa and throughout the world, in the 2000s the US 
started setting up an intricate web of security assistance programmes, which have multiplied over the 
years. In the pre-9/11 period Washington accounted for 57 security aid programmes. Yet, their 
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number had reached 107 in 2017 (Isacson and Kinosian 2017: 3). Through these programmes the US 
has provided “defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, 
credit, cash sales, or lease, in furtherance of national policies and objectives” (McInnis and Lucas 
2015: 8). The Department of Defense (DOD) has run many of the security assistance funds, frequently 
in cooperation with the Department of State (DOS) through its Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. 
Such a prominent role played by the Pentagon in the management of US foreign assistance has 
constituted a departure from the provisions set out by the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, which 
identified the DOS as the main actor involved in the provision of training and military resources to 
third states while looking after US broader interests (Isacson and Kinosian 2017: 6).    
Among the security assistance programmes enacted during the Bush administration, “Section 
1206 Train and Equip Authority”, established by the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA), has represented a major vehicle through which the DOD, with an increasing involvement 
of the DOS, has sought to strengthen partners’ security capabilities, training and equipping foreign 
forces to conduct counterterrorism operations. In the same year in which Section 1206 was launched, 
the DOD Quadrennial Defense Review Report highlighted how “operational experiences – in 
Afghanistan and Iraq…[had] provided important lessons and principles that the Department [had] 
already begun to apply” (DOD 2006: 16), maintaining that “the employment of surrogates will be a 
necessary method for achieving many goals” (DOD 2006: 23) and that the DOD would seek to 
“expand the authorities of the Departments of State and Defense to train and equip foreign security 
forces best suited to internal counterterrorism and counter-insurgency operations” (DOD 2006: 90). 
Supporting local forces to take the lead in security operations was increasingly conceived by US 
policy makers as capable of improving the effectiveness of US counter-terrorism efforts by 
maximising the degree of familiarity and perceived legitimacy of security forces within the concerned 
socio-political environment (DOD 2006: 23). This was also consistent with the US plan for Iraq 
outlined by President Bush in 2005 during a speech at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, foreseeing a greater 
role played by local actors in the achievement of security goals on the ground: “our strategy can be 
summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down” (Bush 2005). In 2007, the second 
year from its creation, Section 1206 accounted for 44 per cent of US$93 million provided by the DOD 
to Sub-Saharan Africa (SAM 2021a). The Pentagon’s assistance to the region increased significantly 
in the subsequent decade, reaching a peak of US$797 million in 2016 (SAM 2021a).  
Despite the temporary nature of Section 1206 foreseen in its original formulation, the programme 
was maintained during the 2010s, being expanded and added to section 333 of Title 10 of US Code 
by the 2017 NDAA, which renamed it ‘Section 333 Building Partner Capacity’. The very term 
‘building partner capacity’, firstly mentioned in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, has 
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increasingly been used by US policy makers during the last decade to describe a wide range of 
“missions, programs, activities, and authorities intended to improve the ability of other nations to 
achieve those security oriented goals they share with the United States” (McInnis and Lucas 2015: 
1).   
The DOD has also implemented security assistance programmes directed by the DOS. The major 
ones have been the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme and the Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) programme. Created in 1976, IMET has been used to professionalise 
foreign militaries, promoting human rights and democratic governance, as well as to foster 
cooperative relationships between the US and its allies. Through FMF, instead, the DOD has provided 
grant funding to partner nations to purchase US arms and defence equipment via the Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) programme. Besides fostering the military capacities of key allies in the war on terror, 
such programmes have played a substantial role in helping the US “secure geographical and political-
technical access” to recipient states (Biegon and Watts 2021: 157), strengthening diplomatic ties and 
increasing US political leverage in distant regions of the world. As the former Assistant Secretary of 
State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew J. Shapiro clarified with respect to the provision of 
defence equipment,  
 
when the U.S. transfers a weapon system, it is not just providing a country with military hardware, 
it is both reinforcing diplomatic relations and establishing a long-term security partnership. The 
complex and technical nature of advanced defense systems frequently requires collaboration and 
interaction between countries. This may include training and support in the use of the system, 
assistance in maintenance, and help to update and modernize the system throughout its life-cycle. 
This engagement helps build bilateral ties and creates strong incentives for recipient countries to 
maintain good relations with the United States. Security assistance therefore helps undergird these 
diplomatic relationships (Shapiro 2012: 29). 
 
In the last two decades, as a consequence of intensifying politico-military relationships with several 
African governments, the US has gained access to an increasing number of facilities on the continent, 
often known as “cooperative security locations” (or ‘lily pads’), to sustain counter-terrorism efforts 
(Ploch 2011: 9).  
Lastly, the DOS has managed some security assistance programmes with minor involvement 
from the DOD. For example, through the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related 
Programs (NADR) account, the DOS has financed the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) programme, 
conceived as a “part of the first line of America’s defense, working to stop terrorists before they reach 
U.S. shores” by “making U.S. partners better able to detect and thwart terrorists” (DOS 2004a: 142). 
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ATA assistance to the African continent increased significantly during the 2000s, shifting from 
US$3.5 million to approximately US$25 million between 2000 and 2010 (Ploch 2010: 33). Still, the 
major fund administered by the DOS has been the Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) account. Through 
the PKO, the DOS has provided training and military assistance to partnered forces involved in peace 
and stability operations. Over the last decade, the majority of the POK fund has been directed to 
Africa, supporting initiatives such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). POK has 
also contributed to sustaining counter-terrorism activities in the continent, financing the TSCTP as 
well as the Partnership for East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) implemented in 2009 (Ploch 
2015: 8; PREACT will be explored in detail in the third section of this chapter). Between 2009 and 
2020, the average annual amount of PKO assistance directed to Africa was approximately US$359 
million, with levels increasing substantially during the second term of the Obama presidency (SAM 
2021b).    
Indeed, US efforts to assist allied forces intensified during the Obama administration, being 
incorporated into a wider approach aimed at achieving national security objectives through a ‘light 
footprint’, prioritising cooperation with local actors (and air strikes, e.g., Luján 2013; Kandel 2014; 
Goldenberg et al. 2016). Despite a minor increase between the end of the 2000s and the beginning of 
the 2010s, the number of US active-duty military personnel deployed overseas, which had started 
decreasing after the end of the Cold War, dipped below two hundred thousand for the first time in 
sixty years during 2016 (Bialik 2017). Such a line of action emerged as a result of further evidence 
showing counter-productive repercussions, in political, military and economic terms, stemming from 
large-scale interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this regard, while the 2012 DOD document 
“Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” highlighted that “U.S. forces 
will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations” (DOD 2012: 6, 
emphasis in original), the 2010 DOD Quadrennial Review Report remarked the significance of 
security assistance in allowing the US to tackle the threat of terrorism while minimising risks 
connected to a deployment of combat troops on the ground: 
 
although security assistance is not new, what has fundamentally changed is the role that such 
assistance can play in providing security in today’s environment.   
 
…enabling our partners to respond to security challenges may reduce risk to U.S. forces and 




President Obama himself made the point during a speech at West Point, New York, in 2014, arguing 
that  
 
some of our most costly mistakes came not from our restraint, but from our willingness to rush 
into military adventures without thinking through the consequences – without building 
international support and legitimacy for our action; without leveling with the American people 
about the sacrifices required.  
 
…a strategy that involves invading every country that harbors terrorist networks is naïve and 
unsustainable. I believe we must shift our counterterrorism strategy – drawing on the successes 
and shortcomings of our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan – to more effectively partner with 
countries where terrorist networks seek a foothold (White House 2014a). 
  
During the speech at West Point, Obama announced the creation of the Counterterrorism 
Partnership Fund (CTPF), requesting US$5 billion to implement several initiatives, including 
providing support to AMISOM in Somalia and to allied forces in Libya. In the same year, the US 
intensified the provision of support to African states, increasing the role of US Special Operation 
Forces (SOF) involved in security force assistance (SFA) in the continent by training, advising and 
equipping local forces on the ground. Between 2014 and 2015, training activities for militaries in 
Sub-Saharan countries increased by nearly 90% (SAM 2017). Furthermore, the Obama 
administration sought to promote programmes improving the effectiveness and the reliability of 
African partners’ security and military institutions. In this regard, in 2014 the US president launched 
the Security Governance Initiative (SGI), dedicating US$65 million (from the NADR account) to 
“reinforce democratic security sector governance”, promote human rights and improve the military 
capacities of six African countries: Mali, Kenya, Tunisia, Niger, Ghana and Nigeria (White House 
2014b).  
Several documents and statements released by the Trump administration envisaged a break with 
the Africa policy of the previous administrations, foreseeing major cuts in the provision of security 
assistance and a greater focus paid by Washington on protecting the homeland by investing in the US 
security potential. The 2017 National Security Strategy, for example, highlighted how the US would 
“encourage partners to work independently of U.S. assistance” (White House 2017a: 11). Along these 
lines, while introducing the 2018 US Africa Strategy, the US National Security Advisor Ambassador, 
John R. Bolton, stressed the “need to make adjustments to address the pressing challenge of great 
power competition, and to correct past mistakes in structuring our funding” so as to “move recipient 
states toward self-reliance, and prevent long-term dependency” while “ensur[ing] that U.S. taxpayer 
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dollars for aid are used efficiently and effectively” (Bolton 2018). Trump himself underlined this 
point during several speeches, blaming the past administrations for having “failed to insist that…often 
very wealthy allies pay their fair share for defense, putting a massive and unfair burden on the U.S. 
taxpayer and…[the] U.S. military” (White House 2017b).   
However, the major changes promised by the Trump administration have failed to materialise. 
US initiatives in the continent “continued…on auto-pilot” (Westcott 2019: 8; see also Biegon and 
Watts 2020b), even registering some increases in the total amount of assistance provided. Indeed, 
whether the DOD average annual expenditure for security assistance in Africa during the eight years 
of the Obama administration was approximately US$328 million, during the first three years of the 
Trump presidency it increased to US$430 million (SAM 2021c).2 Particularly, the average annual 
expenditure for Section 1206/333 increased from US$146 million to nearly US$174 million (SAM 
2021c). In the same way, despite considerable cuts to the ATA programme at global level (SAM 
2019), the DOS average annual expenditure for security assistance in the African continent was 
subjected to a slight increase during the Trump presidency, reaching almost US$1.9 billion (SAM 
2021b).     
Distinguishing the Trump administration’s security policies from those of the Bush and Obama 
administrations was not a new strategy guiding the war on terror in Africa, nor a decrease in the total 
amount of assistance provided by Washington, but rather a decrease in the number of recipient 
countries benefiting from US security support. Between 2017 and 2020, the DOD increasingly 
prioritised partners in the fight against terror at the expense of other countries where the US was 
promoting more long-term projects, re-channelling US security assistance towards key states in North 
Africa (mainly Tunisia and Morocco), West Africa and the Sahel (Nigeria, Niger, Mali and Chad), 
and East Africa (Somalia, Uganda and Kenya) (see SAM 2021d).  
The prominence of security cooperation as a “military strategy” (Ross 2016: 92) to intervene in 
the African continent was reiterated in 2018 by AFRICOM commander General Thomas D. 
Waldhauser: 
 
security operations are executed almost exclusively by the partnered security forces. U.S. Africa 
Command works with partnered security forces based on their operational needs. The vital 
objectives of the U.S. and the partnered nation are achieved through a cooperative relationship in 
which U.S. Africa Command plays a supporting role (AFRICOM 2018, emphasis added). 
 
 
2 As of August 2021, complete data on DOD expenditures for security assistance in Africa in the last year of the Trump 
administration (2020) are yet to be publicised.  
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Despite being placed in the wider context of great-power competition, and being infused with 
the president’s ‘America First’ rhetoric, the US Africa policy during the Trump presidency followed 
the main pattern drawn by previous US governments, relying on local actors as the main vehicle 
through which to fight emerging threats on the ground. Although a nationalist and isolationist agenda 
continued to reverberate throughout several of the president’s statements, the Trump White House 
progressively acknowledged the “importance of strong partnerships in sustaining [US] 
counterterrorism efforts” (White House 2018a: II), conceding that “America First does not mean 
America alone” (White House 2018a: I).  
 
The terrorist threat in Kenya and East Africa 
Exploring the evolution of US security efforts in Africa during the last decades, the previous section 
has shed light on the structure and rationale of US assistance programmes and counter-terrorism 
initiatives in the continent. Before examining how such programmes and initiatives have been used 
in the case study and testing the validity of A  q, this section attests the presence of scope condition 
1 (C1) in Kenya. To do so, the section traces the history of Islamist terrorism in East Africa, showing 
how Kenya has progressively turned into a major target for Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab while, at the 
same time, providing a fertile ground for terrorist networks to flourish.  
In the last few decades, East Africa has played a significant role in the development of Islamist 
terrorism, harbouring Al-Qaeda’s leadership during the 1990s and subsequently giving rise to some 
of the most dangerous clandestine organisations. Since the late 1990s, and especially after 9/11, the 
region has turned into a crucial arena in the US war against terrorism. American security concerns, 
originally focused on the penetration of Al-Qaeda’s operatives, have intensified in the last fifteen 
years as a consequence of the emergence and rapid diffusion of Al-Shabaab. The Somali organisation 
has increasingly been regarded by Washington as posing a major threat, to the extent that in 2011, 
while Somalia was ranked third among the countries considered most dangerous for the US (GAO 
2011), the National Strategy for Counterterrorism classified East Africa as one of the main “areas of 
focus” for US counter-terrorism policies (White House 2011: 14). As shown in the following section, 
such a focus on the region has remained steady up to the present day.  
The first appearance of Al-Qaeda in East Africa dates back to 1992, when Osama bin Laden and 
his cohort relocated to Sudan, forging ties with local groups (including the militia of General Aideed) 
and laying the foundations of what progressively became Al-Qaeda in East Africa (AQEA) (Bryden 
and Bahra 2019). Among the organisations supported by bin Laden in those years was the Somali Al-
Itihaad Al-Islaami (AIAI), founded during the 1980s, whose agenda revolved around fighting Barre’s 
regime, countering Western influence and regaining the territories comprising the ‘Greater Somalia’, 
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lost with the advent of colonialism (Watts, Shapiro and Brown 2007). Al-Qaeda sought to create a 
convergence of interests with Somali militants, providing incentives to channel their efforts into the 
framework of global jihad. The organisation trained and supported logistically AIAI fighters, 
cooperating during operations in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia (Shinn 2007). However, despite bin 
Laden’s attempts to open a new front in the country, Al-Qaeda struggled to align with the local 
cultural tradition and penetrate the decentralised structure of the Somali society, often centred more 
on clan affiliation than religious identity (Watts, Shapiro and Brown 2007). In parallel, the 1996 
Ethiopian intervention against AIAI, along with its decreasing allure among potential supporters 
within and beyond Somali borders (ICG 2005), had a crucial impact on the group, which entered a 
phase of dissolution towards the end of the decade.  
Besides assisting local militias, during the early 1990s Al-Qaeda started organising small teams 
to conduct operations and engage in recruitment in East Africa, taking advantage of the porosity of 
regional borders, as well as of the high levels of corruption, to gain room for manoeuvre. Kenya was 
soon identified as a target. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the US was aware of the 
emergence of an Al-Qaeda cell in Nairobi controlled a close collaborator of bin Laden, Wadih al-
Hage (9/11 Commission 2004: 68-69). Cooperating with Kenyan police forces, the CIA sought to 
track down al-Hage and dismantle its network during 1997 (Coll 2004: 404-405). Still, even when al-
Hage left the scene, the cell in Kenya remained alive.   
Two years had passed since Al-Qaeda’s leadership had departed from Sudan to settle in 
Afghanistan when the sleeper cell in Kenya became active. On 7 August 1998, truck bombs exploded 
in front of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, causing 224 casualties and thousands of 
wounded. One of the masterminds behind the 1998 attacks, Fazul Abdullah Muhammad, was later 
involved in the planning of another operation with the complicity of affiliates in the Kenyan territory. 
In November 2002, Kenyan actors used two surface-to-air missiles to shoot down an Israeli airliner 
departing from Mombasa (Ploch 2010: 6). The missiles missed the target. However, a simultaneous 
attack against the Paradise Hotel, an Israeli-owned hotel in Kikambala (near Mombasa), cost the lives 
of fourteen people. 
Despite not leading to the establishment of a major jihadist presence on the ground, Al-Qaeda’s 
penetration in East Africa during the 1990s contributed to setting in motion loose networks of 
operatives throughout the region, also strengthening local groups of sympathisers. In the following 
years, such a milieu would constitute a crucial component of the fabric with which Al-Shabaab would 
weave its web.     
In the aftermath of the 2002 attack in Kenya, Fazul Abdullah Muhammad and other AQEA 
operatives moved to Somalia, where they reunited with AIAI militants within the nascent Islamic 
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Courts Union (ICU) (Watts, Shapiro and Brown 2007; Bryden and Bahra 2019). The ICU emerged 
as an umbrella organisation catalysing social discontent against the Somali Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG, created in 2004), perceived as the political expression of a small group of Somali 
clans, subjected to Ethiopian influence, and prone to anti-Islamic policies (Menkhaus 2009b). 
Tensions between the TFG and religious groups escalated into a civil conflict in 2006, which saw the 
ICU rapidly taking control of Mogadishu and the south-central regions of Somalia. Such a rapid 
advance of ICU forces frightened Somalia’s neighbour Ethiopia, leading to an armed invasion in 
December 2006. The US backed Ethiopian efforts, also providing air support against AQEA militants 
in Somalia (TBIJ 2017a).  
In the midst of the fight between the ICU and Ethiopian forces, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin 
(HSM) came to prominence as the main actor in Somalia. Al-Shabaab (‘The Youth’), which arose 
during the early 2000s as an armed militia of Islamic courts, succeeded where previous Islamist 
groups had failed, overcoming clan divisions while promoting itself as a catalyst for a national Islamic 
resistance against foreign invaders (Marchal 2009). The narrative promoted by the group, based on 
the external threat and the acquiescence/complicity of the TFG, along with the dramatic intensity of 
the conflict in Somalia, devastating a stateless society that was also struggling with a severe drought, 
increased militants’ appeal among Somali people (and the Somali diaspora community) (Menkhaus 
2009b: 8). The retreat of the ICU leadership during the hostilities consolidated Al-Shabaab’s primacy 
and political autonomy, channelling the war against Ethiopia within the group’s ranks.   
In 2008, the year in which the US designated Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organisation, the group 
had already gained control of many territories in the south of Somalia. Reports released by the UN 
during that period highlight the existence of close ties between Al-Shabaab’s militants and Al-Qaeda 
(UN 2008: 19-20). Despite some attempts by Al-Shabaab’s leadership to gain Al-Qaeda’s official 
endorsement since the late 2000s (e.g., Childress 2010; DOS 2011), a formal affiliation was 
announced only in February 2012. Even before that moment, however, Al-Shabaab had already 
started to retrace Al-Qaeda’s routes in East Africa, seeking to penetrate the social fabric of East 
African societies and extend its influence in the region.  
Reports show how, since the early years of the conflict against the TFG, Al-Shabaab could rely 
on a militia of between 200-500 East African fighters, most of which were Kenyan ethnic Somali and 
non-ethnic Somali Muslims stationed in the “Majimmo sector” in the south of Somalia (UN 2011: 
144; IGAD 2016: 22-23). In 2010, militants of Ugandan and Kenyan origins were involved in Al-
Shabaab’s attacks in Kampala during the World Cup, which was the first major operation carried out 
by the organisation beyond Somali boundaries (Biryabarema 2016). Over time, Al-Shabaab increased 
its reliance on non-Somali Muslims, deepening ties with networks of supporters in Kenya. One of the 
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most important gravitated around the Muslim Youth Center (MYC), founded in 2008 at the Pumwani 
Riyadha Mosque in Nairobi (Anzalone 2012a). Defined by its constitution as a “community-based 
organisation” promoting Islamic values, Muslim integration and human rights (UN 2011: 140), the 
MYC progressively represented an operating base and a mobilising tool for Al-Shabaab in the Kenyan 
territory, disseminating the movement’s propaganda, providing logistical support and facilitating 
travels of new recruits to Somalia. The merger between the MYC and Al-Shabaab was made public 
in early 2012. During the same period, the MYC changed its name in Al-Hijra (UN 2012: 16), 
committing itself to “take the war to Kenya” (Anderson and McKnght 2015b: 546; see also Anzalone 
2012a; Maruf and Joseph 2018).  
While fostering stronger connections with sympathetic groups in East Africa, between the end 
of the 2000s and the beginning of the 2010s Al-Shabaab started facing increasing strategic challenges. 
The advance of the troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), along with the 
opening of a new front in the south of the country, as a consequence of the 2011 launch of Operation 
Linda Nchi (‘Protect the Country’) by the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF), caused several military 
setbacks to militants. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab was suffering a progressive loss of support in 
Somalia. The 2009 withdrawal of Ethiopian troops deprived the group of its main raison d’être in the 
eyes of many potential supporters, who started perceiving Al-Shabaab more as the latest of the 
military militias than as the expression of a national resistance against an external enemy (Menkhaus 
2009b: 9). Militants’ strict application of Sharia law in the territories under control, clashing with the 
more moderate Sufi practices of Somali people, contributed to their loss of popularity in the homeland 
(Menkhaus 2014b; Solomon 2014).    
Such dynamics intertwined with increasing tensions and factionalism within Al-Shabaab, 
culminating in the seizure of power by Ahmed Abdi Godane in 2013. After having taken full control 
of the group through a bloody campaign of internal purge (see Hansen 2014), Godane sought to 
address operational difficulties by intensifying a process of decentralisation, transforming Al-
Shabaab from a territorial-based organisation into a less tangible entity spreading throughout the 
region (Bryden 2014; Williams 2014; Anderson and McKnight 2015a, 2015b; Bryden 2015; ICG 
2015a; Anzalone 2016a). Under Godane’s guidance, militants relied increasingly on taxation and 
extortion of business owners as instruments to overcome the decrease in income caused by the loss 
of strongholds such as the port city of Kismayu (UN 2015: 29). Furthermore, Godane diversified Al-
Shabaab’s structure, seeking to improve the group’s operability in neighbouring countries. By the end 
of 2013, some of Al-Shabaab’s commanders in Somalia had already been assigned to regions in the 
Kenyan territory while two new paramilitary units had been created with the aim of extending 
activities in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia (IGAD 2016: 20). One of these two units, which 
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was called ‘Jaysh Ayman’ and was composed primarily by Kenyan recruits (see Chome 2017; West 
2018), moved towards the border with Kenya, using the Boni Forest as a refuge from which to strike 
in the country (Bocha 2017; Kazungu and Bocha 2017). To sustain the group’s transnational agenda, 
Godane sought to further broaden Al-Shabaab’s potential support base beyond Somali ethnic 
boundaries, intensifying efforts to increase the group’s appeal among Muslims in East Africa (Chonka 
2016; Kfir 2017; see also Vidino, Pantucci and Kohlmann 2010).  
Godane’s death in a US drone strike in 2014 did not lead to substantial alterations for what 
concerns the strategic line followed by Al-Shabaab. The group’s new leader, Ahmad Umar, has 
continued on the path of his predecessor, regionalising militants’ operations and promoting an even 
greater reliance on local operatives (Bryden 2015; ICG 2018; Bryden and Bahra 2019). Despite some 
attempts of a wing of Al-Shabaab to establish links with Daesh during 2015, the organisation, which 
now consists of between 7000 and 9000 fighters (e.g., BBC 2017; Mogire, Mkutu and Alusa 2018; 
Cannon and Ruto Pkalya 2019; CFR 2020b), has remained loyal to Al-Qaeda, seeking to marginalise 
destabilising factions (IGAD 2016; Kfir 2017).   
The changes set in motion by Al-Shabaab’s leadership since 2013 have resulted in a significant 
expansion of the group’s radius of action in East Africa. In October 2013, Al-Shabaab claimed 
responsibility for a bomb blast in a district of Addis Ababa’s that housed embassies and residences 
of diplomats (Fortin 2013). A few months later, a suicide attack targeted a popular restaurant in 
Djibouti (Reuters 2014). In parallel, militants started intensifying recruitment efforts in Tanzania, 
seeking to forge links with local groups and open a new front in East Africa (Bryden 2015; ICG 
2018). However, so far, most of Al-Shabaab’s activities outside Somalia have concentrated in Kenya. 
The porosity of the nearly 700 kilometres of border that the country shares with southern Somalia, 
where Al-Shabaab has maintained its main areas of operation, along with the presence of a supporting 
environment for militants, have rendered Kenya a primary target both in terms of attacks and 
recruitment.  
In 2011, Al-Shabaab started increasing raids in Kenya as part of its claimed ‘retaliation’ against 
the Kenyan government for the implementation of Operation Linda Nchi (see e.g., Anderson and 
McKnight 2015a). By 2012, when the annual number of attacks carried out by the group reached over 
200, nearly one out of four attacks was directed against targets in the country (Miller 2013: 1). Still, 
militants did not conduct major actions in Kenya before the advent of Godane’s leadership. The first 
of the group’s large operations occurred on 21 September 2013, when Al-Shabaab’s militants 
attacked the upmarket Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, killing 67 civilians and injuring more than 
175 (Onuoha 2013). The Westgate attack marked the beginning of a new season of violence in Kenya, 
characterised by a massive refocusing of Al-Shabaab’s paramilitary efforts southwards. Less than a 
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year later, Jaysh Ayman was unleashed on the streets of Mpeketoni Town (Lamu County) causing 
dozens of casualties (IGAD 2016: 24). Yet, the most devastating attack took place on April 2015, 
when militants assaulted the Garissa University College (Garissa County) causing 147 deaths (BBC 
2015). In the following period, despite some fluctuation, Al-Shabaab’s incursions in the country 
maintained a steady trend, registering a peak between 2017 and 2018, when Kenya suffered more 
than 60 incidents (START 2019). By the end of 2018, the total number of attacks well exceeded 300 
(START 2019) 
Two of the last major operations conducted by Al-Shabaab in Kenya were the 2019 DusitD2 
complex attack (Nairobi) and the 2020 attack in Camp Simba (Manda Bay, Lamu County), a military 
base used by the US since 2004. The latter, which was the first attack against US forces in the country, 
caused the death of two DOD contractors and one US soldier stationed in the base, also damaging 
aircrafts and military vehicles (Al Jazeera 2020; BBC 2020; Martinez and McLaughlin 2020). The 
DusitD2 complex attack occurred almost a year before, in January 2019, when gunmen entered the 
DusitD2 hotel complex in the suburb of Westlands, Nairobi, opening fire against people in the 
compound and leaving 21 victims on the ground (BBC 2019b). The incident, which was caused by 
young Kenyans of non-ethnic Somali origins (some of whom even recently converted to Islam, see 
Achuka and Muthoni 2019; Daily Nation 2019; The Star 2019), showed the complexity of the terrorist 
threat in the country, representing the melting point between Al-Shabaab’s regional tentacles and the 
domestic problem of radicalisation (see Bryden and Bahra 2019). The consolidation of links between 
Somali militants and local networks of sympathisers has played a substantial role in furthering the 
penetration Al-Shabaab, contributing to turning Kenya into a new major theatre of the war on terror 
in East Africa.  
 
The US intervention in Kenya 
Having confirmed the presence of a terrorist threat in Kenya (C1) by shedding light on Al-Qaeda’s 
and Al-Shabaab’s activities in the country and East Africa, the chapter now turns its focus to the 
observable manifestations of the first step of the causal mechanism (A  q). This section provides 
strong evidence in support of the case-specific prediction formulated when operationalising the 
mechanism, showing that the US has provided security assistance to Kenyan authorities to fight Al-
Qaeda and Al-Shabaab while keeping a low military presence on the ground. The section explores 
how Washington has used its assistance programmes and counter-terrorism initiatives to promote 
Kenya’s security during the last two decades, presenting some of the local units benefiting from US 
aid and introducing the Kenyan counter-terrorism system. In so doing, the section provides a history 
of the war on terror in East Africa from the perspective of US policy makers, shedding light on the 
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military and diplomatic efforts through which the US has sought to build support for the achievement 
of security goals on the ground.  
In the last two decades, the US has relied on a diversified set of instruments to tackle terrorism 
in East Africa. Some of these have maintained a ‘soft’ character, being focused on the socio-economic 
conditions that militants are believed to exploit to gain recruits and room for manoeuvre in the region. 
For example, US soldiers of the CJTF-HOA have been involved in non-military operations such as 
development projects in areas regarded as vulnerable to terrorism, seeking to gain access to and win 
hearts and minds of local populations (e.g., Bradbury and Kleinman 2010; Ploch 2010). However, 
most of US security resources and efforts have concentrated on more ‘hard’ measures against Al-
Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. Specifically, Washington has relied on two major forms of intervention in 
East Africa: air strikes against militants in Somalia and security assistance to local forces in the 
region.    
Whereas in the early 2000s American forces conducted a limited number of ground raids in 
Somalia, the US started intensifying air strikes during the second term of the Bush presidency, when 
Ethiopian forces invaded the country to fight the ICU (Bergen, Sterman and Salyk-Virk 2020). Since 
then, facing the emergence of Al-Shabaab as a major threat, the US has increased the use of aircrafts 
and unmanned drones. During the Obama presidency, the US conducted more than 30 air strikes in 
Somalia (leading to the death of Godane in 2014) (TBIJ 2017b). Such figures were largely exceeded 
by the Trump administration, which carried out around 200 strikes (Bergen, Sterman and Salyk-Virk 
2020; see also AI 2019a).  
Even more than through air strikes, however, the US has sought to fight terrorism in East Africa 
through indirect interventions, providing assistance to local security forces. Since 2001 and the 
beginning of the war on terror, countries in the region have received US$3.9 billion under the DOS 
NADR, FMF and PKO funds (SAM 2021e). The DOD started playing a prominent role in the 
provision of security assistance to East Africa in the period following the rise of the ICU in Somalia 
and the establishment of Section 1206. Since 2007, the Pentagon has provided nearly US$1.8 billion 
to the region, accounting for nearly 44 per cent of all DOD assistance delivered to the African 
continent in the same timeframe (SAM 2021d).  
Kenya has been a major target of US security policies aimed at countering terrorism in East 
Africa. The increasing threat of Islamist terrorism in the country, whose first major manifestations, 
as seen in the previous section, date back to Al-Qaeda’s first ventures in the region, along with the 
strategic role that Kenya has played as a natural barrier against the spread of Al-Shabaab, have meant 
that Nairobi has been perceived as a crucial ally by the US (see Bachmann and Hönke 2009). In the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Kenya was soon identified by Washington as a frontline state in the war 
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on terror and as an “anchor” country, that is, a key security partner for an effective engagement in 
East Africa (White House 2002: 11). Such a view was reiterated by the 2010 National Security 
Strategy, framing Kenya as one of the “essential subregional linchpins” in Africa (White House 2010: 
45). Over time, the country has turned into the main recipient of DOD Section 1206/333 in the whole 
continent, receiving US$359 million (Uganda, which ranks second, has received US$123 million less 
than Kenya) (SAM 2021f, 2021g). Part of such an amount has been used by US Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) to help develop and assist Kenyan military and Ranger units countering the penetration 
of militants from Somalia (Wikileaks 2010; OSF 2013a). Indeed, as detailed below in this section, 
both the DOS and the DOD have used their funds to set up and sustain a web of regional and bilateral 
programmes aimed at helping “Kenyan security forces to deal with…very specific counterterrorism 
threats” (White House 2015a). Still, such an intensification of security efforts in Kenya has not 
translated into an increased American military presence in the country. On the contrary, in line with 
the case-specific prediction related to A  q, while providing local actors with increasing security 
assistance to fight Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, Washington has limited US boots on the ground. 
Between September 2001 and September 2019, the average number of US active-duty military 
personnel in Kenya was approximately 65, fluctuating between a maximum of 208 (September 2017) 
and a minimum of 23 (September 2008, September 2010) (DMDC 2019).3 As of September 2020, 
their number was 52 (DMDC 2021).  
Kenya already benefited from US military support during the last two decades of the Cold War 
(USAID 2019), when tensions in the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf turned the country into an 
important ally in the region. The end of the superpower rivalry, along with the poor political and 
humanitarian record of the President Moi administration in Kenya, led to a considerable decrease in 
security assistance during the 1990s, when, freed from the constraints of the Cold War, the US became 
increasingly careful to foster good governance and human rights practices among potential recipients 
(Ploch 2013). Security cooperation between Kenyan forces and the US was strengthened after the 
1998 embassy bombings, with Kenya being added to the ATA programme. Still, an attempt to build 
strong security ties occurred only in the post-9/11 period, with the beginning of the global war on 
terror and the end of the Moi government. In 2002, when the US created the CJTF-HOA in Djibouti 
and the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), guided by Mwai Kibaki, won national elections in 
Kenya, the AQEA attack against the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala contributed to drawing Kenya and 
East Africa definitely into the “post-9/11 theatre of US operations” (Usiskin 2019: 66).  
 
3 Data from the years 2006 and 2007 are excluded as they are not reported in the archives of the Defense Manpower Data 
Center (DMDC).  
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One year after the Kikambala attack, the Bush administration launched the East Africa 
Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), seeking to foster counter-terrorism efforts against AQEA by 
providing security assistance to Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Uganda, Eritrea and Tanzania. Being 
financed by DOS funds such as FMF, PKO and NADR, EACTI focused mainly on police training 
and equipping, border and coastal security, and counter-terrorism intelligence, also using part of its 
resources to implement development projects such as educational programmes targeting 
disadvantaged Muslim communities (DOS 2005a: 29; Ploch 2010: 23). Kenya, which was the main 
beneficiary of EACTI US$100 million provided for the years 2003-2004, used the assistance to 
strengthen its counter-terrorism architecture, creating the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) in 
2003, the National Counter-Terrorism Centre and the National Security Advisory Committee in 2004, 
along with the embryo of a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) which, however, was dismantled soon 
after its creation (Whittaker 2008; Prestholdt 2011; Burchard and Burgess 2018). EACTI was later 
substituted by the East African Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI), which integrated many of the 
EACTI programmes, providing training and equipment to Kenyan counter-terrorism forces (Ploch 
2010).  
However, despite US efforts to support and encourage Kenya’s security forces in the fight against 
terrorism, and the dramatic incidents occurring on Kenyan soil in 1998 and 2002, the Kenyan 
government did not manifest a concrete willingness to follow American advice during the 2000s. 
Several documents released by the US in that period express frustration with respect to the stagnation 
of security sector in the country. Indeed, while praising Nairobi for having signed UN conventions 
on terrorism (DOS 2005a: 28) and for “continu[ing] to cooperate with the United States in identifying 
terrorist groups operating within Kenya” (DOS 2006: 50), Washington highlighted how the country 
“registered little to no progress toward the overall strengthening of its capabilities to combat 
terrorism, prosecute terror suspects, or respond to emergencies” (DOS 2006: 50), also “lack[ing] the 
counterterrorism legislation necessary to comply with the UN conventions it has signed” (DOS 
2009a: 20; see also DOS 2008: 19). As will be shown in the next chapter, the Suppression of 
Terrorism (SOT) Bill, introduced by the Kenyan government in 2003, was withdrawn after serious 
criticism from civil society and human rights groups. A new attempt to pass anti-terror regulations 
three years later was blocked again by the opposition. Besides concerns related to human rights 
violations, a large proportion of Kenyan citizens and politicians did not see terrorism as a real menace 
to the country, perceiving the proposed counter-terrorism legislations as mere responses to US 
pressures that would not address more concrete problems faced by Kenyan people (Watts, Shapiro 
and Brown 2007; Whitaker 2014). Fearing negative repercussions at the national elections, the Kibaki 
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administration was disinclined to force the issue. Leaked US embassy cables provide a picture of the 
situation in the country as seen through the eyes of American diplomats:   
 
lack of political will remains a major stumbling block to our CT initiatives with the government 
(Wikileaks 2005a) 
 
In the current political climate, we will not gain much traction pushing policy objectives that are 
not directly seen as election-winning issues. Unfortunately, and despite repeated terrorist attacks 
in Kenya, CT is not one of those issues. 
 
A secondary problem is the inability of various ministries to work together. Currently, there is 
little or no coordination among police, prosecutors and other relevant government ministries that 
deal with terrorism issues. 
  
Despite all this, Post continues to push forward with existing CT programs, albeit on a more 
localized scale (Wikileaks 2006a). 
 
Indeed, faced with difficulties undermining the achievement of counter-terrorism objectives in 
the country, including increasing corruption scandals and the 2007-2008 Kenyan ‘crisis of 
governance’, causing hundreds of deaths and thousands of displaced people after contested national 
elections in 2007 (HRW 2008a), the US sought to carry on the fight against AQEA by intensifying 
support to specific security units (see Wikileaks 2006a). The aforementioned ATPU was one of the 
main beneficiaries of US security policies. Created as a unit working within the Kenyan National 
Police Service, ATPU has been a major counter-terrorism force in the country, tasked with 
responsibilities including “interdict[ing] terrorist activities within the country”, “investigat[ing] all 
terrorism related cases” and “lead[ing] other agencies at all scenes of terrorist related incidents” (DCI 
2019). Through the DOS ATA programme, the US started training and equipping ATPU in 2003, 
when US$10 million were provided within the framework of EACTI (DOS 2004b). In 2005, despite 
suspending some initiatives at national level due to Kenya’s small security commitment and Nairobi’s 
refusal to sign a Bilateral Immunity Agreement (BIA) with the US (Wikileaks 2005b; Mazzetti 2006), 
Washington requested US$4 million for additional counter-terrorism training through ATA, with the 
aim of “giv[ing] this critical front line state [i.e. Kenya] a greatly enhanced capability to locate and 
confront terrorist networks” (DOS 2004a: 145; see also DOS 2005b). US assistance to ATPU 
continued in the following years (Wikileaks 2007a, 2009a; HRW 2008b, 2014), with DOS documents 
underlining how ATA-trained ATPU members were involved in operations to track down AQEA 
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members, including Fazul Abdullah Muhammad (DOS 2009b: 77). Indeed, over time, Kenya turned 
into one of the main beneficiaries of the ATA programme worldwide, receiving nearly US$50 million 
between 2003 and 2011 (OSF 2013a; see also Ploch 2010, 2013), as well as the second major recipient 
country of the NADR fund (financing the ATA programme) in Africa, with US$98 million received 
since the beginning of the war on terror (SAM 2021h). 
In 2009, when Al-Shabaab was consolidating its role inside Somalia, also establishing ties with 
supportive networks in neighbouring countries, the Partnership for East Africa Counterterrorism 
(PREACT) superseded EARSI as the new major US initiative in the region, providing military and 
development support to Somalia, Kenya, Burundi, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, Comoros, South 
Sudan, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, and Rwanda. Building on the strategic framework of its 
predecessor, PREACT was designed as an instrument for a greater engagement in East Africa, 
building the security capacity of East African governments to combat local terrorism while addressing 
deeper sources of vulnerability in the region. One of the main objectives of the initiative in the last 
decade has been to “improve the institutional and operational capacity of militaries to participate in 
regional counterterrorism operations”, using PKO funds to finance AFRICOM activities providing 
logistical and technical support to East African forces (GAO 2014: 10). Furthermore, PREACT has 
aimed at strengthening the capacity of local law enforcement and military units to intercept and 
dismantle terrorist networks throughout the region.  
Kenya was allocated US$20 million through PREACT between 2009 and 2013, turning into its 
major recipient (GAO 2014: 20). During the same period, the progressive intensification of Al-
Shabaab’s activities in the country, along with the emergence of the MYC/Al-Hijra as Al-Shabaab’s 
official affiliate, meant that Kenyan authorities became more and more receptive to counter-terrorism 
needs (see Whitaker 2014). US documents released in that period illustrate Kenya’s changing 
perceptions with regard to terrorism and (in)security during the late Kibaki administration, and the 
consequent shift in the approach pursued by the Kenyan government: 
 
whereas Kenyans have traditionally perceived terrorism as primarily a ‘foreign’ problem, during 
the past year an increasing number of Kenyan citizens and government officials came to recognize 
that their own country and society were threatened by violent extremists (DOS 2010: 21) 
 
The Kenyan government demonstrated increased political will to secure its borders, apprehend 
suspected terrorists, and cooperate with regional allies and the international community to counter 




To be sure, the rhetoric of Kenyan authorities with respect to terrorism has continued to be centred 
on the “external stress” argument (Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom 2017: 120), denying internal problems 
generating radicalisation while framing security threats as merely stemming from circumstances 
and/or occurrences originating outside of Kenyan borders (e.g., Wikileaks 2005a). As President 
Uhuru Kenyatta underlined during Obama’s official visit to Kenya in 2015,    
 
the battle that we’re fighting is not a Kenyan war. Kenya just happens to be the frontier of it, being 
a neighbor to a country that for a long time has not had any kind of formal government (White 
House 2015a).  
  
Still, during the early 2010s, Kenyan leaders progressively came to realise that Al-Shabaab’s 
militants moving southwards were finding, at least, a fertile ground in which to penetrate and gain 
recruits, and that, to counter such activities, the country required a greater commitment. In 2012, 
when KDF participating in Operation Linda Nchi in Somalia where integrated into AMISOM, Kenya 
adopted an official counter-terrorism legislation, promulgating the Prevention of Terrorism Act.  
The increase in Kenya’s security effort coincided with the fostering of US security assistance 
policies in East Africa under the light footprint approach of the Obama administration. While 
maintaining a limited military presence in the region, the US was increasingly framing the fight 
against Al-Shabaab’s expansion as a primary task, intensifying training programmes, as well as the 
provision of logistical support and counter-terrorism equipment, to East African forces. In 2015, 
when the number of US military trainees worldwide reached a peak, East Africa was the sub-region 
with the highest figures in Sub-Saharan Africa, which, in turn, was one of the two regions registering 
the highest figures at global level (the other being Latin America and the Caribbean) (SAM 2017). 
Along these lines, the 2016 DOD request for CTPF in East Africa, corresponding to US$669 million, 
was the highest in the world (DOD 2015: 1).   
Despite Washington’s reluctance to pledge full security support to the Kenyan government, due 
to the controversies regarding the 2007 elections and the international criminal charges against 
President Kenyatta (elected in 2013) for the post-election violence, US policy makers soon realised 
that they had “little choice but to work hand-in-hand with Kenyan officials on counter-terrorism 
efforts in the region” (Whitaker 2014: 98). The 2013 Westgate attack, along with the dramatic 
increase in Al-Shabaab’s violence in the country, contributed to putting aside US reluctancy. In 
2014, after having stressed the role played by Kenya as a “frontline state in the war against al-




…we are working to expand our co-operation. Be assured: you are not alone. The United States 
stands with Kenya in the fight against terrorism and insecurity (Godec 2014).   
 
The inclusion of KDF into AMISOM in June 2012 led to a significant increase in US security 
assistance to Kenyan military forces fighting Al-Shabaab. In July 2012, one month after the 
inclusion, the US provided the Kenyan contingent in Somalia with security equipment (drones) 
worth US$7 million (OSF 2013a: 42). In the following years, Kenya became a beneficiary of DOS 
peace-keeping assistance to AMISOM (under the PKO fund), receiving approximately US$22 
million between 2014 and 2017 (SAM 2021i). During the same period, facing the regionalisation of 
Al-Shabaab’s strategy under Godane and Ahmad Umar, US counter-terrorism support to Nairobi 
through DOD-administered funds intensified substantially. Whereas the US allocated US$141 
million to Kenya between 2010 and 2014, in 2015 the Obama administration announced a 163 per 
cent increase over aid provided in 2014, delivering US$100 million in security assistance (SAM 
2015). The majority of such an assistance was provided by the DOD Section 1206 and 
Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) to train, equip and support logistically Kenyan military 
personnel participating in AMISOM as well as Kenyan forces countering the penetration of Somali 
militants such as the Kenyan Ranger Regiment (Nkala 2015; SAM 2015; GAO 2016). One year 
later, in 2016, US security assistance provided to Kenya through DOD Section 1206 reached a peak 
of nearly US$102 million (mainly used to improve the country’s areal response to security threats) 
(DOD 2018; SAM 2021j).   
Despite raising levels of US aid to the Kenyan military during the mid-2010s, there was a 
decrease in US security assistance directed towards Kenyan police, although the latter still figured 
among the police forces receiving the highest levels of US counter-terrorism support in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SAM 2015).  
In line with the trends illustrated in the first section of this chapter, the US continued to provide 
considerable security support to East Africa under the Trump presidency, with Section 1206/333 aid 
levels shifting from an average annual amount of US$63 million allocated between 2007 and 2016 
to nearly 89 between 2017 and 2019 (SAM 2021e). Despite playing a marginal role within the US 
president’s media campaign, East Africa remained in the spotlight of US foreign policy. Indeed, in 
the first year of the Trump presidency, the White House authorised a DOD proposal for stepping up 
US efforts in the fight against Al-Shabaab (McLeary 2017), identifying part of the Somali territory 
as an “area of active hostilities” (Nissenbaum 2017). Such a directive led to a considerable 
intensification of drone strikes in the country, which, as shown in the beginning of this section, 
reached unprecedented levels, also increasing the number of American soldiers training and 
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equipping forces in Somalia (Al Jazeera 2017; Crilly 2017). In the words of the Chief of Staff of the 
International Crisis Group (ICG), the US war in Somalia seemed to continue “on autopilot” (quoted 
in Schmitt and Savage 2019). So too did US security policies in Kenya, which continued to figure 
among the African countries receiving the highest amounts of assistance to counter terrorism 
(Goodman and Arabia 2018: 19). Washington kept on supporting local authorities in the fight against 
Al-Shabaab while maintaining a distance from the theatres of violence. As AFRICOM commander 
General Stephen Townsend underlined in the aftermath of the 2020 attack in Camp Simba, such 
enduring efforts were meant to “enabl[e] enhanced security and stability in the region and for 
America” (quoted in Browne and Callahan 2020).  
Facing another increase in Al-Shabaab’s activities in Kenya during the first year of its mandate, 
the Trump administration sought to provide Kenyan authorities with enhanced military and logistical 
means to combat the group while maintaining levels of NADR-funded antiterrorism assistance to 
the Kenyan police comparable to those of the previous two US administrations (SAM 2021k). In 
2017, when Kenya became the major recipient of US arms sales offers in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Hartung 2018: 10), Nairobi received nearly US$20 million in counter-terrorism artillery under the 
CTPF (SAM 2018). A year later, along with Somalia, Uganda and Rwanda, Kenya experienced the 
higher increase in US counter-terrorism aid in Sub-Saharan Africa, with Section 333 reaching a peak 
of nearly US$69 million (mainly used to provide drone assistance and counter-terrorism equipment, 
as well as to support the Kenyan Rural Border Patrol Unit) (SAM 2019, 2021j). During the same 
period, Uhuru Kenyatta became the second African president to have an official meeting with Trump 
at the White House. The presidents established a Strategic Partnership, reaffirming their shared 
commitment to “enhance counterterrorism, defense, and maritime surveillance security cooperation 
through intelligence sharing and capacity building” (DOS 2019a). As President Trump argued after 
the meeting, 
 
we do a lot of defense and security. And we’re working very much on security right now (White 
House 2018b).  
 
This view on the progress of the US-Kenya partnership was reiterated in 2019 by the US ambassador 
to Kenya, maintaining that the US had committed itself to foster counter-terrorism support 
(McCarter 2019). To contribute to the fulfilment of such commitment, in early 2020 the US 
announced the creation of the Kenyan Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF-K): a US$2.5 million 
initiative aimed at fostering counter-terrorism investigations on the ground through the provision of 
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training and advise to local forces by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the State 
Department Bureau of Counterterrorism (K. Allen 2020; FBI 2020).     
As seen in the first section of the chapter, while increasing US security aid directed to the 
African continent, the Trump administration cut assistance to several states, re-channelling US 
support towards key allies against terrorism. The centrality of security assistance policies in Kenya 
during the Trump era provides further evidence of the extent to which, in the last two decades, the 
country has continued to be regarded by US policy makers as a crucial partner in East Africa. In line 
with the case-specific prediction related to A  q, despite experiencing different reactions by 
Kenyan authorities, US policy makers have continued to provide local actors in the country with 
high levels of military and defence aid to fight Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, intensifying diplomatic 
efforts while containing the number of US soldiers on the ground.  
 
Conclusions  
This chapter has focused on Step 1 (A  q) of the causal mechanism discussed in the previous 
chapter, according to which post-9/11 US security policies in African states suffering from the threat 
of terrorism (scope condition 1 [C1]) fall within the realm of remote warfare. The chapter has tested 
A  q in the case study by seeking evidence of the US providing security assistance to Kenyan 
authorities to fight local terrorism while containing boots on the ground.   
During the last two decades US policy makers have sought to consolidate ties with key states in 
Africa, elaborating a sophisticated and unprecedented politico-military architecture to counter 
emerging threats while relieving economic, political and military pressures. Within such a 
framework, Kenya has increasingly played a crucial role. As shown, the country has suffered from 
the threat posed by Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, confirming the presence of C1 in the case study. 
Whether Kenya was an important area of operations for Al-Qaeda in East Africa (AQEA) between 
the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the rise of Al-Shabaab in Somalia in the mid-2000s and its 
increasing regionalisation during the 2010s have turned it into a critical arena in the fight against 
Islamist terrorism in Africa. Besides experiencing a dramatic escalation of terrorist incidents, in the 
last decade Kenya has progressively become one of the main sources of recruits for Somali militants, 
also giving rise to a local affiliated group, Al-Hijra. The presence of a supportive environment, along 
with the high porosity of the border with Somalia, have facilitated the penetration of Al-Shabaab, 
which maintains an active presence in the country.   
US policy makers have provided Kenyan authorities with increasing aid and resources to fight 
local terrorism. Kenya has been one of the main beneficiaries of EACTI, EARSI and PREACT. 
Since the inclusion of Kenyan forces within AMISOM, Nairobi has also benefited from US 
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peacekeeping support to the armed contingent in Somalia. Furthermore, Kenya has been a major 
target of the DOS-funded ATA programme and one of the key recipients of DOD Section 1206/333 
and CTPF, receiving technical and logistical aid, as well as counter-terrorism training and 
equipment.    
While supporting and encouraging Kenyan authorities in the fight against terrorism, Washington 
has limited US military personnel in the country to a few dozen tasked primarily with assisting the 
Kenyan military and police. Despite facing reluctance by the national government in the fulfilment 
of counter-terrorism tasks during the 2000s, US policy makers have continued to rely on local forces 
as the main instrument to counter AQEA and Al-Shabaab, seeking to overcome the impasse at 
national level while refocusing US security policies on specific security and military units. Such 
efforts in keeping the security relationship with Kenya alive and strong have continued up to the 
present day. Despite political turbulence, the post-2007 elections crisis, and the criminal charges 
against President Kenyatta, Kenya was one of the main African recipients of US counter-terrorism 
support during the Obama administration. Along these lines, despite a reduction in the number of 
African states benefiting from US security assistance, and Trump’s political rhetoric stressing the 
need to recalibrate US security policies in the global South, the Trump administration continued to 
foster cooperation with Kenya, providing local forces with enhanced instruments to combat 
terrorism.   
The above trends, which have remained steady during the last two decades of US security 
policies in Kenya, constitute a strong evidence in support of the case-specific prediction formulated 
when operationalising Step 1 of the causal mechanism (A  q). In line with what was argued in the 
previous chapter and in the methodological section of the thesis, such evidence provides a powerful 
inferential test substantiating A  q. Indeed, the repeated observation of the US encouraging and 
providing security assistance to Kenyan forces to counter Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab while 
maintaining a low military presence on the ground could hardly have causes other than the 
establishment of a partnership relationship within the framework of remote warfare, in which a 
benefactor country relies on a local actor to fight enemies and achieve security goals from a distance 
(high degree of uniqueness). At the same time, A  q could not exist without such a repeated 
observation (high degree of certainty), as the provision of indirect support and the maintenance of a 
low military presence on the ground constitute key elements denoting the establishment of the 
partnership relationship within the framework of remote warfare.   
The security policies implemented by the US in Kenya in the post-9/11 period reflect the key 
elements of a remote warfare strategy relying on local forces as a surrogate to achieve counter-
terrorism objectives while maintaining a strategic distance from the theatre of violence. As discussed 
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in the previous chapter, although such a strategy can bring benefits, it can also entail considerable 
risks. Indeed, treating African security institutions as the main referent in the fight against terror, it 
turns the local socio-political environment into a critical variable for its effectiveness. Without 
appropriate precautions, the delivery of US security assistance towards fragmented and corrupted 
systems risks having unintentional repercussions, altering fragile balances or even leaving more 
room for manoeuvre to local elites for the achievement of security objectives diverging from those 
of US policy makers. This could exacerbate socio-political conditions causing instability, even 
setting in motion spirals of violence culminating in a serious deterioration of human rights. The next 
chapter will explore these dynamics in Kenya, focusing on Step 2 of the hypothesised casual 
























Causal Mechanism: Step 2 
Kenya’s reaction to post-9/11 US security policies 
 
This chapter deals with Step 2 (q  r) of the causal mechanism discussed in Chapter 2, according to 
which, in African states relying on security measures based on indiscriminate repression against 
suspect groups (scope condition 2 [C2]), the establishment of the partnership relationship with the 
US means that local authorities gain resources and room for manoeuvre to implement such measures. 
The chapter tests the validity of q  r in the case of post-9/11 US security policies in Kenya by 
looking for its observable manifestations. To do so, after having attested the presence of C2 in the 
case study, the chapter seeks evidence of Kenyan authorities managing to use US security assistance 
to implement indiscriminate repression against Muslim and ethnic Somali communities. 
The chapter is composed of four sections.  
The first two sections deal with the Kenyan socio-political context, confirming the presence of 
C2 in the case study by complementing the US-centric analysis of the war on terror in the country 
provided in the previous chapter with a local perspective on security and counter-terrorism. The first 
section provides a historical account of the emergence of socio-political fractures between the Kenyan 
state and its Muslim and ethnic Somali population. As shown, while having their roots in the colonial 
era, such fractures cemented after Kenya’s independence, generating perceptions of Kenyan Muslims 
and ethnic Somalis as ‘foreigners’ and as a potential threat to national stability and security.  
The second section of the chapter illustrates how the beginning of the war on terror and the 
increase in terrorist attacks in Kenya have escalated the impact of historical fractures, heightening 
tensions in the country and increasing suspicions towards Muslim and ethnic Somali communities. It 
details how the effects of such dynamics have intertwined with those of endemic corruption and 
impunity within the Kenyan security system, resulting in a dramatic intensification of state violence. 
Facing the rise of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab in East Africa, Kenyan forces have increasingly relied 
on indiscriminate repression against Muslims and ethnic Somalis to identify militants and punish 
potential supporters. 
The third section of the chapter explores how Kenya’s history and counter-terrorism measures 
have intertwined with the US strategy of remote warfare. It provides extensive evidence in support 
of the case-specific prediction formulated when operationalising q  r, showing that Kenyan 
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authorities have managed to use US security assistance to carry out repression against Muslim and 
ethnic Somali communities. Despite US attempts to redirect Kenyan security measures toward a 
greater respect for human rights and the rule of law, US limited oversight capabilities in the country, 
along with the exploitation of Washington’s counter-terrorism imperatives in East Africa by Kenyan 
security authorities, have allowed Nairobi to evade pressures and avoid major sanctions while abusing 
US policies.  
Finally, the last section explains why the evidence reported in this chapter constitutes a strong 
inferential test to confirm q  r, summarising the main features of such a step of the causal 
mechanism and introducing some of the implications that will be explored in the next chapter.  
 
Through the lens of history: identity and conflict in Kenya 
Kenya has a long history of inequality and repression, whose signs are traceable throughout the course 
of the twentieth century. Still, to provide a clear picture of such phenomena, clarifying their 
implications for Kenya’s post-9/11 counter-terrorism measures and the way in which Kenyan security 
authorities have used US security support, it is necessary to shift the focus back to the early years of 
the colonial rule.  
In 1888, the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) began to administrate the East 
Africa territories, subsequently placed under the authority of British government, which in 1920 
announced the entrance of Kenya, as a colony, into the British Empire. As in other cases 
characterising the colonial period in Africa, boundaries delimiting the British administration were 
drawn regardless of the historical and cultural legacies of the territories concerned and the populations 
inhabiting them. In 1908, the British reached an agreement for the establishment of the border 
between Kenya and Ethiopia. The border with Somalia was defined in 1925, when the Jubaland 
Province became part of the Italian colony. The result was the formation of the Northern Frontier 
District (NFD) in Kenya, a buffer zone separating British settlers from the Ethiopian and Italian 
territories, comprising many ethnic Somali communities (Castagno 1964). Despite not constituting a 
nation in political terms, such communities “possessed a cultural nationalism founded on common 
ethnic origin, a virtually homogeneous culture and way of life, and a single language and religion 
(Islam)” (I. M. Lewis 1963: 50).  
Facing increasing episodes of Somali irredentism, the colonial government sought to secure the 
NFD by restricting the freedom of movement and setting up a rigid model of military administration, 
often based on collective punishment (KHRC 2015a; Whittaker 2015). Still, NFD communities took 
forward the battle for secessionism and Somali nationalism, supported by organisations operating in 
Somalia (TJRC 2013).   
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In the aftermath of the 1960 independence of Somalia, NFD secessionist parties intensified their 
activities, opposing the incorporation of the district into an independent Kenya. As activists 
maintained, whereas a future government of Kenya “would be both foreign and hostile…[NFD] 
religious convictions and cultural opinions, contrary to all geographical or political facts, [would] 
lead it almost naturally to join the Somali Republic” (Okonga 1961: 101-102, quoted in Castagno 
1964: 176). Indeed, the NFD, along with the British Somaliland, the Italian Somaliland, the Ogaden 
region in Ethiopia and the French Somaliland (Djibouti), was one of the five spikes forming the star 
of the Somali flag, representing the territories historically inhabited by Somalis in East Africa (the 
‘Greater Somalia’).  
The 1962 Lancaster House Conference, dealing with Kenya’s independence, was regarded by 
NFD ethnic Somalis as a crucial opportunity to assert their claims in front of the representatives of 
Kenya’s main parties, KANU and KADU, and of British authorities. However, as the latter were 
unprepared to handle a reconfiguration of Kenyan territories immediately prior to independence, and 
needed to promote stable relations with the future government of Kenya (unwilling to cede the NFD), 
they just recommended a reconfiguration of the Kenyan administrative structure (Otunnu 1992). As 
a result, the NFD was integrated into the newly formed state of Kenya and most of the ethnic Somali 
communities became part of the North Eastern Province (NEP). 
Soon after independence, clashes between Kenyan forces and NEP inhabitants marked a breaking 
point between Nairobi and ethnic Somali separatists, with the beginning of a national conflict that 
became known as the ‘Shifta War’ (1963-1967). On 28 December 1963, sixteen days after the end of 
the colonial rule, President Jomo Kenyatta declared the state of emergency, governing the NEP 
through emergency laws; a condition that lasted until the early 1990s, when the process of 
democratisation began.  
Besides frictions in the NFD, in the years preceding the Lancaster Conference, British forces 
were confronted with increasing tensions in the coastal area of the country, where Arab and Swahili 
communities demanded autonomy from the future state of Kenya. Claims of coastal activists were 
based on a concept of “autochthony” (Prestholdt 2014: 252) and leveraged a treaty signed by the 
British authorities and the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1895. Such a treaty sanctioned the British 
administration on a ten-mile strip of land running along the Kenyan coast. Still, differently from the 
other areas of Kenya, that territory was kept under the privileged status of Protectorate, where the 
Sultan maintained a symbolic sovereignty (Brennan 2008). The 1895 treaty became the emblem of 
coastal exceptionalism, concerned with the preservation of Islamic religious traditions within a 
Christian country and, most of all, with a systematic control of immigration of African people from 
the hinterland, generating a conflict over land. 
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At the end, the coastal territories passed under the direct administration of the Kenyan 
government. In the early 1960s, when the discourse of identity converged around de-colonisation and 
African nationalism, separatist claims were regarded as capable of undermining a pacific transition 
toward independence. This was also enshrined in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), calling for “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State” (OAU 1963: 
4), and remarked during the 1964 OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which adopted 
a resolution urging member states “to respect the borders existing on the achievement of national 
independence” (Zacher 2001: 222). African leaders wanted to avoid the spread of political turmoil 
and instability that might jeopardise cooperative efforts, as well as the political and economic 
development of the continent.  
However, along with the conflict in the north-eastern area of the country, tensions in the coast 
help shed light on the development of popular perceptions of coastal Muslim people as “not fully 
Kenyan” (Prestholdt 2011: 7) and of ethnic Somalis as “second-class” (Abdullahi 2014) or 
“ambiguous” (Scharrer 2018: 496) citizens, considered “‘hostile’ to the interests of the state” 
(Whittaker 2015: 643). Such perceptions reverberated throughout the history of Kenya in the 
twentieth century, exacerbating socio-political frictions in the country and consolidating mutual 
mistrust between the government and the concerned minority groups. Critically, as shown in the next 
section, they have had a profound impact on Kenyan security measures in the post-9/11 period.  
Divisions between Nairobi and the periphery of the country cemented over the last decades of 
the twentieth century. Despite the end of the Shifta War, the NEP remained in a condition of 
underdevelopment, subjected to special rules such as the 1970 Indemnity Act, which exempted 
security authorities operating in the region from accountability and legal investigations (TJRC 2013: 
186; see also KHRC 2015a). The maintenance of many of the colonial practices of collective 
punishment by Kenyan authorities resulted in a dramatic increase in large-scale state violence during 
the 1980s, such as in the case of Bulla Karatasi (Garissa county, 1980) and Wagalla (Wajir county, 
1984), when security operations degenerated into massacres (see e.g., TJRC 2013; D. M. Anderson 
2014b).  
Besides facing episodes of state violence, NEP inhabitants continued to experience major 
difficulties in accessing basic rights, especially those stemming from the recognition of Kenyan 
citizenship. In 1989, screening exercises were conducted by Kenyan authorities using “state 
machinery and extra-legal processes to interrogate Somalis in Kenya on their right to citizenship” 
(Lochery 2012: 616; see also HRW 1990). Inspections persisted after the country’s democratic 
opening in 1992, exacerbated by the crisis in Somalia during the early 1990s and the consequent wave 
of asylum seekers directed southward. Kenyan ethnic Somalis were often labelled as refugees or as 
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mere illegal migrants, being denied the right to Kenyan documents (KNCHR 2007; KHRC 2015a). 
As an ethnic Somali member of the Kenyan parliament recounted in 1993, the justification of the 
Principal Immigration officer for denying access to ID cards to ethnic Somali people was that “a 
Somali, whether from Somalia or from Kenya, is a Somali because mtoto wa nyoka ni nyoka [The 
child of a snake is a snake]” (quoted in Scharrer 2018: 507). Despite the process of devolution 
launched with the adoption of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, dividing the country’s provinces into 
forty-seven counties and ensuring greater power and autonomy to local authorities, problems related 
to the obtainment of Kenyan ID have persisted up to the present day (see e.g., Nyabola 2014; Usiskin 
2019; Dahir 2020), with ethnic Somali communities in the north-east even facing the closure of the 
major passport office in the region (ICG 2015b).  
In the coastal area, the decades after the achievement of Kenya’s independence were marked by 
the spread of a sense of discrimination and injustice among native communities, feeling deprived of 
land and resources by the government in favour of upcountry people (Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom 
2015). Such feelings were exacerbated by the absence of a political agenda dealing with the Kenyan 
Muslim population. Indeed, between the 1960s and the 1990s, “there was almost no public Muslim 
politics” (Mwakimako and Willis 2014: 12). The Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), 
an umbrella organisation created in 1973, was the only representative body for Muslim people 
legitimised by the national institutions. However, studies report how the SUPKEM was perceived by 
several Muslims as being too close to the KANU administration, often “succumb[ing] to government 
pressure” (Lynch 2011: 27; see also Oded 2002; Vittori, Bremer and Vittori 2009; Patterson 2015; 
Bryden and Preemdeep 2019). 
The 1992 democratic opening contributed to politicising Muslims’ grievances. Soon after the 
introduction of the multi-party system, the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) was formed. As several 
analysts argue (e.g., Prestholdt 2011; Willis and Gona 2012; Chome 2019), despite appealing to a 
Muslim social identity, most of the claims of the IPK concerned social problems of coastal people 
such as inequality and access to citizenship. However, the presence of a small faction promoting more 
aggressive propaganda, along with the religious character of the party, which was contrary to the 
Kenyan constitution, provided the rationale for the banning of the IPK; a decision that led to 
demonstrations and clashes in the coastal territories where it had acquired large support (Bryden and 
Preemdeep 2019).  
Since the 1990s, in light of the Kenyan Muslim political classes frequently being criticised for 
doing “little to inspire political awareness in their communities or to initiate projects that would 
socially elevate their electorates” (Ndzovou 2014: 4), civil society organisations such as Muslim 
NGOs and human rights groups have sought to raise the problem of Muslims’ marginalisation and 
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put pressure on the government to address political and economic concerns in the coast. Still, 
frustration among local people persists, testified by renewed tensions (e.g., Al Jazeera 2012a; Ayele 
2012; ICG 2016) and the rise of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) as a major organisation 
claiming coastal separation to the cry of “‘Pwani si Kenya’ (‘the coast is not Kenya’)” (Chonghaile 
2012a).  
 
Kenya and the war on terror  
As seen in the previous section, Kenya’s modern history is marked by the presence of considerable 
friction between the ethnic Somali and Muslim population and the national government. Despite 
occasionally erupting into instances of large-scale violence, or generating more evident forms of 
conflict, such friction generally persisted in a latent form during the twentieth century, manifesting 
its effects in the ordinariness of Kenya’s political life. The difficulties of ethnic Somali people in 
accessing Kenyan ID cards, as well as the land grievances of coastal Muslims, were (and are still) 
symptoms of more profound fractures lying at the roots of the Kenyan political state; fractures that 
circumscribe and isolate communities whose “Kenyan-ness has been historically questioned” (ICG 
2014: 12).  
Confirming the presence of scope condition 2 (C2) in the case study, this section shows how the 
war on terror has escalated the impact of historical fractures, dusting off old perceptions of Muslim 
and ethnic Somali communities as a potential threat to national security. As detailed in the following 
pages, these dynamics have had major repercussions on the character of Kenyan counter-terrorism 
policies after the rise of Al-Shabaab, resulting in the systematic targeting of such communities. Still, 
several effects were already visible in the measures adopted by national authorities in the face of Al-
Qaeda’s attacks and of political upheavals in Somalia during the 2000s.   
Despite manifesting reluctance to pledge full support to US directives and strengthen its counter-
terrorism architecture, in the years following the 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa, the Kenyan 
government intensified activities to capture AQEA militants. Besides cooperating with FBI agents 
during investigations on the 1998 attacks, Kenyan forces increased controls in the border areas and 
enhanced surveillance in the country, supported by the rise in US security assistance and the launch 
of EACTI in the early 2000s. However, Nairobi’s security initiatives attracted serious criticism for 
overstepping legal boundaries, mostly at the expenses of Muslim and ethnic Somali people (e.g., 
KHRC 2003; AI 2005; HRW 2008b; Bachman and Hönke 2009; Mogire and Mkutu 2011).  
Following the 2002 AQEA attack in Kikambala, Kenyan authorities demanded the banning of 
several Muslim NGOs, while national forces launched an extensive campaign of arrests against 
hundreds of Muslims in the coastal territories and in Nairobi’s Eastleigh district (which, due to the 
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high concentration of Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees, has been nicknamed ‘Little Mogadishu’) 
(KHRC 2003; AI 2005; Prestholdt 2011; Bachman 2012). A year later, the Kibaki administration 
sought to pass legislation on terrorism, publishing the Suppression of Terrorism (SOT) Bill. Several 
national and international human rights organisations campaigned against the bill, claiming that the 
vague definition of terrorism provided, along with the major extension of police and military powers, 
could “brin[g] back the era of indefinite detention” (K-HURINET 2003), also “open[ing] up the 
potential for the abuse of the legislation through politically motivated arrests or personal vendettas” 
(Redress and Reprieve 2009: 43-44). Specifically, human rights groups raised concerns that the SOT 
Bill could result in the profiling and “target[ing] of Muslims as a group” (including ethnic Somalis) 
(AI 2005: 4), given that the law even allowed security forces to arrest (without warrant) Kenyans 
whose clothes would arise ‘suspicions’ in terms of their membership in a terrorist group (AI 2004; 
Lind and Howell 2008).  
At the end, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the bill was withdrawn. Still, the rise and fall 
of the ICU in Somalia during the mid-2000s, with the consequent exodus of Somalis fleeing towards 
Kenya, led the Kibaki administration to tighten up security measures. Fearing that militants might 
hide within the wave of asylum seekers and penetrate the country, between 2006 and 2007 Kenyan 
agents arrested several dozen people in the border area, a considerable percentage of which was 
rendered to Ethiopian forces in Somalia without due process (HRW 2008b; Redress and Reprieve 
2009).4 Finally, in early 2007, the Kenyan government announced the closure of the border with 
Somalia (BBC 2007).  
The emergence of Al-Shabaab as a major threat during the late 2000s, and its subsequent 
expansion in East Africa, fuelled political paranoia and heightened tensions in Kenya. As feelings of 
insecurity increased, reminiscences of old conflicts against Somali separatists in the NEP began to 
spread among the population. In the eyes of many Kenyans, the profile of the ethnic Somali individual 
progressively merged with that of the Shifta fighter rebelling against Kenyan authorities in the 1963-
1967 war, finally overlapping with that of the Somali jihadist (see ICG 2012; Scharrer 2018). The 
result was a rise in anti-Somali feelings in the country (see e.g., Odula 2011; Raghavan 2011; ICG 
2014; Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom 2015). As a major Kenyan newspaper reported:   
 
the government has allowed these relatives of al-Shabaab to invest in the country… 
 
 
4 According to some sources (e.g., HRW 2008b; Prestholdt 2011), US agents were also involved in the interrogation and 
rendition of detainees.    
104 
 
Kenya has continued to host thousands of Somalis in camps, where, overfed on rations, they plot 
how to harm their hosts. After infiltrating every state department, they have pledged their loyalty 
to their kin by issuing identity documents and passports, thus turning Kenya into a major transit 
point and recruiting ground for terrorists… 
 
Recall that since 1962, Somali have always wanted to leave Kenya and join the greater Somalia 
(Makokha 2014) 
 
It would appear that every little, two-bit Somali has a big dream – to blow us up, knock down our 
buildings and slaughter our children. 
They declared war on us and we thought it was a small matter that some guy in government was 
going to take care of. We were wrong (Mathiu 2014) 
 
In a similar fashion, coastal Muslims’ historical marginalisation and resentments against the Kenyan 
government increased suspicions with regard to their cooperation with the state in the fight against 
terrorism, with the result that Muslims started being “equate[d]…with Somalis, and with al-Shabaab” 
(Chonghaile 2012b).  
Several reports by NGOs and human rights groups show how the intensification of Al-Shabaab’s 
activities in Kenya has been associated with a dramatic (re-)escalation of state violence in the north-
eastern and coastal regions of the country, emphasising how the Kenyan security response has 
frequently degenerated into “discriminatory operations targeting Somali refugees, ethnic Somali 
Kenyans and Muslims” (HRW 2016: 15; see also e.g., HRW 2012a; OSF 2013b; AI et al. 2014; 
HAKI Africa 2016). However, to capture the full spectrum of such operations, and shed light on the 
nature of counter-terrorism in Kenya, it is necessary to explore how the effects of historical fractures 
have intertwined with those of another phenomenon: corruption.  
Since national independence, corruption has been one of the major and most complex problems 
plaguing Kenya. Despite multiple appeals by national authorities to tackle such a problem once and 
for all (for an historical account, see TJRC 2013), the country continues to rank among the most 
corrupt in the world (e.g., Transparency International 2018, 2019). In particular, Kenya’s security and 
defence sector has repeatedly been identified as the most affected area (Transparency International 
2015a), with the Police Service indicated as the “most bribery prone institution” (Transparency 
International 2017: 15). A survey conducted in 2013 by the Kenyan Independent Policing Oversight 
Authority (IPOA), created in 2012 to increase accountability and prevent impunity of the Kenyan 
police force, shows that one third of the respondents had suffered “assault/brutality, falsification of 
evidence, bribery, and threat of imprisonment” at the hand of the police in the preceding year (IPOA 
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2013: 7). Along these lines, a 2015 survey conducted by Transparency International and 
Afrobarometer to explore corruption in Africa stresses how three out of four Kenyans believed that 
“most” or “all” members of the national police were corrupted (Transparency International 2015b).  
The effects of corruption on counter-terrorism in Kenya are twofold. On the one hand, corruption 
deteriorates the level of security in the country, weakening the operational capabilities of the counter-
terrorism system. Whether the progressive development of the Kenyan security architecture in the 
post-9/11 period has led to important victories in the fight against Al-Shabaab and its affiliated 
networks (see e.g., Ochami 2015; ICG 2018; Kazungu 2020; Otsialo 2020), in many circumstances, 
using their powers for personal gain, Kenyan security agents have facilitated militants’ operations in 
East Africa. For example, investigations have discovered that, during the 2013 Westgate mall attack, 
members of the Kenyan army supposed to counter the attackers were instead looting the mall (Al 
Jazeera 2013a; Jorcic 2013; Hidalgo 2015). Along these lines, despite Kenya’s efforts to tackle the 
penetration of Al-Shabaab’s fighters, also involving the creation of a wall separating the country from 
Somalia (e.g., Cannon 2016), high levels of corruption among Kenyan patrol units have preserved 
the permeability of the border to the traffic of arms and men, to the point that “smugglers reportedly 
include the cost of Kenyan police bribes in their fees” (Mwangi 2017c: 1048; see also Higgins 2015; 
Ombati 2015; Hope 2018). In a notable case, Kenyan border guards were bribed by two Al-Shabaab’s 
militants to cross the border and be escorted to Mombasa with weapons, ammunition and explosives 
(Meservey 2015; Goodman and Arabia 2018). According to several reports (e.g., JFJ 2015; 
Rasmussen 2017), even the capture of Kismayu by the KDF during Operation Linda Nchi has proved 
to benefit Al-Shabaab, as Kenyan forces taking control of the Somali city substituted militants in the 
smuggling of charcoal and sugar, continuing to generate financial income for the group through its 
web of roadblocks and taxation systems.  
On the other hand, corruption “enable[s] the excessive use of force” (Goldenberg et al. 2016: 
22), causing a significant increase in human rights violations and reinforcing a climate of impunity. 
Many witnesses report how Kenyan security forces have frequently relied on violence and abuse 
against local people during counter-terrorism operations, engaging in forms of extortion and bribery 
(HRW 2012a, 2013, 2016; ICG 2014). Refugees in the Dadaab camp (Garissa county) recount their 
personal experiences during a security operation carried out in 2011 after terrorist attacks against 
security officials: 
 
it was the day after an explosion in the market…They were three policemen who came. They 





Six policemen came. They asked me to produce explosives, but I had nothing to show them. I told 
them that I am an innocent refugee but they did not listen to me. They beat me with boots and 
batons on almost every part of my body…They also robbed two mobile phones and 5,000 Kenyan 
shillings [about US$60]…I was detained on the same night in Dadaab main police station. I paid 
7,500 Kenyan shillings [about US$90] to be released. I didn’t file a police report (HRW 2012a: 
2-3).  
 
The systemic nature of corruption in Kenya has hampered the prosecution of counter-terrorism 
crimes. Despite some attempts to initiate official investigations, processes have suffered repeated 
setbacks and their outcome has often remained confidential (HRW 2012a; Fick 2018). Lack of 
accountability and a deeply rooted culture of impunity have meant that most of the cases of human 
rights violations have gone unpunished (UN 2013a; AI 2015a; HRW 2016). Furthermore, national 
security authorities have frequently dismissed allegations of abuses during security operations, for 
example claiming that missing people have not been victims of police or military actions but instead 
have left the country to avoid legal prosecution (e.g., Yusuf 2013; Muraya 2015a, 2015b; HRW 2016; 
Zirulnick 2016). As already observed by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, when investigating violence in Kenya’s Mount Elgon and during 
the 2007-2008 post-election crisis, 
 
the Police Commissioner…along with various other senior officials, assured…that no such 
killings [i.e. extrajudicial killings] take place. But he and his colleagues appear to be the only 
people in the entire country who believe this claim (quoted in OSF 2011).  
 
Such an attitude within Kenyan authorities has been associated with a tendency to frame civil society 
organisations dealing with counter-terrorism crimes as seeking to destabilise the security system. In 
2015, for example, a Kenyan Police spokesman explicitly declared that a report of the Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) focusing on violence and abuse during security operations 
was “cheap propaganda”, carried out by the “agents of the hand grenades, bombing and killings in 
Nairobi and the country…[who] want the security agencies to be under pressure and relax on what 
they are doing” (quoted in Muraya 2015b). Similarly, while dismissing allegations of KDF 





instead of commending our security forces who are making major sacrifices to defend and guard 
the country against terrorists, some Kenyan leaders are discouraging them by supporting the 
misplaced allegations… 
 
Would you like us to allow these people [i.e. terrorists] to move freely in our country and harm 
us? Of course not…That is why we insist that our military and other Kenyan security agents must 
be given room to carry out their work without political interference (quoted in PSCU 2015).  
 
Such accusations have often been followed by more concrete counter-measures. In the last 
decade, Kenyan NGOs working on accountability and the impact of Kenyan counter-terrorism 
policies have faced increasing difficulties and, in some cases, even forced de-registration over alleged 
support for terrorism (HRW 2015c, 2018; KHRC 2015b). For example, in 2014, in response to a 
series of terrorist attacks in the country, Kenyan authorities closed more than 500 NGOs (BBC 2014; 
Honan 2014). A year later, after the Garissa attack, the Kenyan government listed 85 entities 
suspected to be associated with Al-Shabaab, freezing the bank accounts of two well-known NGOs 
investigating counter-terrorism crimes against minority groups in the country (BBC 2015; Kubania 
2015). Even though the ban against the NGOs was lifted after a ruling by the High Court, the actions 
of Kenyan authorities were interpreted by national and international human rights groups as an 
attempt “to intimidate not only the two organizations but all civil society” (KHRC 2015b; see also 
e.g., AI 2015b; HRW 2015c).  
Two security initiatives can be taken as an example to show the effects stemming from the 
intertwining of historical fractures and corruption in post-9/11 Kenya. Despite not differing from 
many other cases in terms of their main features, such initiatives gained wide media resonance 
because of their scope and intensity (case 2) or their occurrence in direct response to major terrorist 
attacks (case 1).  
The first case is that of the Kenyan security response after Al-Shabaab’s attacks in Lamu and 
Tana River counties in 2014 (which included the Mpeketoni attack mentioned in Chapter 3). Despite 
the magnitude of the incidents, which saw a considerably high number of militants raiding villages 
along the main road connecting the two counties, Kenyan security forces involved in the counter-
terrorism operations were reported to suffer from lack of coordination and planning, arriving hours 
late on the scene only to commit widespread human rights violations against local Muslim and ethnic 
Somali communities (HRW 2015a, 2016; Nyagah, Mwangi and Attree 2017). An IPOA investigation 
shows that the focus of Kenyan agents was “on self-preservation and caution rather than immediate 
response to save life, property, provide assistance to the public and apprehend the offenders” (IPOA 
2014a: 13). Other reports of human rights groups highlight how security forces used indiscriminate 
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violence against local people, stealing valuables from citizens and arbitrarily “arrest[ing] men and 
boys from their houses, inside the mosques and on the road” (HRW 2015a: 35; see also HRW 2016). 
The second case is that of Operation Usalama Watch (‘Peace Watch’), launched by the Kenyan 
authorities in 2014 after terrorist attacks in Mombasa and Eastleigh (Nairobi) with the official 
objective of tackling terrorism in specific hotspots. Even in this circumstance, investigations express 
serious concerns regarding the ostensibly discriminatory character of the operation, which targeted 
primarily ethnic Somalis and refugees living in Nairobi (AI 2014; Muhumed 2014; Williams 2014; 
HRW 2015b; Wairuri 2018). Reports emphasise how counter-terrorism forces asked for bribes, 
“raided homes, buildings, and shops, carting away money, cell phones, and other goods” (HRW 
2015b; see also IPOA 2014b). Arrested people were detained “without charge, and in appalling 
conditions for periods well beyond the 24-hour legal limit” (HRW 2015b). Thousands were 
transferred to refugee camps in northern Kenya, while hundreds of ethnic Somalis were forcibly 
deported to Somalia (AI 2014: 4).  
In both of the above cases, old fractures lying at the roots of the Kenyan state echoed throughout 
the actions of Kenyan forces. Mistrust towards (historically) ‘othered’ communities (see Breen-Smith 
2014) escalated in the face of terrorism, turning Muslims and ethnic Somalis (including Somali 
refugees) into scapegoats for the security crisis in the country. Furthermore, in both of the above 
cases, corruption and lack of accountability played a considerable role in affecting the character of 
Kenyan initiatives, turning the war on terror into a catalyst for the legitimisation of extraordinary 
means of coercion and the normalisation of the excessive use of force. Operations designed to identify 
and capture Al-Shabaab’s militants rapidly lost their ‘counter-terrorism’ character, as well as their 
operational efficiency, degenerating into a wave of raids characterised by the recurrence of violence 
and abuse at the hand of security forces (AI 2014; HRW 2015a).  
Stemming from the interplay between historical fractures and corruption is a security system that 
“fight[s] terror with terror” (KNCHR 2015), countering terrorism by relying on indiscriminate 
repression against suspect groups.  
Personnel from most of the units composing the Kenyan security system have been reported to 
take part in “widespread, systematic and well-coordinated” human rights violations against Muslims 
and ethnic Somalis (KNCHR 2015: 6), including the Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU), the Kenyan 
Defence Forces (KDF), the Administration Police (AP), the General Services Unit (GSU) and the 
Rural Border Patrol Unit (RBPU) (e.g., HRW 2013, 2014, 2015a, 2016; Al Jazeera 2014a; KNCHR 
2015). In many circumstances, security agents have followed a similar modus operandi during 
counter-terrorism operations, cracking down on the population after terrorist attacks with the aim of 
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identifying the perpetrators and punishing potential supporters of Al-Shabaab. As a local activist 
clarifies,  
 
every time a terror incident happens in northern Kenya the towns are deserted fearing violent 
retaliation and collective punishment from security forces. Security forces arrest everyone on the 
street without discrimination (quoted in ICG 2014: 13). 
 
Interviews undertaken by NGOs and journalists with ethnic Somalis living in the north-eastern 
counties highlight how KDF security initiatives in the region have frequently degenerated into forms 
of collective punishment (HRW 2012a, 2012b; Wakube et al. 2017; Bearak 2019; for similar KDF 
initiatives in the coastal region, see e.g., The Standard 2019). A notable instance occurred in Garissa 
town after the killing of three soldiers in November 2012. Military forces retaliated against residents, 
beating, arresting and shooting dozens of people (including students in a local school) (BBC 2012a; 
Wakube et al. 2017). In the heat of the struggle, the Suq Mugdi, the biggest market in Garissa, burst 
into flames (ICG 2014; Osman 2015).  
In many circumstances, members of different units have operated in conjunction during reprisals 
(see e.g., HRW 2012b, 2013, 2016; AI 2014). Interviewing local people in northern Kenya, Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) details some of these operations: 
 
12 witnesses told…that a combined force of regular police, administration police, and the riot 
police (General Service Unit) carried out a two-hour-long operation in the village of Bulla Iftin 
on the outskirts of Garissa [north-eastern Kenya] in response to a 9:30 p.m. grenade attack on the 
Iftin police post. The witnesses told…that within 20 minutes of the grenade attack a large 
contingent of police officers arrived in the village, kicking doors open, beating women and 
children, and threatening villagers. “We shall make sure we have killed all of you terrorists before 
you kill us,” one witness said he heard an officer say (HRW 2012b). 
 
However, besides large-scale raids directed against entire communities, personnel from Kenyan 
security units such as the ATPU have also been reported to participate in more surgical operations 
targeting specific suspects among the Muslim and ethnic Somali population (OSF 2013b; HRW 2016). 
Even in this case, operatives have tended to follow a defined pattern of action:  
 
heavily armed ATPU officers break down doors; give no warning, reason, or display a warrant 
for the raid; provide no or minimal identification; and beat and threaten bystanders and terrorist 




Personal testimonies of Kenyans arrested during targeted raids have regularly included allegations of 
excessive use of force, incommunicado detention and psychological and physical torture at the hand 
of security agents (AI 2005; KNCHR 2015; HRW 2016; Allison 2017b). Such allegations have 
frequently been complemented by concerns regarding the implementation of a planned policy of 
assassination by Kenyan security authorities to eliminate potential militants and their sympathisers 
(BBC 2013; Gisesa 2013; OSF 2013b; Al Jazeera 2014a; HRW 2014; Meleagrou-Hitchens 2015). 
Whether “compelling evidence” regarding the existence of “death squads” among the Kenyan police, 
“charged with eliminating suspected leaders and members of criminal organizations”, was already 
gathered by the UN Special Rapporteur in 2009 (UN 2009; see also KNCHR 2008), in more recent 
years such a policy of assassination has been mentioned in relation to the unexplained murders of 
several prominent Muslim leaders, some of whom were allegedly linked to Al-Hijra (see Al Jazeera 
2012b, 2014a; Linthicum 2014; INCLO 2016). Still, according to some sources, its scope might be 
wider (e.g., KNCHR 2015; HRW 2016). Many Kenyans who have disappeared or been found dead 
in the last decade (most of whom had some responsibilities within, or were frequenters of, local 
mosques) were last seen by witnesses in the custody of members of the ATPU, the KDF and other 
security units (OSF 2013b; KNCHR 2015; HAKI Africa 2016; HRW 2016). As of 2020, ‘Missing 
Voices’, a group of organisations investigating extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in 
Kenya, has documented more than 160 cases that occurred during anti-terror operations, the vast 
majority of which have not resulted in prosecutions (Missing Voices 2020).   
Self-declared members of the ATPU confirmed the involvement of the unit in extrajudicial 
killings during interviews with the BBC and Al Jazeera, framing police frustration in regard to the 
persistent lack of evidence against suspects, hampering convictions through legal proceedings, as the 
main reason underlying the line of action of security agents: 
 
the justice system in Kenya is not favourable to the work of the police…So we opt to eliminate 
them. We identify you, we gun you down in front of your family, and we begin with the leaders 
(quoted in BBC 2013). 
 
If the law cannot work, there’s another option…eliminate him (quoted in Al Jazeera 2014a) 
 
Similar claims regarding the limitations of the law in the fight against terrorism were also made by 
the Mombasa County Commissioner when justifying the issuing of a shoot to kill order on terrorist 




these are not people to be arrested since they have also killed others. If we find any of them, we 
will finish them on the spot. They are not people to take to court. Who is going to be your witness 
in court? What witnesses will be used? (quoted in Ndonga 2014; see also Mwahanga 2014).  
 
However, despite the allegations of Kenyan security agents, since the early 2010s the country 
has tightened up considerably its legislation on terrorism. Whether the absence of a specific regulation 
during the 2000s might be framed by some analysts as complicating the issuing of court rulings and 
encouraging security agents to operate outside the legal framework (e.g., Watts, Shapiro and Brown 
2007), in the last decade, Kenyan policy makers have pushed for more stringent legal measures to 
prosecute militants and their supporters. Still, none of these measures have prevented security 
authorities from continuing to rely on violent means when tackling the terrorist threat. On the 
contrary, in the years following the adoption of the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act, Kenya 
registered an upsurge in human rights abuses. Faced with the escalation of Al-Shabaab’s attacks in 
the country, security agents intensified the “collective profiling of Muslims, and specifically Somalis” 
(Halakhe 2014), while the average cost of a bribe asked by the police to Somali refugees and Kenyan 
Somalis to avoid detention even increased threefold (ICG 2014: 12).   
To an extent, such a trend was also a consequence of the law itself, which provided security 
forces with additional leeway to arrest and detain suspects. Indeed, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
was widely criticised for granting police wide powers that could be used “as a tool against political 
opponents, civil society, religious and ethnic groups” (OSF 2013b: 11; see also Chonghaile 2012b; 
AI 2019c). Along these lines, the controversial Security Laws (Amendment) Act, signed by President 
Kenyatta in 2014, provided security authorities with supplementary powers to hold terrorist suspects 
(up to a year, even without charges), also limiting the freedom of expression and placing considerable 
restrictions on the national refugee policy (to the point that eight sections of the Act were declared 
unconstitutional by the Kenyan High Court) (Al Jazeera 2014b; Smith 2014; Agoya 2015).  
However, as much as specific laws can legitimise more draconian security responses, or enhance 
legal avenues to prosecute terrorist suspects, the enduring nature of violence in post-9/11 Kenya lies 
primarily in the way in which dramatic levels of corruption and impunity, along with historical 
fractures, have normalised the exploitation, abuse and circumvention of national and international 
laws by security authorities during counter-terrorism operations. As already noted by the Executive 





the existence of the legislation is not sufficient to deter the vice neither are the stiff penalties that 
are recommended in the bill. There is need for genuine support from the government to enact this 
law. We need a good set of people to be put in place to interpret the legislation (quoted in Mogire 
and Mkutu 2011: 478).  
 
Regardless of the legal landscape at the national level, in the last two decades, Kenyan forces have 
continued to respond to terrorism by relying on a heavy-handed approach against perceived threats 
in Kenyan society (see Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom 2017; Mogire, Mkutu and Alusa 2018).  
Recent developments in the Kenyan counter-terrorism framework must be interpreted against 
such a background. Indeed, although since the mid-2010s the Kenyatta administration has placed a 
greater emphasis on preventive initiatives to fight radicalisation and rehabilitation programmes for 
former militants, major changes for what concerns the character of Kenyan security initiatives are yet 
to materialise. The Kenyan National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE), announced 
by President Kenyatta in 2016, has built on the devolution of powers enshrined in the 2010 Kenyan 
Constitution, promoting security projects at county level and seeking to foster a more collaborative 
approach towards civil society (Presidency of Kenya 2016). Such directives have had positive 
outcomes in some areas of the country, contributing to forging more trustful and constructive 
relationships with the local Muslim and ethnic Somali population (Wakube et al. 2017; ICG 2018). 
As a human rights campaigner in Mombasa explains,  
 
[the police] began to engage us and we in turn could reach out to community members who are 
suspicious of members of the security establishment. This changed dynamic resulted in much 
better relations between the authorities and the community (quoted in ICG 2018: 10).  
 
However, as important as local successes are, more is yet to be done to heal historical wounds 
and address deep-rooted flaws in the security system fuelling the cycle of violence. As documented 
by the IPOA and by Kenyan civil society organisations, the number of abuses committed by the 
police, including extrajudicial killings and disappearances, rose sharply in 2019 (Missing Voices 
2020; Yusuf 2020; Wambui 2020). In several circumstances, counter-terrorism forces have continued 
to respond to terrorism through repressive means, facilitated by the permanent climate of impunity 
(see e.g., HRW 2019a; The Standard 2019). Furthermore, Kenya has sought to tighten its grip on 
suspect people. Despite the ruling of the Kenyan High Court, which struck down a plan to close the 
Dadaab complex and repatriate Somali refugees as unconstitutional, the government has periodically 
re-proposed the project on the basis of national security concerns, framing the refugee camp, in the 
words of Deputy President William Ruto, as a “center for recruitment, radicalization and training and 
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planning for terrorist attacks by al-Shabaab” (quoted in The Washington Post 2016; see also AI 
2019b; Bhalla 2019; HRW 2019b; Mwangi 2019). Although Kenya’s 2016 NSCVE is a welcome 
step towards a change in the management of national counter-terrorism measures, without more 
targeted policies tackling the sources of inequality and social frictions in the country, security 
strategies can hardly prevent such counter-terrorism measures from being driven, and manipulated, 
by the historical perceptions and the personal interest of local security actors.   
 
Remote warfare and its implications in Kenya 
Chapter 3 has shown how post-9/11 US security policies in Kenya have reflected the key elements of 
a remote warfare strategy aimed at pursuing the war on terror in a distant region of the world while 
limiting the number of American soldiers on the ground. As discussed, in the last two decades, 
seeking to tackle the intensification of Al-Qaeda’s and Al-Shabaab’s activities in East Africa, 
Washington has encouraged and supported Kenyan counter-terrorism initiatives, providing national 
authorities with increasing resources and more sophisticated instruments to combat security threats. 
To explore how such policies have impacted at a local level, interacting with the concerned socio-
political environment, the previous two sections of this chapter have complemented the analysis of 
US efforts in Kenya with a perspective on security and counter-terrorism in the country. 
Contextualising post-9/11 Nairobi’s security responses within Kenya’s socio-political history, this 
chapter has shown how fractures lying at the roots of the Kenyan state, along with endemic corruption, 
have had a crucial impact on the character of the counter-terrorism measures adopted by local security 
authorities. The rise of insecurity in Kenya during the last two decades has been associated with a 
dramatic escalation of indiscriminate repression against suspected Muslim and ethnic Somali 
communities, confirming the presence of scope condition 2 (C2) in the case study.  
This has major implications for US security policies. Indeed, whether increasing military and 
defence support directed towards Kenya has favoured the expansion and diversification of Nairobi’s 
security architecture, fostering interagency cooperation and strengthening national counter-terrorism 
capabilities, it has also contributed to fuelling a security system that is profoundly affected by the 
historical perceptions and the personal interests of local actors. Such perceptions and interests have 
meant that US assistance has inadvertently been diverted from its intentional objectives, falling prey 
to the local dynamics of violence. Chapter 3 has illustrated how Kenyan security units such as the 
ATPU, the RBPU and the KDF have received substantial amounts of US assistance to fight terrorism, 
including training and equipment. The same units, as detailed in the previous section, have regularly 
been reported to participate in repressive operations against Muslims and ethnic Somalis. The 
ostensibly endemic character of such operations, along with the tendency of national authorities to 
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deny their occurrence or downplay their significance as the consequence of the actions of “a few 
rotten apples” in the security system (OSF 2011), raise serious concerns with regards to the 
repercussions of US security efforts in the country.  
Faced with such concerns, US officials have increased pressure on the Kenyan government to 
enhance good governance and fight impunity. Several DOS reports express an increasing awareness 
of the levels of corruption among local security forces and the deterioration of human rights in the 
country (DOS 2007, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2018). In 2014, Washington joined the chorus of Western 
countries criticising the Security Laws (Amendment) Act, highlighting that “protecting Kenya’s 
constitution and upholding civil liberties and democracy are among the most effective ways to bolster 
security” (Al Jazeera 2014b). Such a view was reiterated a year later by the US Ambassador to Kenya, 
Robert F. Godec, during a public speech in the country:  
 
here in Kenya, there have been accusations of extra-judicial killings, and other abuses, by the 
police. Communities have spoken out on the need to improve treatment by police, on the need to 
build stronger trust… 
 
…words are not enough.  Promises about human rights are not enough.  Not nearly enough… 
 
Government leaders, politicians, the police, the judiciary, and their partners in civil society must 
all take action to stop injustices. They must investigate allegations (Godec 2015).  
  
Besides highlighting more evident humanitarian implications associated with Kenya’s harsh 
security measures, in some circumstances, US officials have also identified potential repercussions 
in strategic terms. US documents recognise that some state actions, including “state-sanctioned 
violence and heavy-handed tactics by security actors”, could have deleterious effects (DOS and 
USAID 2016: 4), and that “governments that routinely victimize their citizens may be particularly 
vulnerable to generating VE [i.e. violent extremism]” (USAID 2009: v). Especially since the adoption 
of the ‘whole-of-government’ approach by the Obama administration, Washington has placed an 
increasing emphasis on democracy and human rights as crucial instruments for countering violent 
extremism (e.g., DOD 2010; White House 2010; DOS and USAID 2016). As President Obama 
himself stressed during his 2015 official visit to Kenya: 
  
if you paint any particular community with too broad a brush, if in reaction to terrorism you are 
restricting legitimate organizations, reducing the scope of peaceful organization, then that can 
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have the inadvertent effect of actually increasing the pool of recruits for terrorism and resentment 
in communities that feel marginalized (White House 2015a).  
 
Along these lines, several US officials have warned that, in the absence of concrete steps taken 
by Kenyan authorities to implement changes on the ground and halt the misuse of security assistance, 
the US would not hesitate to resort to unilateral measures to sanction human rights violations. As the 
US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Johnny Carson, wrote to President Kibaki, 
 
[Kenya’s] future relationship with the United States is directly linked to the degree of your support 
for urgent implementation of the reform agenda as well as a clear opposition to the use of violence 
(quoted in Dagne 2011: 3).   
 
Similarly, while emphasising that counter-terrorism crimes in Kenya “place elements of U.S. security 
assistance at risk”, the US Secretary of State, John F. Kerry, considered the possibility of limiting US 
security support:  
 
we strongly condemn human rights abuses by Kenyan security forces and take seriously our 
responsibility to withhold or condition our assistance in light of applicable legal requirements and 
ethical principles (U.S. Government Publishing Office 2016a: 98).  
 
However, despite the warnings of US policy makers, little has changed in the way in which 
Kenyan forces have confronted security threats. The following pages provide strong evidence in 
support of the case-specific prediction formulated in relation to Step 2 of the causal mechanism (q  
r), showing that Kenya has managed to exploit the US strategy of remote warfare, avoiding major 
sanctions while using US security assistance to implement indiscriminate repression against Muslim 
and ethnic Somali communities.  
A first factor that has hampered US initiatives and enabled Kenya to take advantage of 
Washington’s support has concerned the limited capacity of US policy makers to exert sufficient 
oversight over the actions of surrogates in the country receiving assistance.   
Over time, the US has developed several legal instruments regulating the provision of assistance 
towards partner states and determining how and under which conditions such assistance must be 
suspended. Specific bills, for example, have been adopted by Congress to restrict aid delivered to 
countries exhibiting a lack of respect for rule of law and human rights (Ploch 2010: 37; SAM 2014: 
3). Still, the major tool used by US policy makers to bar assistance to foreign security, military and 
police forces have been the Leahy Laws. Named after their author, Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the laws 
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were promulgated in 1998, and subsequently expanded in 2012 (United States Congress 2012: 431), 
to regulate assistance provided under the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act as well the provision of 
training by the DOD (although the DOS-managed NADR fund is exempted, the DOS has regularly 
included it, see Serafino et al. 2014: 5, 8). Under the Leahy Laws, the US cannot provide training, 
equipment or other forms of aid to a unit of a foreign country if even one of its members is suspected 
to be involved in a gross violation of human rights (aid is restored only after proper investigations are 
conducted and the perpetrators are brought to justice in the concerned states). The vetting of the 
security agents is initiated by the members of the local US embassy, who analyse data from US 
databases and reports of civil society organisations, and subsequently continued by the DOS Bureau 
for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the DOS regional bureaus (Serafino et al. 2014: 10).  
The introduction of the Leahy Laws has represented an important step towards the protection of 
human rights worldwide. Still, the laws, as well as the other instruments regulating US aid, have a 
(potential) weakness: the effectiveness of the vetting process is highly dependent on the availability 
of information for the US staff. Without monitoring mechanisms ensuring appropriate knowledge of 
the local context in which aid is delivered, the individual identification of human rights violators, and 
of their units, becomes rather complicated. This is of fundamental importance in the case of 
partnership relationships such as that between the US and Kenya, characterised by a strategic and 
physical distance separating the benefactor state from local actors receiving indirect support. Indeed, 
as the remoteness between Washington and its frontline partner in the war on terror increases, so does 
US difficulties in monitoring actions on the ground.   
In Kenya, the erosion of US oversight capabilities has enabled local forces benefiting from US 
assistance to engage in repressive operations. Despite several attempts to strengthen the Leahy vetting 
system (see e.g., Wikileaks 2008c, 2009e; 2010), US officials have often been unable to suspend aid 
due to a lack of evidence regarding the identity (i.e. the names) of the Kenyan agents committing 
human rights abuses (e.g., HRW 2014, 2016). The abovementioned frequency of joint operations 
among members of different units has further complicated individual identification. In some 
circumstances, local witnesses have recognised the security units involved in repressive operations 
thanks to their familiarity with the uniforms and the vehicles used by specific security forces (e.g., 
KNCHR 2015; HRW 2016). Still, whereas such testimonies have rarely constituted strong evidence 
for the vetting process, on several occasions, Kenyan people have lacked appropriate knowledge to 
support US investigations. As leaked US embassy cables highlight,  
 
since police and military units wear almost identical uniforms, correctly identifying perpetrators 




…the substantial similarity of uniforms worn by Kenyan Army, Kenya Police Service (KPS), and 
Administration Police (AP) personnel caused confusion and hampered efforts to identify better 
alleged perpetrators of human rights abuses (Wikileaks 2008b).  
 
Furthermore, Kenyan security agents have often managed to circumvent monitoring mechanisms 
in the country. Witnesses of police and military violence have stressed how, despite introducing 
themselves as members of security forces, agents have often concealed their identity, dressing in 
plainclothes (e.g., Yusuf 2013; KNCHR 2015; HAKI Africa 2016) or even wearing “balaclavas or 
masks during arrests” (HRW 2016: 3). Such a course of action, along with the lack of internal 
investigations in the country, have thwarted US efforts. As noted by US officials, in the absence of 
measures addressing the climate of impunity in Kenya, Washington “face[s] a significant challenge 
to minimize the risk of having trained police personnel who commit abuses” (Wikileaks 2009b). 
Although the DOS does not generally publicise the suspension of aid as a consequence of the 
Leahy vetting (see OSF 2014), US officials and some NGOs have occasionally confirmed the 
exclusion of some Kenyan units from security assistance due to human rights concerns (e.g., U.S. 
Government Publishing Office 2016a: 98). For example, whereas several sources document the 
continuing provision of training and resources to the ATPU during the first half of the 2010s (e.g., 
OSF 2013b; HRW 2014), a 2016 HRW report attests the suspension of US assistance to the unit, 
stating that “if the ATPU comes under consideration for future assistance, US officials told Human 
Rights Watch that it would carefully review all available information in order to determine whether 
to assist the unit” (HRW 2016: 75). However, even so, the report notes how US aid to other units 
involved in counter-terrorism crimes, such as the KDF and the RBPU, persisted (HRW 2016: 74-75; 
for instance, in 2018 alone, the Trump administration provided the RBPU with more than US$12 
million through Section 333, see SAM 2021j). In addition, according to human rights operators, 
Kenyan security authorities have even sought to exploit the remoteness of US policy makers to 
overcome the Leahy vetting by creating “temporary, ad hoc units”, comprising members of the police 
and the military, from whom funding cannot be withdrawn, as “they don’t officially exist” (Allison 
2017a).  
Such a state of affairs concerning US oversight capabilities in Kenya has also been exacerbated 
by some shortcomings in the collection and updating of information by US officers. Reports of the 
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) show how US assistance programmes have 
often presented imprecisions in their data or have lacked important documentation. For example, a 
study on PREACT finds mistakes and imprecisions in the reporting of the activities carried out on the 
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ground (GAO 2014), while a 2008 investigation on the ATA programme in Kenya and other five 
countries states that “ATA annual reports…contained inaccuracies…such as the number of students 
trained and courses offered” (GAO 2008: 5). Such findings have been corroborated by further 
examinations of the ATA programme at a global level, highlighting how data on members of the 
security forces participating in the activities have often been incomplete (GAO 2017). Leaked US 
embassy cables reveal US efforts in the late 2000s to tackle such problems by “developing a 
comprehensive database of all Kenyan personnel trained” and ensuring “greater control over 
candidate selection to…eliminate as much as possible participants whose deployment histories raise 
questions about their conduct” (Wikileaks 2009b). Still, an inspection of the US embassy in Nairobi 
carried out by the State Department Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in 2012 raises serious 
concerns regarding the lack of a “process for collecting and updating information on human rights 
abuses” and of a “reporting mechanism to verify that individuals who are vetted and cleared are the 
same persons who receive training” (OIG 2012: 9). According to the OIG report, the US embassy 
staff only checked names of potential human rights violators based on a 2008 KNCHR report on 
violence in the 2007-2008 post-election crisis (OIG 2012: 9). Without a precise account of the number 
and the identity of trainees, US safeguards against human rights abuses are weakened. However, more 
recent inspections of the embassy register improvements in the conduction of the vetting process 
(e.g., OIG 2018).  
A second, and most important, factor that has enabled Kenya to abuse US security assistance 
concerns the nature of the US strategy on the ground and the role played by Kenya forces within such 
a strategy.  
As argued in Chapter 2, despite showcasing the power and the resources of the US military and 
economic machine, remote warfare originates from the identification of a ‘limit’, that is, the 
benefactor’s willingness to avoid higher political, economic and military costs in the conduct of the 
war on terror through the deployment of troops in distant theatres. Such a limit has major implications 
for what concerns the management of US relationships with African partners. Indeed, rather than 
allowing US policy makers to operate from a position of strength, it forces them to make several 
compromises. Washington’s reluctance to directly engage in remote conflicts turns local intervener 
states into crucial allies for the projection of US power and the achievement of short-term security 
goals on the ground. This increases costs associated with disengagement, generating considerable 
dilemmas for US policy makers facing cases of repression in partner countries. Whether repressive 
security measures are contrary to the democratic principles upheld by the US, a withdrawal of indirect 
support could exacerbate regional insecurity and favour the expansion of terrorism. DOD documents 
call for the adoption of preventive procedures avoiding the emergence of such dilemmas by providing 
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assessments of potential risks involved in the use of security assistance in specific contexts (for a 
review of such documents, see GAO 2013). Still, to find a balance between Washington’s 
commitment to human rights and the pursuing of counter-terrorism objectives, US officials have often 
relied on a pragmatic approach, preserving security partnerships with key allies while seeking to 
redirect them towards a greater respect for human rights and the rule of law. As the 2011 US National 
Strategy for Counterterrorism states,  
  
in some cases partnerships are in place with countries with whom the United States has very little 
in common except for the desire to defeat al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents. These partners 
may not share U.S. values or even our broader vision of regional and global security. Yet it is in 
our interest to build habits and patterns of CT cooperation with such partners, working to push 
them in a direction that advances CT objectives while demonstrating through our example the 
value of upholding human rights and responsible governance (White House 2011: 6). 
 
Such an approach is evident in the case of Kenya. On the one hand, Washington condemns 
counter-terrorism crimes carried out by Kenyan security authorities. On the other hand, however, the 
role that Kenyan security institutions play in the war against terrorism, as discussed in Chapter 3, is 
regarded as of fundamental value for the achievement of security objectives and the preservation of 
stability in East Africa. As a senior US official clarified to the Kenyan president during a meeting, 
“no country between Cairo and Capetown [sic] is more important than Kenya” (Wikileaks 2009c). 
As a result, rather than altering security assistance policies in the country, US policy makers have 
sought to calibrate them so as to provide local actors with support to counter AQEA and Al-Shabaab 
while, at the same time, avoiding an intensification of repression. 
Leaked US embassy cables shed light on US diplomatic efforts and the political calculations 
underlying remote warfare in Kenya (e.g., Wikileaks 2006b, 2007b, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2010). 
While stepping up pressure on the national authorities to uphold democratic values, US 
representatives have often refrained from taking measures that might undermine Kenya’s stability 
and counter-terrorism capabilities. An example concerns the visit of a Kenyan senior official to 
Washington in 2007 and the related request for more US security support. US officials acknowledged 
that “transparency is not a word he [i.e. the Kenyan representative] is comfortable with and he is 
sometimes disposed to thinking that human rights are a troublesome obstacle to law enforcement”, 
also stressing that his “‘shoot to kill’ orders to the police are not something that we can endorse” 
(Wikileaks 2007b). However, at the same time, a refusal of the request for security assistance was 
framed as capable of jeopardising counter-terrorism goals on the ground, causing a greater harm to 




the primary reason for his visit to the U.S. is to obtain assistance for the police in their fight against 
crime and terrorism. As the U.S. Government, we can have no higher priority than addressing the 
violent crime and terrorism problem in order to help ensure the safety of Americans.  
 
It is essential that we dig deep and pursue every avenue to be responsive to the Kenyan 
government's requests. Being responsive will help reinforce Kenyan cooperation on Somalia and 
anti-terrorism efforts, and will directly contribute to fighting crime, thus contributing to the safety 
of Americans and the stability of our strategic partner (Wikileaks 2007b). 
 
In another case, after having raised concerns with regard to endemic human rights breaches at the 
hand of the Kenyan police and the lack of oversight mechanisms in the country, US officials 
underlined the importance of Kenyan counter-terrorism efforts within the post-9/11 security 
framework: 
 
there are important U.S. national security interests at stake in Kenya. Security sector assistance is 
a key means to advance those U.S. national security interests. The challenge we must grapple 
with is how best to use security assistance to engage on areas of interest to us without in any way 
contributing to human rights abuses, and how best to use current and possible future assistance to 
press for and encourage meaningful police reform (Wikileaks 2009b). 
 
Washington’s approach to the security partnership with Kenya reverberates also in several public 
statements of US policy makers. An example is the remarks made by President Obama during the 
abovementioned visit to Kenya in 2015. Facing increasing episodes of violence in the country, Obama 
reminded President Kenyatta that “the Kenyan government is accountable to the Kenyan people”, 
also underlining how “respecting civil society” and the rule of law is of fundamental value in the fight 
against terrorism (White House 2015a). Yet, at the same time, the US president praised the efforts of 
Kenyan forces combating Al-Shabaab in Somalia and emphasised the significance of US-Kenya 
counter-terrorism cooperation, announcing that Washington would provide additional security 
support (White House 2015a).   
However, in the same way that the adoption of a remote warfare strategy affects the behaviour 
of the benefactor country, even surrogate states are responsive to such a change. Kenya is not a 
passive partner, unaware of the role that it plays on the international stage and of the limit from which 
remote warfare originates. On the contrary, US counter-terrorism imperatives in East Africa, along 
with Washington’s reluctance to tackle the terrorist threat through direct intervention, have generated 
121 
 
a moral hazard, providing Nairobi with considerable leverage in the partnership relationship (see 
Prestholdt 2011). While cooperating with the US in the fight against AQEA and Al-Shabaab, Kenyan 
security authorities have managed to take advantage of the post-9/11 scenario to “accommodate [US] 
demands which suit them, and adapt, subvert or obstruct those which they cannot ignore” (Hills 2006: 
638). This is evident, for example, in the case of US demands concerning the signing of a Bilateral 
Immunity Agreement (BIA) in the mid-2000s. As already mentioned in Chapter 3, Nairobi opposed 
Washington’s request, causing a suspension of some US assistance programmes in the country. Still, 
Kenya’s inflexibility to US pressure forced Washington to come to terms with its strategy in the war 
on terror and to rapidly restore most of the aid to protect security interests in East Africa (Bachman 
2012). As a Pentagon official declared, 
 
Kenya is a key partner in our counterterrorism strategy and our goals in Africa…this [i.e. the 
suspension of aid] hurts us, there’s no question about it (quoted in Mazzetti 2006).  
 
In the framework of Kenya’s counter-terrorism initiatives, despite the intensification of US pressure 
to stop the perpetration of violence and the warnings of US policy makers regarding potential 
sanctions, Kenyan forces have continued to operate outside of the law, exploiting Kenya’s post-9/11 
geo-strategic significance and the consequent difficulties of US policy makers to disengage or cut 
aid, to gain additional assistance. As a recent HRW report notes, Western “rhetorical comments, 
though important, are not prompting change in the conduct of Kenyan security forces” (HRW 2016: 
73; see also HAKI Africa 2016).   
Confronted with such a lack of change, Washington has enacted counter-measures seeking to 
enhance local civil-military relations and improve the living conditions of vulnerable communities in 
the country. After the 2007-2008 post-election violence, Kenya was included among the beneficiaries 
of DOD Section 1207 Security and Stabilization Assistance, with the aim of supporting “positive 
civic engagement among disaffected youth…foster[ing] trust between police and local communities; 
enhanc[ing] Kenyan military’s ability to provide security and stability” (Serafino 2010: 10). Funding 
from Section 1207 was used in the late 2000s to finance USAID development projects seeking to 
increase social inclusion and reduce the vulnerability to terrorist recruitment of ethnic Somalis in the 
north-eastern region (Wikileaks 2009e). Similar projects have also been implemented in the Kenyan 
coast and Nairobi’s Eastleigh district to address local grievances and encourage peaceful dialogue 
between Muslim communities and the national institutions (e.g., Bradbury and Kleinman 2010; 
Nyagah, Mwangi and Attree 2017). Furthermore, the US has provided support to IPOA to increase 
accountability in the country (Watts, Jackson et al. 2018: 58), and has sought to empower Kenyan 
122 
 
civil society organisations as a way “to promote positive changes in Kenya governance” (DOS 2009b: 
78; see also e.g., Wikileaks 2009b). 
In addition, Washington has taken precautions to prevent the misuse of security support. Whether 
the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme has continued to be used to 
professionalise the Kenyan military and spread the values of democracy and rule of law, Section 1206 
Train and Equip Authority was supplemented with a human rights training component for local 
forces. Such a component was transferred to Section 333 Building Partner Capacity by the US 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017, being flanked by institutional 
capacity building programmes aimed at enhancing “civilian control of the national security forces” 
in partner states (U.S. Government Publishing Office 2016b: 506).  
 However, as important as such precautions and US soft security measures have been, they have 
suffered from major shortcomings. Specifically, they have been extremely limited in comparison to 
US security support to Kenyan forces and have rarely come to grips with the historical and systemic 
nature of repression in Kenya. Despite the increasing emphasis placed on institutional capacity 
building and security sector reform, the bulk of post-9/11 US security assistance in Kenya, as shown 
in the previous chapter, has been directed towards short-term counter-terrorism objectives in the fight 
against AQEA and Al-Shabaab (e.g., Bachmann and Hönke 2009; Bruton and Williams 2014; 
Goldenberg et al. 2016; Goodman and Arabia 2018). Compared to such goals, “considerably less 
energy and fewer resources [have been] focused on ensuring that the internal security 
services…address…threats effectively, or protect and do not marginalize or alienate vulnerable 
populations” (Goldenberg et al. 2016: 2). As a US embassy cable highlights with respect to US aid 
to Kenyan police,    
 
building counterterrorism capacity, including enhanced border security and maritime security 
capabilities, has been the major focus of our assistance. Capacity building in core civilian police 
skills…has not been our main focus (Wikileaks 2009a).   
  
For example, in 2018, when the DOD Section 333 in Kenya reached a peak of US$69 million, only 
0.1% of such an amount was used for human rights training and seminars, while most of the assistance 
consisted of tactical and logistical support for Kenyan counter-terrorism forces (SAM 2021j).  
Nonetheless, even in the case of greater sums allocated for human rights training during joint 
military exercises, doubts would persist with regard to its actual impact in terms of a decrease in state 
violence. Indeed, despite contributing to the professionalisation of Kenyan forces, such a training is 
unlikely to tackle the underlying causes of repression in the country (for a similar argument, see OSF 
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2013a). Without being integrated into more extensive measures aimed at favouring a process of 
reconciliation at a national level and rooting out endemic corruption, US preventive tools can hardly 
ameliorate social conditions and avoid the misuse of security assistance in Kenya. In the same way, 
regardless of their success, US small-scale development projects seeking to address grievances and 
foster social inclusion of Kenyan Muslim and ethnic Somali communities cannot decrease or 
overshadow the effects that corruption and historical fractures still have on the daily life of such 
communities (see Bachmann and Hönke 2009; Prestholdt 2011). As a report emphasises when 
exploring US development activities in the country, “it is naive to assume that a project or series of 
small projects are sufficient to change people’s perceptions, convictions, and values, regardless of the 
historical and contemporary local, regional, and global sociopolitical and economic context” 
(Bradbury and Kleinman 2010: 5).   
The Obama administration sought to redirect US security policies in Kenya towards a greater 
combination between indirect support against terrorism and longer-term initiatives addressing 
inequality and promoting human rights. Besides the Security Governance Initiative mentioned in 
Chapter 3, the US president also sponsored joint efforts with Kenyan authorities to fight corruption 
and enhance democratic values (e.g., White House 2015b). Yet, so far, the balance between such 
initiatives and US short-term security imperatives in East Africa has been rather fragile. Limited 
funding and pressing counter-terrorism needs have often undermined the scope of US long-term 
efforts on the ground (e.g., Bruton and Williams 2014; Goodman and Arabia 2018). Such imbalances 
have showed the great importance attached by US policy makers to the fight against Al-Shabaab and 
the achievement of regional stability. At the same time, however, they have also reflected the 
prominence of a problem-solving approach to (counter-)terrorism that, while framing local security 
institutions as the main referent to neutralise threats on the ground and restore stability, has not fully 
appreciated the dangerousness (and the destabilising nature) of the status quo. Intertwining with the 
realpolitik of local actors on the ground, such an approach has contributed to delaying concrete 
changes in the Kenyan counter-terrorism policy. Conscious of the relevance of US-Kenya counter-
terrorism cooperation within the post-9/11 US security framework, Kenyan security authorities have 
managed to evade external pressures, welcoming increasing amounts of US security support while 
maintaining repressive measures against (perceived) threats in the country.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has focused on Step 2 (q  r) of the causal mechanism outlined in Chapter 2, according 
to which, in African states relying on harsh security measures based on indiscriminate repression 
against suspect groups (scope condition 2 [C2]), the establishment of the partnership relationship with 
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the US means that local authorities gain resources and room for manoeuvre to implement such 
measures. After having assessed the presence of C2 in the case study, the chapter has tested q  r by 
looking for its case-specific manifestations in the form of Kenyan authorities managing to use US 
security assistance to carry out indiscriminate repression against Muslim and ethnic Somali 
communities.   
The chapter has provided extensive evidence of Kenya taking advantage of the relationship with 
the US in the post-9/11 period, showing how Kenyan security authorities benefiting from US 
logistical support, training and equipment have regularly been involved in cases of indiscriminate 
repression against ethnic Somali and Muslim communities while managing to evade Washington’s 
pressures and avoid major sanctions. As outlined in the methodological section of the introductory 
chapter, such evidence constitutes a strong inferential test corroborating q  r. Indeed, besides having 
a high degree of certainty (Step 2 could hardly occur in its absence), the evidence has also a high 
degree of uniqueness, as the abuse of US assistance by Kenyan authorities could hardly have 
explanations other than the establishment of a partnership relationship within the framework of 
remote warfare. This has been further highlighted in the above analysis. As shown, the US strategy 
of remote warfare in Kenya has had major implications, limiting the ability of Washington to exercise 
control over the actions of its partner and determine the use of security assistance. The remoteness 
separating the US from the theatre of its intervention has undermined oversight of Kenyan security 
units receiving assistance, hampering the vetting process. Furthermore, the US reluctance to intervene 
directly through the deployment of troops in East Africa has increased the agency of Kenyan security 
authorities vis-à-vis US policy makers, generating a moral hazard. While cooperating with the US in 
the fight against AQEA and Al-Shabaab, Kenyan authorities have managed to exploit Washington’s 
counter-terrorism imperatives on the ground to circumvent US directives regarding the management 
of security in the country.  
Such implications highlight how the effects of remote warfare are highly dependent on the 
context in which the strategy is implemented. Allowing partners to use US support with fewer 
constraints, the US strategy is susceptible to the interests and perceptions of local actors concerning 
the scope and the nature of the security threat. Such perceptions and interests do not emerge from 
nowhere, but instead are the consequence of the convergence of social, political and cultural processes 
in a given time and setting.  
In Kenya, perceptions and interests driving local counter-terrorism measures have been 
profoundly affected by the escalation of historical fractures in the post-9/11 period and the endemic 
character of corruption within the security sector. As illustrated, historical fractures and endemic 
corruption have progressively turned the war on terror into a catalyst for the normalisation of the 
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excessive use of force against suspect groups, causing a dramatic intensification of indiscriminate 
repression against the Muslim and ethnic Somali population. In such a context, US policies have 
provided increasing funds and resources to professionalise and strengthen the Kenyan counter-
terrorism system. Still, being driven by a problem-solving perspective on the war on terror, they have 
almost left untouched the flaws that jeopardise its function.  
Such dynamics have had substantial repercussions, contributing to the exacerbation of inequality 
and the erosion of human rights in the country. However, besides humanitarian and political 
consequences, there may also be further implications. As noted above, US documents and statements 
have occasionally acknowledged that some state actions may have negative effects in the conflict 
against violent extremism. Yet, the US strategy of remote warfare seems to underestimate the political 
drivers of radicalisation and the way in which Washington’s indirect support towards a fragmented 
and corrupted system can inadvertently contribute to undermining the very stability and security that 
it aims to protect. The misuse of US assistance by surrogate forces relying on indiscriminate 
repression against perceived threats risks fuelling dynamics of violent interaction among social actors 
on the ground fostering social discontent and increasing mobilisation into terrorism. The next chapter 


















Causal Mechanism: Step 3 
Kenya’s counter-terrorism measures and radicalisation 
 
This chapter deals with Step 3 (r  B) of the causal mechanism discussed in Chapter 2, according to 
which indiscriminate repression carried out by US African partners against suspect groups causes an 
increase in radicalisation. The chapter tests the validity of r  B in the case study by exploring its 
expected manifestations and searching for evidence of Kenyan Muslim and ethnic Somali 
communities becoming prone to mobilising into Al-Shabaab, and managing to do so, in the face of 
indiscriminate repression. 
The chapter is composed of three sections.  
The first two sections provide evidence in support of the case-specific prediction related to r  
B, showing how, in line with the Social Movement Theory (SMT) approach to radicalisation set out 
in Chapter 2, the use of indiscriminate repression by Kenyan security authorities has been 
accompanied by an increase in the propensity of Muslim and ethnic Somali communities to mobilise 
into Al-Shabaab, along with the generation of conducive socio-political conditions enabling them to 
do so.  
The first section focuses on the motivational aspect of mobilisation, showing how Muslims and 
ethnic Somalis have become increasingly alienated from national institutions and, ultimately, prone 
to rebelling against the state and mobilising into Al-Shabaab when facing encounters with repressive 
authorities. The second section focuses on how such a propensity has concretised in practical terms. 
As the section highlights, dynamics of violent interaction with national authorities have been followed 
by the emergence and consolidation of socio-political conditions enabling would-be militants facing 
repression to translate their aspiration into action through the establishment of connections with Al-
Shabaab.       
The last section explains why the evidence provided in the chapter constitutes a strong inferential 
test to confirm r  B, summarising the main features of such a step of the causal mechanism and 
setting the ground for the conclusive chapter of the thesis.  
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Indiscriminate repression and radicalisation in Kenya: motivating mobilisation 
As shown in Chapter 4, the adoption of a remote warfare strategy by the US in Kenya has had serious 
implications. Nairobi has managed to exploit its role within the post-9/11 US security framework, 
along with Washington’s strategic and physical distance in the security partnership, to gain increasing 
resources and room for manoeuvre for the implementation of harsh counter-terrorism measures based 
on indiscriminate repression against the Muslim and ethnic Somali minority. In the last two decades, 
especially after the rise of Al-Shabaab as a regional player, such a minority has regularly been 
subjected to episodes of collective punishment, mass arrest, torture and abuse. Reports show how the 
escalation of terrorism in the country has been accompanied by a dramatic increase in practices of 
ethnic and religious profiling by national forces, subjecting suspect groups to harsh security 
procedures just because of their physical appearance or their clothes (e.g., HRW 2012a; ICG 2012; 
Ndung’u, Salifu and Sigsworth 2017). In some circumstances, even Muslim clerics publicly 
campaigning against terrorism have not escaped detention (and bribery), being “automatically 
suspected of involvement with the group [i.e. Al-Shabaab], based purely on their identity” (Wakube 
et al. 2017: 24).  
The scapegoating of suspect groups for the escalation of terrorism has also favoured the spread 
of sentiments of fear and hostility among the population, “affect[ing] the attitudes toward Somalis 
[and Muslims] in everyday life” (Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom 2015: 26). A survey of the Inter-
Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK) in Mombasa and Kwale counties (characterised by high levels 
of terrorist recruitment) shows that most of the respondents were critical of the religious policy of the 
Kenyan government, with many of them mentioning extrajudicial killings as a major driver of 
religious intolerance and conflicts among locals (DOS 2019b). Episodes of public violence against 
ethnic Somalis were registered in Nairobi’s Eastleigh district after terrorist attacks in the early 2010s 
(Lough 2012; Al Jazeera 2013b; Botha 2014b). In the north-eastern and coastal territories, heavily 
targeted by Al-Shabaab’s operations and the following reprisals of Kenyan forces, frictions between 
Christians and Muslims have over time reached alarming levels, with both communities accusing 
each other of not taking appropriate steps to prevent violence against their members (Ndzovou 2017a; 
Wakube et al. 2017). 
The progressive consolidation of patterns of violent interaction with the state has affected 
profoundly the way in which Muslims and ethnic Somalis have constructed and conceived social 
reality. Indeed, cracking down indiscriminately on historically ‘othered’ social groups, Kenyan 
authorities have signalled that nearly any individual belonging to such groups could potentially be 
treated as a terrorist, demarcating boundaries distinguishing them from the rest of the population. 
Several studies emphasise the emergence of feelings of fear and mistrust towards national security 
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institutions among communities facing repression (Anderson and McKnight 2015a; Finn et al. 2016; 
Villa-Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke and Humphrey 2016; Ndung’u, Salifu and Sigsworth 2017; Chome 
2019; Botha and Abdile 2020). Interviews of Muslim and ethnic Somali people confirm such trends, 
conveying a marked lack of confidence in the fairness and the reliability of the Kenyan security 
system:    
 
this is the government disappearing our people. How can we trust them with fair investigations 
and trial? It is meaningless to expect anything from the police or the courts (quoted in HRW 2016: 
25).  
 
We don’t trust the government because of cases of rampant youth disappearances without trace, 
unwarranted police crackdowns and continuous sexual abuse and harassment of families whose 
children are suspected to have joined extremist groups in Somalia (quoted in International 
Alert/KMYA 2016: 31).  
 
What concerns me most at the moment is my security. It is not possible to get justice in Kenya 
under these conditions. Terror suspects either disappear or get shot, you know, and nothing 
happens (quoted in HRW 2015a: 46).  
 
Eventually, a sense of isolation and victimisation has consolidated among ethnic Somalis 
experiencing violent encounters with national authorities in the north-eastern territories and Nairobi, 
contributing to politicising their collective identity. A letter sent by local leaders in Mandera (north-
eastern Kenya) to the ministers for defence and internal security in 2011 expresses the state of 
apprehension and the concerns of the local population following repeated cases of collective 
punishment for the occurrence of terrorist attacks against Kenyan forces in the region:  
 
on daily basis security men were being killed by thugs in other regions of Kenya and yet the 
population dwelling within that [sic] environs are not collectively punished. Does this mean 
Somalis are all naturally threat [sic] to the security of this nation? Does it signify that we are all 
Alshabab [sic] or their sympathizers? (quoted in HRW 2012a: 34-35). 
 
Similar concerns were emphasised by the Mandera County Senator in an article published in a major 




the [ethnic Somali] community has been stigmatised and portrayed as “terrorists” by the 
xenophobic narrative of the State…God forbid, should any other explosion occur tomorrow, 
ordinary Kenyans may turn on the Somalis!... 
…Terrorism is a global scourge affecting many countries and ours is no exception. Blaming the 
Somali community collectively is wrong and will create more resentment towards the State… 
(Kerrow 2014).  
 
Indeed, investigations on Usalama Watch have found that the recurrence of human rights abuses 
against ethnic Somalis during the operation contributed to fuelling frustration and social alienation 
(Villa-Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke and Humphrey 2016; Wakube et al. 2017), awaking feelings of 
historical inequality between them and the rest of the population (Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom 2015). 
As a report of the Kenyan Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) stresses, Usalama Watch 
“elicited a perception of targeted bias or discrimination from members of the dominant Somali 
community” (IPOA 2014b: 7). Such a perception is captured by the words of ethnic Somali people 
interviewed in the aftermath of the events: 
 
I am a Kenyan through and through. I was born here and I do not know anywhere else to call 
home. But when such things happen, they make me feel like an alien. Does Kenya want us, does 
Kenya appreciate us?... there is a worrying element of intolerance against Somalis from the streets 
and even in the media (quoted in Some 2014).   
 
We support any operation that will weed out all kinds of criminals but what we are against is the 
nature of the operation. The government needs to adopt smart policing, intelligence gathering and 
fighting corruption within the police force [rather] than targeting [a] specific community (quoted 
in The New Humanitarian 2014).  
 
A sense of isolation and frustration has also developed among Kenyan Muslims in the coastal 
areas of the country. Several reports emphasise increasing tensions among local communities facing 
the intensification of counter-terrorism raids (e.g., OSF 2013b; HAKI Africa 2016; Ndung’u, Salifu 
and Sigsworth 2017). Interviews with Muslim people show resentment towards national security 
authorities, blamed for “automatically label[ling] the Muslims as the terrorist” (quoted in Shetret, 
Schwartz and Cotter 2013: 10) and treating them “like second-class citizens”, ignoring their centuries-
old history in the coastal territories (quoted in Blair 2014; see also Botha 2013). Mass arrests, violence 
and detainment by ATPU members are regarded as a major cause of concern, leaving deep inner 




I have no rights. It’s like I’m not a human (quoted in OSF 2013b: 48). 
 
What type of life do they want us to live? They keep coming for us. They portray us as dangerous. 
No one wants to sit in our home. We are alone here…The perception of the community is that 
this is a no go zone (quoted in OSF 2013b: 48).  
 
The emerging climate of pervasive anxiety is captured by the words of the chair of the Kenyan 
Muslim Human Rights Forum: 
 
the moment…[a human rights violation] is cloaked in the war on terror, nobody gives a 
damn…That's where I really feel very frightened about what is going on (quoted in Chonghaile 
2012b).  
 
Trapped in a permanent condition of precariousness and insecurity, members of the Muslim 
population in the coast have started reacting violently. The unexplained murders of several Muslim 
clerics, some of whom were renowned for their ostensibly radical views (and involvement with Al-
Hijra and Al-Shabaab), served as a trigger for the outburst of anger. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
Kenyan security units have been widely suspected of being behind the killings, which would be 
inscribed within a policy of targeted assassinations aimed at eliminating potential security threats 
while circumventing the judicial system (e.g., Al Jazeera 2014a; Linthicum 2014; HAKI Africa 2016; 
HRW 2016). Following the death of Sheikh Aboud Rogo, a Muslim cleric identified by the UN 
Security Council as Al-Hijra’s major ideologue and a crucial supporter of Al-Shabaab (IGAD 2016), 
violence erupted on the streets of Mombasa, where rioters clashed with police forces (killing five of 
them) after having burned three churches and committed widespread looting (BBC 2012b; OSF 
2013b). Social unrest continued as locals blamed the state for engaging in unlawful killings against 
Muslims. As a youth frequenting Rogo’s mosque claimed after the incidents, “today it is Mr Aboud 
Rogo. Tomorrow it might be me” (quoted in BBC 2012b).  
A similar scenario occurred a year later, in October 2013, after the murder of Rogo’s successor, 
Sheikh Ibrahim Omar. Rioters set fire to a Salvation Army church in Mombasa, engaging in a fight 
against police forces that caused the death of four people. Even in this case, the government was 
heavily criticised by a fringe of the Muslim society, interpreting the killing as a violent retaliation by 
Kenyan authorities against Muslims for Al-Shabaab’s attack at the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi 




this is no doubt a police execution, given what has happened in Nairobi (quoted in Al Jazeera 
2013c).  
 
They [i.e. the authorities] have panicked because of their own laxity which killed Kenyans at 
Westgate. Now they are trying to save face by sacrificing innocent Muslims…We are not going 
to take this lightly (quoted in Akwiri 2013).  
 
With Westgate, emotions are very high and there is public pressure to get results and be seen to 
be clamping down on terrorism…They [i.e. the authorities] know public opinion will be on the 
side of counter-terrorism agencies, no matter how heavy-handed the operations are (quoted in 
Akwiri 2013).  
 
Among those railing against the government for the death of Sheikh Ibrahim Omar was Abubakar 
Sheikh Ibrahim Shariff, commonly known as ‘Makaburi’ (‘graveyard’ in Swahili); a radical preacher 
listed by the UN and the US as a terrorist, who exerted an increasing influence over Al-Hijra, 
providing support to Al-Shabaab in the Kenyan territory (UN 2013b; Nzes 2014; IGAD 2016). 
Interviewed by Al Jazeera and the BBC between 2012 and 2013, he predicted his own death at the 
hand of Kenyan forces:   
 
the police are supposed to protect us…But how can I go there when I know they want to kill me 
too; when I know that I am next (quoted in Al Jazeera 2012b).  
 
I know they [i.e. Kenyan forces] are going to kill me. But I am a Muslim. I believe that my life 
and death [are] in the hands of Allah (quoted in BBC 2014a).  
 
Eventually, Makaburi was found dead on a road outside Mombasa in April 2014, killed by unknown 
assailants. Riots and protests in Mombasa followed the assassination of the cleric, proclaimed a 
martyr by dozens of youths (BBC 2014a; Sanga and Mwahanga 2014).  
In line with what expected by the SMT approach to radicalisation set out in Chapter 2, the 
progressive consolidation of a climate of collective insecurity among the Muslim and ethnic Somali 
population suffering from dynamics of violent interaction with Kenyan forces has increased 
significantly costs associated with passive inaction, fuelling a desire for revenge against a state 
perceived more as “a source of injustice and insecurity” (Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom 2015: 27) than 
as a safeguard against such problems. A 2016 report of the Kenya National Commission of Human 
Rights (KNCHR) on youth radicalisation on the Kenyan coast shows that more than half of the people 
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interviewed had experienced harsh treatment by the police against their family members, one fifth of 
which had started developing “very extreme views against police and government” (KNCHR 2016: 
16). As a study by the International Crisis Group (ICG) stresses, rather than curtailing terrorist 
activities, security crackdowns against coastal Muslims have often “inflamed local sentiment”, 
exacerbating instability on the ground (ICG 2018: 8). Along these lines, a 2015 survey of 
Afrobarometer exploring the impact of Kenyan security measures among the ethnic Somali 
population finds that “Somali Kenyans feel marginalised by the state and express problematic levels 
of social intolerance, factors that indicate the presence of political and social conditions associated 
with higher levels of violent extremism” (Afrobarometer 2015: 1). Interviews of Kenyan Muslims 
and ethnic Somalis provide further evidence in support of such trends, highlighting increasing anger 
towards national security institutions: 
 
the KDF [i.e. Kenyan Defence Forces] doesn’t respect our community. They are guilty of gross 
misconduct and human rights abuses. They are raping innocent girls. There are many families 
who want revenge (quoted in Villa-Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke and Humphrey 2016: 19).  
 
People get executed [by security forces] and this makes the young blood boil, they want to get 
revenge (quoted in Nyagah, Mwangi and Attree 2017: 18).  
 
So and so was killed and nothing was done. No report on killed religious leaders. People are bitter 
especially the youth on what is happening (quoted in MUHURI 2015: 18).  
 
At the same time, social alienation and collective insecurity among suspect groups have 
contributed to shaping a socio-political atmosphere increasing the resonance of Al-Shabaab’s 
propaganda. Reports and research articles show how, rather than remaining indifferent to the politico-
military developments in post-9/11 Kenya, the group has repeatedly appealed to the local Muslim 
population (including ethnic Somalis), seeking to capitalise on the escalation of historical fractures 
by framing state violence as the expression of a perpetual war against Islam and invoking violent 
jihad as the vehicle to achieve both vengeance against Kenyan authorities and self-determination in 
the face of recurring (historical) injustices (e.g., S. J. Hansen 2013; Anderson and McKnight 2015a; 
Anzalone 2016b).5 The protraction of violent interactions with Kenyan forces has provided legitimacy 
to Al-Shabaab’s narrative, matching it with the living experiences of targeted audiences. Accounts of 
 
5 I have analysed Al-Shabaab’s propaganda and framing activity in a recently published article (which, as mentioned in 
the Acknowledgements, draws on some parts of this thesis); see Papale 2021. 
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think tanks and human rights groups highlight a growing consensus among the Kenyan Muslim 
population regarding the positive correlation between practices of collective punishment and support 
for the clandestine organisation (e.g., ICG 2014; MUHURI 2015; Wakube et al. 2017). By favouring 
the spread of interpretative orientations based on discrimination against the Muslim minority, state 
violence has generated sympathy for Al-Shabaab among aggrieved communities while increasing 
hostility towards national institutions (KNCHR 2016; Villa-Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke and 
Humphrey 2016). As a youth leader in Garissa declares to Human Rights Watch,  
 
young people have started saying that if today they were given the opportunity to decide between 
[living under] al-Shabaab and the Kenyan military, they would choose al-Shabaab. The military 
doesn’t usually have contact with the civilian population, so they use a lot of force. You can’t 
even talk back to them. They don’t even ask you questions (quoted in HRW 2012a: 35). 
 
A similar perspective emerges from the words of a Muslim woman in Lamu: 
 
the reality is that people have some sympathy for al-Shabaab and fear the KDF. Even for me, if I 
had to pick between the two, I would run to al-Shabaab (quoted in Nyagah, Mwangi and Attree 
2017: 14).  
 
As expected by the proposed SMT approach, such “cognitive effects” of repression (della Porta 2013: 
68) have increased the effectiveness of Al-Shabaab’s mobilisation strategies in Kenya, delegitimising 
Kenyan authorities while turning the movement into a catalyst for quenching the thirst for revenge, 
obtaining justice and achieving an otherwise unachievable political change in the eyes of potential 
supporters (see also Mwangi 2017a, 2017c).  
Accounts of Kenyans mobilised into Al-Shabaab highlight how members of suspect groups 
decided to join the organisation in the face of indiscriminate violence at the hand of Kenyan security 
units. Interviewing 95 Kenyan members of Al-Shabaab, along with 46 relatives of Kenyans associated 
with the group, a 2014 investigation by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) shows that, while 97 
per cent of the respondents perceived the Islamic religion as under threat, 65 per cent considered the 
Kenyan counter-terrorism strategy as the “single most important factor” that drove them into the arms 
of militants, blaming Nairobi for treating all Muslims as terrorists, killing Muslims during security 
operations and, consequently, persecuting Islam (Botha 2014b: 20). As a Kenyan who spent a period 




I believe my religion is under threat because those who are guilty of terrorism and those who are 
not guilty are treated in the same manner by the authorities (quoted in Ndung’u, Salifu and 
Sigsworth 2017: 40).  
 
Such findings are reflected in a broader study of the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) exploring dynamics of terrorist recruitment on the African continent, in which one-fifth of 
the respondents were Kenyans mobilised into terrorism. As the UNDP final report highlights (UNDP 
2017: 73), 71 per cent of the people interviewed regarded “government action”, including practices 
of violence and abuse during counter-terrorism operations, as the factor that finally pushed them in 
their journey towards violent extremism. Declarations of Kenyan militants provide further evidence 
of the political causes of mobilisation, supporting a view of national security policies as a major driver 
of militancy. For example, when asked by an Al Jazeera reporter whether she would carry out a 
terrorist operation in Kenya if commanded to do so by Al-Shabaab’s emir, a supporter of the group 
based inside the country replied that 
 
judging by how the Kenyan government is acting, if I’m given a task to do and it agrees with the 
teachings of Islam, then I’ll do it (transcribed from Al Jazeera 2015).  
 
In some cases of radicalisation, the killing of a Muslim cleric has been a tipping point, fostering 
feelings of community belonging and motivating Kenyan Muslims (including ethnic Somalis) to 
mobilise to avenge the perceived persecution by national authorities (e.g., K. Allen 2015; Yahya 
2016). For instance, locals in Kutulo (Wajir county) estimate that Al-Shabaab recruited hundreds of 
people from the surrounding area in the year after a religious teacher was seen being taken by the 
KDF in a near village and later found dead on a road (Bearak 2019). Such consequences of the 
disappearance and extrajudicial killing of Muslim religious leaders have been emphasised by some 
Kenyan activists calling for a greater respect for human rights: 
 
the government is radicalizing the people…It doesn’t matter if the guy [i.e. Muslim leader] is a 
devil or an angel. We are saying due process should be followed (quoted in Linthicum 2014).  
 
In other circumstances, Kenyan Muslims have mobilised after personal experiences of 
repression. Mkutu and Opondo (2019: 13), for example, recount the case of a young Kenyan turned 
to Al-Shabaab after the ‘disappearance’ of his two brothers to gain more security, escape state 
violence and avenge his relatives. Other investigations show that Kenyan women have joined the 
organisation after episodes of police abuse and violence against loved ones (Ndung’u, Salifu and 
135 
 
Sigsworth 2017; The East African 2018; West 2019). Such experiences of violence and mistreatment 
against family members have also been reported by some Al-Shabaab’s Kenyan senior operatives 
(e.g., Mohamed 2019). A youth leader at the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque in Nairobi, where the Muslim 
Youth Centre (MYC) was founded (Anzalone 2012), confirms dynamics of violent interaction with 
the state as a crucial determinant of radicalisation among local Muslims, emphasising the sense of 
hopelessness and the anger driving youths into jihad and increasing Al-Shabaab’s allure in the 
country: 
 
this because they [i.e. Muslim youths] feel that they’ve been forgotten, they have been neglected, 
and they have nowhere to run. These individuals have lost total hope. They have nothing to lose. 
They see the state as an enemy [rather] than the protector. I have seen my neighbours 
disappearing, I have seen my friends being shot. What is the difference between here and 
Somalia? You can die here for being nothing, and you can die there for being something. The 
majority of persons between thirty-five and thirteen, [the] majority of them, they do feel that way 
(transcribed from Al Jazeera 2015). 
 
Similar accounts are provided by a member of a civil society organisation in Nairobi, showing how 
episodes of indiscriminate repression against fellow Muslims in the country have often had a major 
impact for the process of mobilisation of local people into Al-Shabaab:  
 
when Muslims in Majengo [i.e. slum in Nairobi] see Muslims in North Eastern, or Muslims in 
Eastleigh or in other parts of the country, being persecuted, they feel bitter. Most of them are not 
able to control their anger, so they look for ways to vent out, and one way is to join Al-Shabaab 
so that they can unleash the bitterness that they have. You realise most of the Muslims from 
Majengo went to Somalia because of the injustices, the bitterness and frustrations that they have 
experienced. They have never healed from the traumas that they have experienced (quoted in 
Breidlid 2021: 11). 
 
The above findings highlight how the interplay between security authorities and suspect groups 
has had major implications in Kenya. In line with the SMT approach to radicalisation detailed in 
Chapter 2, Muslim and ethnic Somali communities facing violent encounters with Kenyan authorities 
have become increasingly motivated to embark in collective action against the state. The exacerbation 
of feelings of insecurity, alienation and resentment among such communities has progressively 
culminated in the generation of a reservoir of potential recruits for Al-Shabaab in the Kenyan territory. 
Confirming the case-specific prediction formulated in relation to r  B, the next section focuses on 
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the way in which the propensity for mobilisation among Kenyans has concretised in practical terms, 
leading them to join the Somali group. To do so, the section looks at the establishment of connections 
between Al-Shabaab and suspect groups, providing the latter with access to channels and resources 
to mobilise and sustain violent contention against the state.   
 
Indiscriminate repression and radicalisation in Kenya: enabling mobilisation 
The precise number of Kenyan people mobilised into Al-Shabaab is unknown and subject to debate, 
with some analysts suggesting figures of nearly two thousand militants, corresponding to a quarter of 
the group’s members (Burridge 2014; Mogire, Mkutu and Alusa 2018; Cannon and Ruto Pkalya 
2019). However, most of the sources agree to consider Kenyans as the largest group of foreign fighters 
within Al-Shabaab (e.g., Botha 2013; Kajee 2014; AP News 2017). The organisation has gained 
increasing appeal among disenfranchised youths in the country, extending its tentacles even to non-
Muslim areas such as the central and western counties, where some Christians have recently 
converted to Islam and joined the cause of jihad (e.g., Nyamori 2016; Gikandi 2019; Oudia 2020). 
Still, the vast majority of Al-Shabaab’s supporters in Kenya have come from the capital and the 
Muslim- and ethnic Somali-inhabited territories. In this regard, a 2018 survey involving 190 youths 
and 23 community leaders from Nairobi and the counties of Isiolo, Garissa, Kwale, Kilifi and 
Mombasa discovers that 70 per cent of the respondents had at least one relative, close friend or 
neighbour engaged in violent extremism (including recruitment activities on Kenyan soil) (Miriri 
2019). As shown in Chapter 3 and 4, the porosity of the Kenyan border with Somalia, along with the 
presence of a supportive environment dating back to Al-Qaeda’s first ventures in the country, have 
facilitated considerably the penetration of Al-Shabaab and favoured early episodes of recruitment 
among local groups. Nonetheless, much of the reason why the organisation has managed to take deep 
roots in Kenyan society, eluding national security mechanisms while providing aggrieved 
communities with channels and means for mobilisation, is to be found elsewhere than in the mere 
overlapping of such factors. Most of the conditions for mobilisation have emerged and consolidated 
following dynamics of interaction among social actors in the country, therefore developing in action.  
As noted in Chapter 3, even before the official affiliation with Al-Qaeda and the subsequent 
process of regionalisation under the guide of Ahmed Abdi Godane, Al-Shabaab had started retracing 
Al-Qaeda’s routes in East Africa. The presence of some leading Muslim figures involved in Islamist 
activism in Kenya (among which the aforementioned Sheikh Aboud Rogo and Makaburi) paved the 
way for the establishment of links with the Somali organisation during the late 2000s (Hansen 2013; 
Bryden and Bahra 2019). In such a context, networks of Muslims (including ethnic Somalis) 
gravitating around mosques and religious groups played a significant role in facilitating the spread of 
137 
 
Al-Shabaab’s message, allowing the penetration of the movement. Since the early 1990s, such 
networks (especially on the Kenyan coast) had constituted a centre of political debate and an arena of 
interaction for local groups propagating radical religious ideas (Mwakimako and Willis 2014; Bryden 
and Bahra 2019). The beginning of the war on terror and the progressive increase in tensions between 
the Muslim population and national security authorities contributed to turning them into a major site 
of contention. Indeed, benefiting from a relatively high degree of resistance to the scrutiny of national 
security authorities, they gradually became the hubs around which Al-Shabaab developed its initial 
support infrastructure in the country, merging with, and also supplanting, local Islamist groups 
previously associated with AQEA (ICG 2012, 2018).  
Reports of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea released between the late 2000s 
and the early 2010s highlight how “many Somali businesses and religious centres [in Kenya]…have 
links with various armed opposition groups [in Somalia] and actively recruit or raise funds for them” 
(UN 2008: 47), raising concerns regarding the progressive formation of “indigenous networks 
engaged in recruitment, radicalization and resource mobilization on behalf of Al-Shabaab in Kenya” 
(UN 2011: 24). Some mosques on the Kenyan coast, such as the Masjid Musa and Sakina mosques 
in Mombasa, were allegedly used for terrorist activities, storing weapons and propaganda items for 
militants (e.g., Al Jazeera 2014c; BBC 2014b; Van Metre 2016). Even mosques in the central and 
north-eastern territories were used by Al-Shabaab to achieve mobilisation of Muslims in the region 
(e.g., Wikileaks 2009e; Mayoyo 2014).  
Taking advantage of the difficulties of Kenyan authorities in penetrating the social fabric of local 
religious institutions and collecting security information, the group tended to follow regular patterns 
of action during encounters with potential adherents in local mosques. Individuals regarded as more 
responsive to radical propaganda were generally approached after sermons and then gradually 
isolated from their peers, sometimes being invited to participate in discussions and seminars in 
smaller groups (Botha 2014a; Mwakimako and Willis 2014). As Kenyans mobilised into Al-Shabaab 
recall, 
 
it was after afternoon prayers. We went to a corner of the mosque [in Mandera] where we could 
talk quietly (quoted in Maclean, Khamis and Ahmed 2012). 
 
One day while we were at the Majengo Mosque [in Nairobi], some people approached us and 
invited us to a meeting…At the time, the mosque was still under construction so we held the 
meeting in one of the old rooms on the ground floor. We were nine of us…At the mosque, we 
were introduced to someone who would turn out to be a leader of Al-Shabaab in the country 




Once persuaded to join the cause, aspiring members were instructed on how to reach the territories 
under Al-Shabaab’s control and who to rely on to be transported during the different stages of the 
journey, sometimes being escorted directly to the group’s training camps by exploiting the high 
porosity of the Kenyan border with Somalia (see e.g., P. Taylor 2013; Komu 2020). Investigations 
show how, in several circumstances, militants relied on intermediaries to smuggle Kenyan supporters 
across the frontier, using hotels in Eastleigh to traffic false documents and host people before their 
departure (UN 2011; Maruf and Joseph 2018). 
Until the early 2010s, the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque in Nairobi was one of the major arenas of 
interaction for the radical milieu in Kenya, disseminating Al-Shabaab’s propaganda and organising 
several events in support of jihad (UN 2011; Anzalone 2012; ICG 2012). As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
the MYC, which was founded at the mosque in 2008 (Anzalone 2012), rapidly turned into a 
operational base for Al-Shabaab in the Kenyan territory, developing strong connections in other areas 
of the country (such as Mombasa and Garissa) and engaging in recruitment for the Somali group 
(Nzes 2014). In 2012, when the MYC officially allied with Al-Shabaab and changed name in Al-
Hijra, the group’s leader, Ahmed Iman Ali (who was a student of Sheikh Aboud Rogo in Mombasa), 
was appointed coordinator of Al-Shabaab’s activities in Kenya (ICG 2012). In the same period, 
however, the group started suffering several setbacks at the hand of Kenyan security forces, as part 
of the intensification of Kenya’s heavy-handed security measures for the escalation of Al-Shabaab’s 
attacks. Increasing raids on suspicious mosques and religious centres, along with the unexplained 
killings of Al-Hijra’s cadres and ideologues (including Rogo and Makaburi), forced several militants 
and their affiliates to escape to Al-Shabaab’s strongholds in Somalia or disperse throughout Kenya 
and Tanzania, abandoning their traditional centres of activity in Kenya’s major cities (IGAD 2016: 
4; see also Ahmed 2019; Bryden and Bahra 2019).  
However, rather than dismantling the terrorist support infrastructure in the country, the tightening 
up of Kenyan counter-terrorism policies, with the consequent intensification of indiscriminate 
repression, has had considerable repercussions on national security. As expected by the proposed 
SMT approach to radicalisation, repressive security measures have been followed by the generation 
of socio-political conditions enabling members of suspect groups facing dynamics of violent 
interaction with national authorities to concretise their emerging propensity for mobilisation, gaining 
access to channels and resources to engage in collective action against the state. 
While creating incentives to mobilise, the increase in violent encounters between Kenyan forces 
and suspect groups, along with the resulting erosion of trust in the state-citizen relations discussed in 
the previous section, have pushed the Muslim and ethnic Somali minority to gradually close in on 
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itself, “increas[ing] the relevance of informal networks to people’s survival strategies” (International 
Alert/KMYA 2016: 27). Investigations show how, fearing practice of indiscriminate repression, 
Muslims and ethnic Somalis have often retreated into their own communities, seeking to minimise 
contacts with Kenyan forces. For example, the aforementioned study of IPOA on Operation Usalama 
Watch highlights that, as a result of the police raid in Nairobi, “members of the…[ethnic Somali] 
community would flee and lock themselves up in houses whenever they sighted Police vehicles or 
officers” (IPOA 2014: 7). Interviewed by Amnesty International, a local woman declares how, due 
to the high risk to personal safety associated with the interaction with national forces, she decided to 
“imprison” herself in her house for a period after the operation (AI 2014: 11). Similar episodes have 
been reported throughout the country. As a local in Garissa observes,  
 
at night…this town is just like Mogadishu…Mogadishu is better than Garissa…because the town 
is deserted…Sixty per cent [of local ethnic Somali people] do not have ID cards…the happening 
of these issue [i.e. insecurity and Al-Shabaab’s killings]…has put youths in a bad situation…if 
you do not have ID cards you are [treated by the security forces] like an [Al-Shabaab’s] ally…it 
has led to so many youth arrested, some of them being taken…where we do not know (transcribed 
from Al Jazeera 2013b).  
 
Along these lines, a youth in Wajir emphasises that, as a consequence of indiscriminate repression 
against locals, 
 
people fear the military. If they see a military car coming, everybody locks the doors (quoted in 
HRW 2012a: 35).  
 
Such dynamics have contributed to deteriorating national security in two ways: firstly, by 
reducing community support to national security authorities and secondly, by disincentivising 
discussion on terrorism at a community level. Being frightened by the reaction of counter-terrorism 
forces, aggrieved communities have been increasingly reluctant to report cases of recruitment of 
Kenyan youths into Al-Shabaab or provide information regarding the activities of the group in the 
country (e.g., K. Allen 2015; Van Metre 2016; BBC 2017; Nyagah, Mwangi and Attree 2017; Botha 
and Abdile 2020). In several circumstances, for example, “fear of victimisation and harassment at the 
hands of the police” has held Muslim women back from reporting the disappearance of their partners, 
given that many who have done so have been subjected to regular interrogations (Ndung’u, Salifu 
and Sigsworth 2017: 46). A survey of local people in Isiolo county confirms such a trend, showing 
how even parents reporting the disappearance of their children have been treated like potential 
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terrorists and subjected to mistreatment by national forces (Mkutu et al. 2018: 104). Interviews and 
focus group discussions on counter-terrorism provide further evidence regarding the concerns of 
Kenyan people:   
 
Muslims are presumed to be terrorists by security officers. Me being a Muslim will be the first 
one to be held responsible when I report such a case to police [coming forward with information] 
(quoted in Botha and Abdile 2020: 29).  
 
The police use the aspect of collective responsibility. They arrest everyone including the one 
forwarding the information (quoted in Botha and Abdile 2020: 79). 
 
The security agencies are not well trained to handle any person who report information hence the 
reporter will be the first victim hence fear for my life (quoted in Botha and Abdile 2020: 81). 
    
However, such concerns have tended to be neglected or overlooked by national authorities, 
identifying old frictions with the Kenyan state as a major cause for the lack of security cooperation 
among Muslim and ethnic Somali communities. As the Kenyan police spokesman replies when asked 
why security forces are still struggling to capture Al-Shabaab’s militants operating in the country,  
 
it is because of the fact that the [ethnic Somali] community does not open up…these are people 
from one community. Whether you are Somali from Kenya or you are Somali from Somalia, these 
are brothers (transcribed from Al Jazeera 2013b).  
 
Fearing to be associated with militants and their supporters by dealing openly with sensitive 
topics, Kenyan communities have also shied away from public debates on Al-Shabaab and 
radicalisation. For example, an investigation shows how, being afraid to draw police attention, people 
in Isiolo have been reluctant to discuss cases of mobilisation among local youths (Miriri 2019). 
Discussion has increasingly gone underground, developing within small networks of friends and 
relatives providing aggrieved groups with arenas of free speech circumventing repressive Kenyan 
policies (Villa-Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke and Humphrey 2016). On the one hand, this has 
contributed to complicating counter-terrorism investigations, increasing the impermeability of 
Muslim and ethnic Somali communities to national security authorities (see Burridge 2014). In 
parallel, it has weakened people’s ability to coordinate and manage security at the local level, 
depriving communities with crucial information on terrorist activities while disempowering religious 
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leaders who could discourage mobilisation and spread messages of peace (Van Metre 2016). A local 
in Eastleigh complains:   
 
we know sleeper cells exist in our community, but we have no idea where they are (quoted in Van 
Metre 2016: 30).  
 
Such a condition has been exacerbated by the intensification of Al-Shabaab’s campaign against 
Kenyan Muslims opposing jihad. Since the early 2010s, the group has stepped up its incursions in 
Kenya, intimidating locals into not cooperating with Kenyan security agencies and punishing 
individuals regarded as ‘betrayers’ (Ndzovu 2017b; see also Garvelink 2012; UN 2015). In a notable 
case, the chairman of the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), who lined up against 
jihadism, was killed by gunmen in Mombasa while returning home from a local mosque (Anderson 
and McKnight 2015a). Targeted communities have increasingly felt backed into a corner, caught 
between Al-Shabaab’s violence and the retaliatory measures of Kenyan security authorities. This has 
reinforced the climate of fear and mistrust in the country, further discouraging public engagement 
with counter-terrorism issues. As a journalist in Lamu explains,  
 
people are scared about al-Shabaab sympathisers being among us - so we are careful on what we 
say […] Both al-Shabaab and the security forces are the reasons for not writing stories on these 
issues – but the security forces are worse (quoted in Nyagah, Mwangi and Attree 2017: 14). 
 
The Kenyan government has sought to address such problems by launching the Nyumba Kumi 
Initiative; a community policy strategy that foresees the establishment of a community leader every 
ten households to monitor potential security threats. However, despite achieving some positive 
results, the initiative has suffered from operational difficulties (e.g., Mkutu et al. 2018; Diphoorn, van 
Stapele and Kimari 2019), sometimes also clashing with the diffidence of Muslims and ethnic Somalis 
(International Alert/KMYA 2016; Breidlid 2021). As an ATPU officer admits when discussing the 
condition of Kenyan women in the country, the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and the Kenyan police 
has continued to represent a major obstacle towards the exchange of information between national 
authorities and aggrieved communities: 
 
some women are caught between a rock and a hard place…When al-Shabaab warns them, they 
fear the group and cannot talk. No one will protect the women if the information is leaked. Fear 
[of the police] prevents the disclosure of information especially when police are corrupt and take 




The growing disconnect between Muslim and ethnic Somali communities and Kenyan authorities 
has contributed to increasing the resilience of Al-Shabaab in the country, enabling militants to 
circumvent the counter-terrorism system while forging ties with suspect groups. Facing the increase 
in surveillance and the intensification of heavy-handed security measures by Kenyan authorities, Al-
Shabaab has reduced traditional recruitment efforts in Kenya’s mosques. However, far from being 
erased, dynamics of radicalisation have been pushed further underground. The organisation, along 
with its Kenyan affiliates, have exploited divisions in the country to gain freedom of movement 
among disenfranchised groups, adopting a more flexible and decentralised network structure to 
operate from the shadows while capitalising on increasing frictions among Kenyan actors (see IGAD 
2016). Investigations show how militants have infiltrated the social space of local communities in 
Nairobi’s slums as well as in institutions of higher learning, where a number of university students 
have mobilised into Al-Shabaab’s ranks (BBC 2014c; Burridge 2014; Merab 2015; West 2016). In 
parallel, more secure venues such as madrassas and private houses, along with social media platforms, 
have been used for terrorist propaganda and the establishment of contacts with potential adherents 
(ICG 2012; Villa-Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke and Humphrey 2016). As a security source highlights 
in an interview for a major Kenyan newspaper, 
 
the cells are currently active…Only that the recruiters have changed tack…(quoted in Ahmed 
2019).  
 
In most cases, emerging links between Al-Shabaab and Muslim and ethnic Somali communities 
have been constructed around the role of “brokers” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 142) such as 
friends, teachers, religious figures and family members, providing militants with access to local 
networks (Speckhard and Shajkovci 2019). Reports show that friends have generally been the main 
actor connecting Kenyans to the organisation (Botha 2014b; UNDP 2017). Feelings of trust and 
personal bonds characterising the friendship relationships between the group’s intermediaries and 
potential recruits have eased the penetration of Al-Shabaab and the negotiation of its interpretative 
orientations at the periphery of the Kenyan society, also alleviating the impact caused by the rupture 
of previous social ties during and after the process of mobilisation (Botha 2014b). At the same time, 
the lack of trust and communication between national authorities and aggrieved communities, along 
with the increasing difficulties of the latter in exercising control over their own security, have 
contributed to keeping much of such dynamics underground.  
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Al-Shabaab has also relied increasingly on women as a source of connections with Kenyan 
suspect groups. Due to their alleged “influence on the private sphere” of individuals within the 
household (Villa-Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke and Humphrey 2016: 25) and their unsuspicious profile 
in the eyes of security forces, the group’s female supporters have mostly operated in non-combative 
roles, “provid[ing] the ‘invisible infrastructure’ for al-Shabaab by enabling, supporting and 
facilitating violent extremism through a number of…activities” (Ndung’u, Salifu and Sigsworth 
2017: 30-31), including recruiting Kenyan militants, providing mujahideen with safe refuge before 
and after operations in the country, delivering weapons and gathering intelligence on the ground 
(Mukinda 2015; Al Jazeera 2018; Badurdeen 2018b; The East African 2018; Achuka 2019; ICG 
2019; West 2019). As regards the latter task, recent studies provide evidence on the use of women as 
spies by Al-Shabaab. Information networks among sex workers in Nairobi slums, often developed as 
a form of personal defence and safeguard in the face of repeated dynamics of violent interaction with 
police forces, have been exploited by militants to buy information disclosed by corrupt agents (Petrich 
2018; Petrich and Donnelly 2019). Even in this case, the disconnect between segments of the Kenyan 
population and the security forces has provided Al-Shabaab with a window of opportunity to increase 
operations. In some circumstances, the group’s female agents have even been sent to specific hot 
spots to obtain intelligence by local forces and set the ground for future attacks. As an officer of the 
General Services Unit (GSU) explains, 
 
they [i.e. Al-Shabaab’s female agents] always target villages that closely border our camps. They 
have tried establishing a close relationship with us while others are even willing to become lovers 
of some officers (quoted in Kazungu 2017). 
 
Besides relying on the figure of local intermediaries, militants have also taken advantage of 
increasing mistrust between Muslim communities and Kenyan security authorities to gain direct 
access to local networks. In recent years, Al-Shabaab has begun to occupy Muslim-majority villages 
on the Kenyan coast for hours, seeking to forge ties with the local population and gain proselytes by 
promoting peaceful interaction, delivering sermons and preaching about militancy (Chome 2017; 
West 2018; Speckhard and Shajkovci 2019). Fear of security authorities, along with increasing 
sympathy towards the organisation among some members of local communities (see e.g., Nyagah, 
Mwangi and Attree 2017), have often hampered cooperation with the Kenyan forces, undermining 
investigations in the area. As the commander of Operation Linda Boni, implemented by Nairobi to 




every time our officers are deployed in those areas to conduct a search once an attack happens, 
no terrorist is found. Does it mean that these terrorists evaporate? (quoted in Kiage 2018).  
 
In line with the SMT approach set out in Chapter 2, the progressive consolidation of connections 
between Al-Shabaab and Kenya has contributed to removing barriers to mobilisation, providing 
aspiring militants facing practices of indiscriminate repression by national security authorities with 
major opportunities to concretise their propensity. Indeed, the group has represented a crucial source 
of channels and resources for aggrieved communities to “translate individualized discontent into 
organized contention” against the state (Wiktorowicz 2004b: 10). Operating as a transnational 
organisation controlling territories outside the radar of Kenyan forces (which, due to the high porosity 
of the Kenyan border with Somalia, have been relatively easy to reach), Al-Shabaab has provided 
would-be militants with sanctuaries where to take refuge and acquire resources in the form of 
organisational and tactical skills, leadership, as well as supplies, to engage in collective action. 
Accounts of Kenyan recruits and returnees shed light on the rigid paramilitary training imposed by 
Al-Shabaab in Somalia, involving exercises with firearms and grenades, and even ‘martial arts’ (Al 
Jazeera 2015; UN 2018; Ahmed 2019; Komu 2020). A report of the UN Monitoring Group on 
Somalia and Eritrea provides details:  
 
new Al-Shabaab recruits initially receive three months of basic military training, which can be 
reduced to a month if there are pressures at the frontline for more troops. Thereafter, some trainees 
continue to take specialized courses in assembling IEDs, sniping, or guerrilla warfare (UN 2013b: 
66).  
 
Such training, along with the provision of leadership and military and technical equipment, have 
contributed to increasing considerably the capability of Kenyans to organise and sustain violent 
contention against the state, turning weak and isolated groups of potential dissidents in the country 
into the branch of a broader and more powerful network. As an investigation of the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) points out, “since [East Africa’s] regional jihadist cells and 
networks typically lack the tradecraft to plan and stage effective operations, returning Al-Shabaab 
veterans provide much-needed operational experience, expertise, and, in some cases, leadership, 
potentially transforming aspiration into action” (IGAD 2016: 21). Such dynamics were confirmed by 
Ahmed Abdi Godane as a central component of Al-Shabaab’s strategy of regionalisation, aimed at 
destabilising East African societies by using experienced fighters who “understand their own 
countries vulnerabilities intimately” (quoted in Chome 2017). Chapter 3 has shown how ‘Jaysh 
Ayman’, the paramilitary unit created by Al-Shabaab’s leader to expand operations in coastal Kenya, 
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has been composed primarily by native people who, after having received specific training in 
Somalia, have gone back to their home country to fight. As a senior Al-Shabaab’s member emphasises 
when discussing the group’s foreign operations arm,  
 
we are training Muslims boys from Kenya who had been oppressed there, and we return them 
back there (quoted in Mubarak 2014).  
 
However, besides Jaysh Ayman’s fighters, even Kenyan-based supporters and members of cells 
and groups such as Al-Hijra have “continued to travel back and forth to Somalia” to “receiv[e] 
training and instructions before returning to Kenya to engage in operations” (IGAD 2016: 4). In line 
with what was argued in Chapter 2, the availability of such “resources for violence” (della Porta 2009: 
19, emphasis in original) has reportedly played a major role in reducing the “asymmetry of force” 
(Salehyan 2011: 7) in the country, providing Al-Hijra operatives with the capacity to remain 
operational in the face of the security crackdown implemented by Nairobi and gain even more 
autonomy to conduct clandestine operations (Bryden and Bahra 2019). As a security analyst argues 
when examining the rise in terrorist violence in Kenya, 
 
partly what we are seeing now is blowback…The people who spent time in Somalia are now 
coming back to use that experience in their country (quoted in Raghavan and Lynch 2013).  
 
The reduction of Al-Hijra’s vulnerability, in turn, has increased its ability to forge and strengthen 
connections between Al-Shabaab and Kenyan suspect groups, acting as a bridge for the exchange of 
support and resources. Recovering from the decapitation and dispersion of its leadership, the 
organisation has managed to gain access to the Kenyan prison system to recruit militants (especially 
among vulnerable people on trial for terrorism-related crimes, see IGAD 2016: 28) and plot new 
attacks in the country (Kelley 2016; Ndung’u 2016; Bryden and Bahra 2019). In 2018, Al-Hijra was 
officially designated by the US as a terrorist organisation, highlighting its major role in providing Al-
Shabaab with new members and facilitating the travel of mobilised Kenyans to Somalia (Kelley 
2018).  
An alarming number of Kenyans have reportedly turned to Al-Shabaab since the early 2010s and 
the intensification of Kenya’s heavy-handed security measures (e.g., K. Allen 2015; UN 2015; Jebet 
2016; M. Odhiambo 2018; Bearak 2019; Miriri 2019). As seen above, the presence of a receptive 
environment for Somali militants among Kenyan Islamist networks has played a role in favouring Al-
Shabaab’s penetration and setting in motion initial processes of mobilisation. The porosity of the 
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Kenyan border with Somalia has been another component of such processes, allowing the free 
movement of militants and their supporters from and to the country. Still, more than by those factors, 
the mobilisation of Kenyans into Al-Shabaab has been enabled by conditions that have developed 
and consolidated following dynamics of interaction among social actors. It is after such dynamics 
that Al-Shabaab’s message has gained increasing resonance, Kenyan security forces’ monitoring 
capabilities have been weakened and aggrieved communities have turned into a fertile environment 
for the establishment of channels of mobilisation. Ultimately, it is such dynamics that will shape the 
future of terrorism in the country. Indeed, whether relying on more sophisticated border control and 
counter-terrorism intelligence can improve Nairobi’s capacity to detect jihadist cells and foil their 
plots (for example, see UN 2018), such initiatives risk being insufficient if not flanked by more 
targeted policies increasing community support in the fight against terror. Kenya will hardly erase 
terrorism just by seeking to isolate vulnerable groups from potential providers of resources for 
violence when its counter-terrorism measures continue to produce and reproduce conditions (and 
incentives) for mobilisation. As a supporter of Al-Shabaab based inside the country declares when 
discussing Kenyan government’s attempts to dismantle terrorist networks by building a wall at the 
border with Somalia, 
 
let them build a wall…Actually we’re praying for them to build the wall. Let’s see if the fighting 
will end. Let them build a wall. We’re already inside Kenya (transcribed from Al Jazeera 2015).  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has focused on Step 3 (r  B) of the causal mechanism discussed in Chapter 2, according 
to which practices of indiscriminate repression carried out by US African partners increase 
radicalisation on the ground. The chapter has tested r  B in the case study by searching for its 
expected manifestations: Kenyan Muslim and ethnic Somali communities becoming prone to 
mobilising into Al-Shabaab, and managing to do so, in the face of indiscriminate repression. 
The chapter has provided extensive evidence in support of the above forecast, showing how, in 
line with what expected by the SMT approach set out in Chapter 2, the use of indiscriminate 
repression has been accompanied by an increase in the motivation of targeted communities to 
mobilise into Al-Shabaab, along with the generation of socio-political conditions enabling them to 
realise their ambition. As outlined in the methodological section of this work, such evidence 
constitutes a strong inferential test substantiating r  B. Indeed, on the one hand, it has a high degree 
of certainty, as r  B could not occur without groups facing indiscriminate repression becoming 
motivated to mobilise into terrorism and managing to do so. At the same time, the evidence provided 
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has a high degree of uniqueness, as the increasing propensity to mobilise among Muslims and ethnic 
Somalis facing indiscriminate repression, along with the concretisation of such a propensity, could 
hardly have plausible explanations other than the negative effects that indiscriminate repression has 
on radicalisation (r  B). This has been further confirmed in the analysis. As shown, dynamics of 
violent interaction between the Kenyan state and the ethnic Somali and Muslim minority have 
contributed to widening historical fault lines in the country, demarcating rigid boundaries isolating 
suspect groups from the rest of the population and exacerbating feelings of insecurity, frustration and 
social alienation. This has had major effects in terms of national security, fuelling the propensity of 
suspect groups to rebel and take revenge against the state while increasing Al-Shabaab’s appeal. In 
parallel, dynamics of violent interaction have also played a major role in shaping conducive 
conditions allowing mobilisation to unfold. Indeed, fuelling fear and mistrust towards national 
institutions, encounters with repressive authorities have caused a gradual disconnect between Muslim 
and ethnic Somali communities and the state, increasing Al-Shabaab’s capability to navigate Kenyan 
society and penetrate the social space of suspect groups. Facing Kenya’s crackdown on mosques 
following the intensification of terrorist attacks in the early 2010s, the organisation has adapted its 
network structure, exploiting social divisions to circumvent national security measures while 
providing potential supporters with channels and means to mobilise. Emerging connections between 
Al-Shabaab and Kenyan communities have enabled aspiring militants facing indiscriminate 
repression to gain access to sanctuaries outside the radar of Kenyan authorities as well as resources 
to engage in collective action and sustain contention against the state.  
Kenya’s counter-terrorism measures based on indiscriminate repression have fuelled the process 
of radicalisation in the country, contributing to shaping militancy and its horizons in the East African 
region. The validation of Step 3 of the causal mechanism in the case study finally validates the 
mechanism in its entirety, highlighting the link connecting post-9/11 US security policies and 
radicalisation in Kenya. Such a link, along with its theoretical and empirical implications, will be 













Each chapter of the thesis has provided a piece of the puzzle enabling this study to answer the research 
question, exploring whether and how post-9/11 US security policies have had a negative impact on 
radicalisation in Africa. The first chapters have assessed the state of the art in the related literature, 
introducing the conceptual, methodological and theoretical tools that have been used to conduct the 
analysis. Then, the last three chapters have focused on exploring the hypothesised causal mechanism 
in the case study. This chapter sets out the conclusions of the work, summarising its findings and 
discussing its contribution. 
The chapter is composed of three sections. 
The first section presents the research findings. It starts by briefly summing up the structure of 
the research, reviewing the procedure that has been taken to answer the research question and 
discussing its rationale. Then, the section outlines how each of the three steps composing the causal 
mechanism validates the hypothesised link between post-9/11 US security policies and the increase 
in radicalisation in the case of Kenya. 
The second section focuses on the empirical implications of the research, detailing its 
contribution to the literature on post-9/11 US security policies and radicalisation in Kenya while 
providing recommendations to stakeholders. The section highlights how harsh counter-terrorism 
measures have contributed to deteriorating national security in Kenya, calling for a recalibration of 
both Nairobi’s and Washington’s security efforts on the ground so as to fight the threat posed by Al-
Shabaab and Al-Qaeda without losing local support and fuelling dynamics of mobilisation into 
Islamist terrorism.  
The final section discusses how the evidence provided in the thesis validates the research 
hypothesis with its underlying theoretical framework, filling a longstanding gap in the literature by 
shedding light on the dynamics through which post-9/11 US security policies are connected to an 
increase in radicalisation in African states. In so doing, the section outlines the implications that the 
theoretical framework has for US policy makers and for the study of US initiatives in Africa.    
    
Research findings 
This thesis has focused on US security efforts and the emergence of terrorism in Africa during the 
last two decades, investigating whether and how post-9/11 US security policies have had a negative 
impact on radicalisation in African states. Relying on a critical theory-inspired research orientation, 
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the study has placed the emphasis on the socio-political environment of African states receiving 
Washington’s support as a crucial link between US initiatives and radicalisation on the ground, 
pointing to dynamics of interaction between local authorities and the population as a major dimension 
affecting the process of mobilisation to political violence. Through a deductive approach, an 
interdisciplinary framework has been set up to capture the interaction between US policies, African 
agency and the emergence of terrorism. Incorporating analytical elements from multiple theoretical 
traditions, such a framework has been developed around a three-step causal mechanism hypothesised 
to connect the subjects of study. The mechanism represents the conceptualisation of the research 
hypothesis according to which, by reflecting a strategy of remote warfare in contexts characterised 
by the threat of terrorism and the use of indiscriminate repression against suspect groups by local 
security authorities, post-9/11 US security policies have had a negative impact on radicalisation in 
African states. 
To test the hypothesis, the research has been designed as a qualitative case study, exploring the 
case of post-9/11 US security policies in Kenya through a theory testing process-tracing method. Such 
a method has allowed to identify causal forces in action by translating each of the steps of the 
mechanism into case-specific predictions of their observable manifestations. The relatively high 
degree of uniqueness and certainty characterising the predictions formulated has meant that the 
evidence found in their favour has provided strong tests for causal inference, substantiating the related 
steps of the mechanism (see Van Evera 1997; Beach and Pedersen 2013).  
Building on research on remote warfare, Step 1 (A  q) of the mechanism has hypothesised that, 
in African states characterised by the threat of terrorism (scope condition 1 [C1]), post-9/11 US 
security policies lead to the establishment of a partnership relationship within the framework of 
remote warfare. This step has been corroborated in the case study by providing evidence of its 
expected manifestations: the US providing security assistance to Kenya to fight Al-Qaeda and Al-
Shabaab while keeping a low military presence on the ground. As shown in Chapter 4, in the last two 
decades, the US has increased security efforts in Kenya significantly, providing national authorities 
with growing amounts of indirect support, including counter-terrorism training and equipment to 
security forces, to fight local terrorism. In so doing, however, Washington has limited its military 
presence in the country to a few dozen soldiers, relying on Nairobi as a surrogate to project its military 
power on the ground.   
Building on research on security assistance and the role of agency, Step 2 (q  r) of the 
mechanism has hypothesised that, in contexts characterised by the use of harsh security measures 
based on indiscriminate repression against suspect groups (scope condition 2 [C2]), the partnership 
relationship with the US means that local authorities gain increasing resources and room for 
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manoeuvre to implement such measures. This step has been substantiated in the case study by 
providing extensive evidence in support of its case-specific prediction: Kenya managing to use US 
security assistance to implement indiscriminate repression against suspect Muslim and ethnic Somali 
communities. As illustrated in Chapter 5, Kenyan security authorities benefiting from US assistance 
have been involved in practices of indiscriminate repression against such communities, who have 
been scapegoated for the escalation of terrorism in the country. Still, despite the recommendations 
and the pressure exercised by US policy makers, two main aspects underlying the US strategy in the 
country have allowed Kenyan authorities to avoid sanctions and continue abusing assistance. Firstly, 
the increasing remoteness between the US and its surrogate, which has jeopardised US oversight 
capabilities, hampering the enforcement of legal provisions regulating the allocation of aid to 
repressive security units. Secondly, the generation of a moral hazard, in that local security authorities 
have exploited the role of Kenya as a frontline actor within the post-9/11 US security framework and 
the reluctance of Washington to fight the local terrorist threat by deploying troops on the ground to 
disregard US demands while welcoming increasing assistance. 
Building on research on Social Movement Theory (SMT), Step 3 (r  B) of the mechanism has 
hypothesised that indiscriminate repression implemented by US African partners increases 
radicalisation on the ground. Even this final step has been validated in the case study by providing 
strong evidence supporting its case-specific prediction: Kenyan Muslim and ethnic Somali 
communities becoming prone to mobilising into Al-Shabaab, and managing to do so, in the face of 
indiscriminate repression. Chapter 6 has shown how the implementation of Kenya’s harsh measures 
based on indiscriminate repression has been accompanied by a deterioration of national security. On 
the one hand, Muslim and ethnic Somali communities facing dynamics of violent interaction with 
national security authorities have displayed an increasing propensity to engage in collective action 
against the state through mobilisation into Al-Shabaab. On the other, violent encounters with the state 
have been followed by the emergence and consolidation of conducive socio-political conditions 
enabling would-be militants to access channels and resources for mobilisation, therefore turning 
aspiration into action.  
The validation of the three steps of the mechanism in the case study (A  q  r  B) has both 
empirical and theoretical implications. 
 
Empirical implications  
At the empirical level, the validation of the mechanism firstly highlights the need for a recalibration 
of the Kenyan counter-terrorism policy so as to counter Al-Shabaab without losing community 
support and fuelling (old) frictions undermining national security. The progressive intensification of 
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indiscriminate repression against suspect groups in the post-9/11 period has alienated vulnerable 
sections of the population, increasing social disconnect and fuelling the motivation of Muslim and 
ethnic Somali communities to radicalise. As the evidence provided in this work suggests, growing 
fear, mistrust and resentment towards national authorities among such communities have not only 
disempowered Kenyan forces, undermining their capabilities to penetrate the social fabric of suspect 
groups, but have also had major repercussions for what concerns militants’ appeal in the country, 
shaping a socio-political terrain on which Al-Shabaab’s message has increasingly taken deeper roots. 
The terrorist group has easily taken advantage of Nairobi’s counter-terrorism measures to gain 
traction at the periphery of Kenyan society and establish connections enabling aspiring recruits to 
concretise their emerging propensity to violence. 
Chapter 1 has illustrated how the literature on radicalisation in Kenya has often prioritised factors 
such as religious identity, ideology and socio-economic grievances as the major drivers of terrorism 
in the country. Such a prioritisation, as shown in Chapter 2, has reflected a broader tendency in the 
field of terrorism studies towards a ‘de-politicisation’ and ‘de-contextualisation’ of dynamics of 
radicalisation in favour of a closer focus on terrorists and their organisations. This work does not 
neglect the multiplicity of drivers that can trigger the process of mobilisation of Kenyans. On the 
contrary, while exploring the impact of local repressive measures on radicalisation, it has provided a 
story of how the process unfolds in the country, treating such measures as a ‘contributing factor’ 
rather than the sole driver of mobilisation (see Mahoney 2015). The thesis acknowledges that the 
story provided can intertwine with a multiplicity of other stories and that factors such as economic 
incentives or status claims can sometimes play a role in cases of individual involvement in terrorism. 
Setting up a universal explanation of radicalisation, as discussed in Chapter 2, has not been the aim 
of this research. Rather, the thesis makes a contribution to the literature on terrorism in East Africa 
by shifting the emphasis to dynamics of violent interaction between social actors as a major dimension 
of radicalisation in Kenya, bringing politics back into the analysis of terrorism in the country and 
shedding light on the role played by the state as an agent of mobilisation.   
Stressing the negative repercussions of violent counter-terrorism in Kenya does not mean 
denying the importance of military and police measures in the fight against Islamist militancy in East 
Africa. The threat posed by Al-Shabaab cannot be tackled without relying on resolute initiatives 
including security interventions to counter the penetration of militants and oust the group from its 
hideouts. Still, terrorism cannot be defeated when the approach implemented generates continuous 
incentives for radicalisation. The point here is that acting effectively is not a matter of finding a 
balance between counter-terrorism imperatives and objectives related to human rights and social 
stability. Rather, effective action requires aligning Kenyan security goals to human rights standards, 
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countering terrorist violence while tackling endemic corruption and healing (historical) fractures 
among social actors. Without addressing the political drivers of Islamist militancy and promoting a 
genuine process of pacification between the state and suspect groups, Nairobi risks having a long 
road ahead before terrorist networks will be dismantled and the fight against the ‘mujahedeen’ will 
be over.  
These insights have profound implications for US security efforts. Chapter 1 has shown how the 
scholarship on post-9/11 US security policies in Kenya has been broadly divided between studies 
stressing the benefits of US engagement in local security and a more critical strand of research 
emphasising negative repercussions of US activities in humanitarian and political terms. This work 
provides a contribution to such a literature by highlighting serious consequences of US policies for 
what concerns the rise of terrorism.  
As the evidence provided in the thesis shows, the adoption of a remote warfare strategy in the 
post-9/11 period has allowed US policy makers to contain costs in the fight against Islamist militancy 
in East Africa, turning Kenya into a surrogate to achieve aligned security objectives on the ground. 
Nairobi has been added to regional counter-terrorism initiatives, also becoming one of the major 
recipients of US bilateral security assistance on the African continent. Such a strengthening of US-
Kenya politico-military ties has played a role in the development of the local counter-terrorism 
architecture, increasing Kenyan security capabilities and contributing to the generation of specialised 
anti-terrorism forces. However, rather than erasing the local security threat, the US strategy has 
entailed serious consequences for the stability of the East African region. The establishment of a 
security partnership with Kenyan security authorities has enabled the latter to gain resources and 
room for manoeuvre to implement indiscriminate repression against suspect groups, unintentionally 
contributing to increasing radicalisation in the country.  
More is to be done to achieve peace and security in Kenya. As illustrated in Chapter 3 and 4, 
while investing in the Kenyan military and counter-terrorism machine, the Bush, Obama and Trump 
administrations almost left unaltered the flaws that jeopardise the local security system and generate 
support for Islamist militants. The echo of ancient conflicts and disputes has continued to reverberate 
among social actors in the country, affecting local perceptions and interests. Historical fractures have 
widened in the face of increasing insecurity, reshaping old feelings of hostility towards Muslims and 
ethnic Somalis. The effects of this process have intertwined with those of endemic corruption within 
the Kenyan security sector, resulting in a major intensification of human rights violations. Faced with 
such repercussions, US policy makers have occasionally sought to engage Kenyan security authorities 
in long-term programmes addressing social frictions and the abuse of power in the country. Yet, so 
far, despite Washington’s (ostensibly genuine) desire to redirect Kenyan policies and improve human 
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rights on the ground, most US efforts have continued to be directed towards the achievement of short-
term objectives in the fight against AQEA and Al-Shabaab, conceived as a prerequisite for any other 
major initiative. Human rights training for Kenyan forces and military-led social and development 
projects in vulnerable areas of the country have been the main instruments adopted to redress the 
effects of remote warfare on the ground. Nonetheless, however useful, such instruments cannot deal 
with the systemic nature of repression in Kenya, nor can they tackle the mechanism causing the abuse 
of US policies. On the contrary, they have generally ended up falling prey of the very same dynamics 
enabling local authorities to evade US pressure while repressing suspect groups.  
Regardless of whatever action may be taken by the US in the forthcoming years, the last two 
decades of counter-terrorism in the country highlight how any effective security strategy must start 
from acknowledging the limits of ‘fighting threats from a distance’ and, above all, the political causes 
of mobilisation into Islamist terrorism, identifying dynamics of violent interaction between the 
Kenyan state and the local Muslim and ethnic Somali communities as a critical factor determining 
the effect(iveness) of Washington’s indirect intervention. Without such a processes of identification, 
and a consequent reorientation of US policies in line with a greater sensitivity towards the local socio-
political context, the provision of support to Kenyan security authorities risks only adding fuel to 
local violence, inadvertently favouring Al-Shabaab’s activities on the ground.  
In line with what has been argued above in relation to Kenyan measures, the rethinking of US 
efforts in Kenya does not necessarily imply a withdrawal from more military and defence-oriented 
activities in the country. Security assistance has the potential to impact positively on the future of the 
war on terror in East Africa, helping Kenyan forces defeat the threat of Islamist militancy. Rather, 
US policy makers should make sure to build conditions fostering peace and emancipation before 
building local military capacity. This includes ensuring that the persistence (and expansion) of 
jihadism is not the expression of poor civil-military relationships generating resentment and anger 
among the most vulnerable sections of the population. Doing so would require greater US efforts to 
promote (long-term) initiatives increasing accountability among Kenyan forces and favouring 
reconciliation between the state and Muslim and ethnic Somali communities, even at the cost of 
making much of US military support conditional on their implementation. Short-term achievements 
in the fight against Al-Shabaab and its ally Al-Qaeda may prove to be insufficient in the long run if 
not flanked by concrete socio-political measures rooting out corruption and addressing inequality in 





As outlined in the methodological section of the introduction, a causal mechanism identified in a case 
study through process-tracing cannot automatically be assumed to operate in other cases composing 
the population of reference. This is a limitation intrinsic to case study research and the process-tracing 
method, which do not allow for cross-case inferences. However, such a limitation does not mean that 
the theoretical expectations of this work are to be discarded. On the contrary, they are valid as they 
have proven to apply at least to the case of Kenya. As discussed in the introduction, the main 
requirement of process-tracing “is simply that the generalization apply to the kind of case under 
analysis” (Mahoney 2012: 585), meaning that the theory is to be consider valid if within-case 
evidence suggests so, setting the ground for further research testing its ability to explain other cases 
in the population (see Van Evera 1997; Beach and Pedersen 2013). Along these lines, the findings of 
this work corroborate the research hypothesis, confirming its underlying theoretical framework as an 
innovative lens through which to capture the impact of post-9/11 US security policies on 
radicalisation in Africa. Such a lens does not make a definitive conclusion on the issue. Rather, to 
quote Gerring (2006: 85), it is more of a “hunch”, representing a first attempt to explore a new 
pathway for the study of American interventionism and the emergence of terrorism on the continent. 
Further studies should be undertaken to build and expand this pathway, investigating the proposed 
causal mechanism, with its underlying theory, in African states other than Kenya.  
Integrating elements from multiple and historically unconnected strands of research, the 
theoretical framework of this work sheds light on the way in which US security efforts intertwine 
with the social fabric of African states, giving voice to local communities by shifting the emphasis to 
local politics and pointing to dynamics of interaction among social actors as a critical dimension 
affecting the process of radicalisation. This shift, which has been inspired by the Critical Terrorism 
Studies (CTS) research orientation adopted, brings politics back to the centre of the analysis, 
conceiving terrorism as a form of political violence and contextualising cases of mobilisation to such 
violence into their landscape of meaning. In so doing, it allows for a holistic study of how US policies 
unintentionally contribute to increasing radicalisation on the continent, filling a longstanding gap in 
the literature by tracing the steps through which such policies are connected to a deterioration of local 
security.    
The theoretical framework suggests that post-9/11 US security policies in Africa entail major 
risks. Being driven by a problem-solving perspective on the war on terror that frames remote 
interventions based on the provision of indirect support to African security institutions as the major 
strategy to restore local stability, US policies overlook the way in which the status quo can play a 
crucial role in destabilising the system. The actions taken by African states can contribute to the rise 
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and expansion of terrorism, generating social frictions playing into the hands of potential agitators. 
Without appropriate precautions and a closer focus on the socio-political dynamics underlying the 
process of mobilisation, security efforts centred on African authorities as surrogates may cause 
blowback effects paradoxically jeopardising the achievement of the very goals that Washington aims 
to achieve. This is because, rather than allowing US policy makers to negotiate from a position of 
strength, remote warfare increases the leverage of African agents vis-à-vis their partner. As 
highlighted in the pages of this work, African actors are not passive agents merely executing US 
directives. On the contrary, they have a lot to gain from partnering with Washington and turning into 
frontline states in the war on terror. US counter-terrorism imperatives on the ground, along with its 
reluctance to intervene directly and fight enemies through the deployment of a considerable number 
of troops, enable African states to gain increasing resources and room for manoeuvre to evade 
sanctions while abusing American assistance.  
Such dynamics illustrate how ‘fighting threats from a distance’ is a double-edged sword. On the 
one hand, it allows the US to project its power in distant territories, containing economic costs as well 
as potential military and political repercussions associated with the maintenance of security divisions 
in the theatres of violence. On the other, however, it risks fuelling, or even triggering, socio-political 
dynamics on the ground dramatically increasing the costs and repercussions of US intervention.    
The first chapter of the thesis has shown how, while acknowledging potential negative 
implications of US indirect intervention, some authors have regarded the benefits of such intervention 
as outweighing the costs, arguing that security partnerships are a pragmatic and effective instrument 
enabling Washington to pursue the fight against terrorism in otherwise difficult environments. A 
similar argument has often resonated throughout the words of stakeholders, identifying 
disengagement from key allies as entailing detrimental consequences. As argued in the previous 
section in relation to post-9/11 US security policies in Kenya, this research does not advocate for 
disengagement. A complete withdrawal of US support from Africa would hardly ameliorate the 
situation in vulnerable states relying on external assistance to counter militants and would probably 
end up generating a void to be filled by other international powers seeking to fight their way into the 
continent (see Allen 2018). Nor does this research call for an increased reliance on direct forms of 
US intervention based on the deployment of military contingents in African states. To reiterate, US 
assistance has the potential to do good and alter the balance of power in fragile settings, promoting 
local ownership while providing African actors with crucial resources to strengthen the local security 
system and combat terrorism. Still, underestimating the impact of local politics on the effectiveness 
of US indirect intervention risks doing more damage than good.  
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Particularly, as the theoretical framework suggests, in African states relying on indiscriminate 
repression against suspect groups, the provision of US indirect support to fight the local terrorist 
threat remotely contributes to adding fuel to local dynamics of violent interaction between the state 
and the population, increasing radicalisation on the ground. The decreasing ability of US policy 
makers to exert control over the assistance provided leaves room for the integration of such assistance 
within the vicious cycle of violence by African forces. Here, Social Movement Theory (SMT) 
captures the effects caused by the protraction of violent encounters with national authorities. Rather 
than enabling the state to identify potential agitators hiding among the population, discouraging 
suspect groups from providing support to militants, indiscriminate repression has dramatic 
consequences, exacerbating the problem of terrorism. Repression widens the cleavage between 
political institutions and targeted communities, politicising their collective identity while fuelling a 
desire for revenge. In so doing, it generates sympathy towards militants fighting national authorities, 
increasing the resonance of the terrorist message by turning mobilisation into a vehicle to engage in 
collective action against the state. The social disconnect that is created as a consequence of such 
dynamics favours the establishment of connections with militants at the margins of the society, 
enabling aspiring recruits to get access to channels and resources for mobilisation.  
Reverting the mechanism linking post-9/11 US security policies to a deterioration of security in 
Africa is not just a matter of redirecting the efforts of local partners towards the achievement of 
common objectives, as suggested by studies reviewed in Chapter 1, or intensifying activities to 
professionalise African forces. Rather, as the Kenyan case shows, it requires acknowledging the more 
complex, historical and systemic nature of the flaws undermining counter-terrorism efforts on the 
ground and enabling the abuse of US policies. Local politics in African states is not made of 
ephemeral material that can be fixed with short-term and military-oriented forms of indirect 
intervention. On the contrary, it is the expression of the convergence of broader social, political and 
cultural processes in a given time and context, which can only be addressed and reoriented through 
long-term engagement. Without such an engagement, Washington risks investing efforts to merely 
perpetuate conditions increasing local vulnerability from terrorism, building partnerships that it 
cannot control and supporting actors whose agenda runs counter to emancipatory objectives on the 
ground. Along these lines, this work recommends US policy makers to reorient security policies in 
the continent so as to fight terrorism while effectively promoting processes of reconciliation and 
increasing accountability in socio-political environments plagued by repression and long-standing 
frictions between suspect groups and the state. This line of action would not only ensure that the 
achievement of short-term operational goals within the counter-terrorism framework is not done at 
the expenses of human rights and fundamental freedoms of African people, but also that pursuing 
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such goals do not unintentionally contribute to laying the foundations for the spread of further 
violence, generating never-ending conflicts on the ground.  
One way this could be done is by empowering local actors supporting peace and accountability 
while imposing stricter conditions for the allocation of military and defence aid. This last solution 
would inevitably cause some turbulence, generating tensions with repressive African governments 
and, in some contexts, even operational difficulties during counter-terrorism operations. However, 
promoting the alignment of security initiatives to human rights standards is a first and crucial step to 
safeguard humanitarian and development conditions in local theatres while moving effectively 
towards the eradication of terrorism.  
In any case, the reorientation of US policies cannot be initiated without a deeper understanding 
of the political drivers of radicalisation on the part of US policy makers. As highlighted in this work, 
US documents recognise that state violence and the curtailment of freedom can have potential 
repercussions undermining counter-terrorism efforts and favouring the resilience of terrorism. Such 
concerns must not take second place to the pragmatism required in the fight against Islamist violence 
in Africa. Instead, a greater effort has to be made to identify and understand the political conflicts 
underlying such violence. Treating terrorism on the continent as the expression of a political 
willingness generated by context-specific conditions does not mean providing jihadists with some 
sort of justification or overshadowing the more military imperatives of counter-terrorism. On the 
contrary, it entails rehumanising African militants, grasping the full spectrum of local dynamics of 
contention and, consequently, acquiring a greater knowledge regarding the type of intervention 
required, and its potential implications on the ground. In this sense, it means acting concretely to 
avoid the already mentioned identification of the African continent as a “key front in the next stage 
in the fight against terrorism” (quoted in Gardner 2020) by US officials turning into a dramatic self-
fulfilling prophecy in the near future.   
Besides providing guidelines to US policy makers, the theoretical insights of this work have 
implications for the study of US initiatives in Africa. As highlighted at the beginning of this section, 
the main contribution that the thesis makes to such scholarship stems from its interdisciplinary and 
innovative character, which allows it to explore the links between post-9/11 US security policies and 
radicalisation on the ground by developing a framework capturing the implication that local politics 
entails. For too long the study of US interventionism in the continent has remained unconnected from 
that of mobilisation into terrorism, prioritising a focus on the structure of the counter-terrorism 
architecture set up by Washington while forgetting that the effectiveness of such an architecture and, 
ultimately, its raison d'être, depend on its actual impact on local security. Detailed accounts of the 
character and opportunities of post-9/11 US security policies have advanced the academic debate on 
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American foreign policy in the era of global terrorism. However, they have done little to increase our 
knowledge about whether and how such policies contribute to the fight against terrorism in Africa. 
To do so, it is necessary to shift the focus of analysis, merging the study of US policies with that of 
African politics and radicalisation on the ground.  
The (apparent) distance that separates these units of analysis should not discourage academic 
inquiry. On the contrary, it should stimulate more efforts to integrate analytical tools from different 
research fields enabling appreciation of their intertwining. In this respect, as this work shows, 
adopting a CTS research orientation can help accommodate multiple perspectives within a single 
framework and formulate hypotheses regarding the causal connections between the subjects of study. 
As discussed in the introduction of the thesis, data on these subjects do not abound and are often 
difficult to be retrieved, as most of the activities concerning (counter-)terrorism in Africa occur out 
of the public eye in contexts characterised by high levels of violence. Still, triangulating between 
different documentary sources can enable the researcher to overcome potential difficulties and 
mitigate the impact of access problems. Finally, the evidence collected can be organised and 
examined by using a process-tracing method, which allows us to measure and evaluate the 
hypothesised causality.   
This work hopes to serve as an encouragement and a call for more holistic and interdisciplinary 
examinations of the impact of post-9/11 US security policies in Africa. Kenya does not stand alone 
among the states that in the last two decades have presented favourable conditions for the occurrence 
of the causal mechanism outlined in the thesis. Several other countries on the continent have 
experienced US military and security initiatives to fight terrorism associated with increasing levels 
of state violence and radicalisation. A notable example is Nigeria, where the battle against Boko 
Haram has escalated since the late 2000s. Still, even states in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region 
receiving considerable amounts of US support have often relied on controversial measures to counter 
the rise of terrorism and defeat local militant groups. Studies focusing on these countries would 
contribute to the development and consolidation of the proposed theoretical framework, providing 
important touchstones and paving the way for cross-case analysis. Such studies would require 
conducting new operationalisations of the mechanism, so as to identify its case-specific 
manifestations. Most of all, however, they would require embracing a de-exceptionalised view of 
terrorism that acknowledges the context-dependent and political nature of Islamist violence in Africa 
rather than labelling it as the mere expression of an irreconcilable desire for destruction. Moving in 
this direction would bring major benefits to the discipline, advancing understanding of the US-led 
war on terror by exploring its concrete effects on the dynamics that nurture the Islamist threat on the 
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ground. Ultimately, it would contribute to advancing peace and security on the continent, working 
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